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Introduction to the Portfolio
The discipline of counselling psychology has been described as fragmentary and 
disparate (Strawbridge and Woolfe, 1996), encompassing a number of theoretical and 
methodological approaches and a range of epistemological stances. This reflects a 
dynamic and evolving profession that questions the nature and place of psychology 
and of psychotherapeutic practice within its many contexts (Woolfe, 1996). 
Additionally, in its concern to value the therapeutic relationship as a meaningful 
transactional encounter, there has been a focus upon the therapists’ role in the delivery 
of psychotherapeutic services. The diversity of theoretical stances possible within 
counselling psychology is reflected within this portfolio. The Academic, Therapeutic 
and Research Dossiers all demonstrate a familiarity with a range of theoretical and 
methodological approaches, together with the ability to draw upon and make relevant 
those approaches in clinical practice. However, the dominant epistemological stance 
taken throughout this portfolio is social constructionist. This is particularly apparent 
in the Research Dossier, which adopts that perspective in one form or another in all of 
the three works in this section. My interest in social constructionism developed from 
the women’s studies courses I took as part of my undergraduate degree, where much 
of the focus was upon deconstructing the gender assumptions that underpin modernist 
thinking.
Immediately prior to taking that degree I had been the editor of a trade journal for 
those working with people who required residential and nursing care, primarily the 
elderly. Concurrent with my undergraduate studies I arranged conferences for 
residential care managers. Many of those speaking at the conferences and writing for 
the journal were psychologists whose interests were directed towards the improvement 
of the social conditions of people living in residential care. For instance, they tried to 
persuade care managers to provide residents with a key to their own rooms, something 
they had been reluctant to do, fearing that those in their care would lock themselves in 
or be unable to remember where they had put them. It seemed to me that these 
psychologists were working to encourage carers to break away from the traditionally 
restrictive codes regulating care homes and to find and use greater humanity in their 
work. I could see that, in the main, their interventions benefited both carers and
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residents and it was deeply satisfying for me to be a part of that process. Having had 
such an amenable taste of psychology, I wanted more and thus, although having 
acquired a university degree several years previously, I embarked on my studies.
Throughout some of the time I worked on the trade journal, I also attended 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. This was a wholly positive experience that helped me 
to flourish and develop my potential in many areas. It too gave me an interest in 
pursing an area of psychology that would facilitate similar processes in other people. 
I was attracted to counselling psychology because it looks beyond the medical model 
of psychotherapeutic practice in its consideration of the client/therapist relationship 
and it endorses a humanistic value system of empathic, positive regard towards its 
clients. I have endeavoured to uphold those principles throughout my training and 
they are evident in the fabric of the work presented here and in particular in the 
Therapeutic Practice Dossier.
The cultural and historical environment in which I am embedded has influenced the 
values that I bring to my practice and to my research and their contribution to the 
approach taken in this body of work is undoubtedly significant. That I am a middle 
class, white woman who grew up in mid-Canada and who has experienced several 
previous careers will have an impact on the way that I pursue my research interests, 
perceive my clients and conduct myself within the institutional contexts that I now 
work. Before immigrating to the United Kingdom, I completed a media studies 
degree and subsequently worked as a journalist and film producer for a major 
Canadian television network. The understandings and perspectives that I now hold 
have been considerably influenced by this background and the experiences that are 
attached to it, just as my work on the trade journal has influenced the view that I have 
of elderly people. Between completing my undergraduate psychology degree and 
undertaking this doctoral training I spent a year working with women who struggled 
with distressed eating practices. That experience too is apparent within this portfolio 
and again, this is particularly apparent within the Research Dossier.
The portfolio begins with a selection of four essays, contained within the Academic 
Dossier. The first two essays illustrate a grasp of psychodynamic and cognitive
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behavioural (CBT) principles respectively and to some extent they relate theoretical 
issues to matters of clinical practice. Additionally, the CBT paper considers macro 
level concerns about the professional identities of counselling psychologists and the 
emphasis we have placed upon the importance of the therapeutic relationship in our 
development as a specialist discipline. Both CBT and psychodynamic approaches 
adopt a realist epistemological stance and, although I am critical of such 
methodologies later in the portfolio, I have included these works as a means of 
demonstrating my knowledge of their foundational principles and the contribution of 
their theoretical perspectives to contemporary practice. The third paper in this 
collection presents a discussion of Billig’s (1997) notion of the dialogic unconscious 
and it introduces my interpretation of how this concept might be made therapeutically 
relevant. The final piece of work in this section takes a critical stance on Freudian 
interpretations of ‘reality’ and the way in which the therapeutic endeavour can 
pathologise distressed individuals.
The Therapeutic Practice Dossier introduces the context of my clinical work and 
describes other therapeutic work undertaken on placements. The final clinical paper 
provides an account of the integration of theory and practice into my therapeutic 
practice with respect to my experience of being placed within a number of NHS 
contexts that required adherence to a particular model. It discusses my strengths and 
limitations as a therapist and the use I have made of supervision and it traces the 
history of my personal and professional development as a counselling psychologist.
The Research Dossier begins with a review of literature concerning eating disorders 
spanning from the Medieval saints through to the present day and it is followed by a 
discourse analytic study of therapist and interviewer constructions of Anorexia 
Nervosa (AN). Although these two pieces of work were not written in consecutive 
years of study, their subject matter is linked and they are therefore most appropriately 
and logically placed together. The final research paper is again a discourse analytic 
study also concerned with therapeutic endeavours, however it is concerned with the 
study of what has been termed by Billig (1997) the ‘dialogic unconscious’. All three 
of these papers adopt a social constructionist approach and therefore an 
epistemological coherence is maintained throughout this research profile. Although
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the final two papers utilise a discourse analytic methodology for the analysis of data, 
there are considerable distinctions between the two approaches. In the study related to 
AN, the preliminary stages of analysis, especially selection procedures, were guided 
by Potter and Wetherell (1987), whereas later readings were grounded in Parker’s 
(1999) critical approach to the analysis of discourse. This differs fundamentally from 
any approach that is concerned with the dialogic unconscious because Billig’s (1997) 
concept requires modification to the principles of discursive psychology upon which 
traditional discourse analytic methodologies are founded.
All three projects in this Dossier consider the implications of their conclusions for 
theory and psychotherapeutic treatment. The literature review examines the social and 
historical foundations of eating disorders based on a selection of historical literature 
concerning constructions of self-starvation from the Middle Ages through to the first
•  •  •  f l irecorded diagnosis of AN in the 18 century. ‘Feminist’ psychoanalytic approaches 
to eating disorders are examined and criticised for their reliance on concepts and 
practices that oppress and subjugate women. A social constructionist, narrative 
approach to therapy is considered to be significantly less problematic for feminist 
therapeutic practitioners working with women with eating disorders.
In the paper Size Matters: Psychotherapeutic Discourses o f Anorexia Nervosa, the 
focus is upon therapists’ accounts of AN and their own roles in its treatment. The 
research also examined how accounts of AN were jointly produced in therapist and 
interviewer conversational interactions. Eight therapists were interviewed using a 
semi-structured format and transcriptions of these conversations were discourse 
analysed. Three extracts from three different therapists were used in the final 
analysis. In extract 1, the therapist drew upon a psychoanalytic discourse and 
constructed her client’s mother as being overly enmeshed and emotionally reliant 
upon her anorexic daughter. Extract 2 concerned the contrasting of a successful with 
an unsuccessful therapy by the therapist, who constructed one of her client’s as being 
overly enmeshed with her. Finally, in Extract 3 a male client who was unable to 
utilise therapy was compared with a female client who successfully recovers from her 
anorexia.
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The Dossier concludes with the paper, How Rude Can You Get, The Dialogic 
Unconscious in Therapy, which links the seemingly oppositional domains of 
discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory. It employs the Freudian notion of 
repression to explain why certain utterances are privileged over others and it suggests 
that discursive acts have repressive as well as expressive functions. According to 
Billig (1997, 1999) the temptation to be rude is so routinely repressed that an 
unconscious rhetorical skill is acquired in order to facilitate politeness (also known as 
‘everyday morality’, Garfinkel, 1967) within everyday conversations. Six therapy 
sessions - three from each of two clients - were discourse analysed in order to examine 
the utility of the concept of the dialogic unconscious. These sessions were examined 
for instances of client’s talk about everyday morality and for evidence of discursive 
repressions. The research identified repression as a feature of psychotherapeutic talk 
and found that it was implicated in client’s conceptualisations of their perceived 
psychological difficulties. It was concluded that the dialogic unconscious could be 
observed in therapist/client interactions. This study therefore establishes a research 
basis for the views that I have expressed in the essay The Dialogic Unconscious: The 
Missing Link or a Contradiction in Terms?, contained within the Academic Dossier.
In addition to providing fresh insights into both historical and contemporary social 
constructions of eating disorders and in particular Anorexia Nervosa, this portfolio 
provides a useful platform for the adaptation of the discourse analytic practices of 
discursive psychology. It also affords psychodynamic practitioners with a helpful 
means of incorporating a social constructionist ideology and perspective into their 
clinical endeavours.
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Academic Dossier
This dossier contains a selection of four academic papers submitted over the three 
years of my psychotherapeutic training. The first three papers are diverse in their 
approach and discuss a range of theoretical models of therapy including 
psychodynamic, cognitive behavioural and the ‘dialogic unconscious’ respectively. 
The ‘dialogic unconscious’ is a notion that links psychodynamic theory with social 
constructionism and the submitted paper includes a personal account of how I 
incorporate the concept into my therapeutic practice. The final essay contained within 
this dossier addresses issues related to the ‘Context of Counselling Psychology’ and in 
particular it concerns Freud’s conceptualisation of ‘fantasy’ and ‘reality’ and how this 
has affected contemporary psychotherapeutic practices.
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Countertransference, the Essence of the Therapeutic Relationship
“The patient’s hook catches its fish in the analyst’s unconscious and reels it in
Searles, 1958: 247
The analytic relationship is commonly acknowledged to involve two primary and 
inter-related processes: those related to transference and those related to 
countertransference. The latter will be the central concern of this paper. The above 
quote is an apt reference to the phenomena of countertransference made by Searles 
(1958) and later noted by Young (2000), who believes that the fundamental role of 
countertransference in the therapeutic relationship is insufficiently recognised by 
many psychoanalytic practitioners. Moreover, Young believes that 
countertransference not only provides the basis of knowledge for what occurs between 
patient and therapist but is also “the basic process in all human communication and 
knowing” (1990: 12). To begin to understand the term countertransference it may be 
helpful to briefly discuss the concept of transference and to identify its role in the 
therapeutic encounter and ultimately in the psychological healing process. The crucial 
relationship between transference, as experienced by the patient and 
countertransference, as experienced by the therapist, will then be explored and 
discussed with particular reference to the clinical practice of this writer.
In 1910 Freud first characterised the transference of emotions and experiences 
founded in early childhood occurrences and fantasies and re-experienced within the 
analytic relationship as transference neurosis, or as a “compulsion to repeat” (Freud, 
1920: 229). He believed that transference could take either of two forms - it could 
cause the person under analysis to experience the analyst in precisely the same way as 
he had experienced an important figure from the past; or, he could replay the analytic 
experience in such a way that a wished for relationship with an important figure from 
the past was enacted. Either way, Freud proposed that the re-enactment compulsion 
was undertaken not as a conscious process but as an unconscious attempt to overcome 
the relational disturbances and imbalances founded in early childhood. The 
psychoanalytic method that Freud evolved is therefore primarily based upon his
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theory of the mind and also on his understanding of the developmental mechanisms of 
childhood.
It was Freud’s belief that by making the client’s unconscious processes known to them 
through analytic interpretation, they could develop new, more positive and functional 
ways of relating. He claimed: “If we succeed, and we usually can, on enlightening 
the patient on the true nature of the phenomenon of transference, we shall have struck 
a powerful weapon out of the hand of his (sic) resistance and shall have converted 
dangers into gains” (Freud, 1940: 177). Gradually Freud moved from the view that 
the analyst should act as a mirror, or scientific investigator without evidence of a 
personality, into a conviction that the analytic relationship could be used as a means of 
understanding the patient’s unconscious motivations and needs (Kahn, 1997). 
Encouraging and magnifying the transferential experience of the patient in such a way 
that analytic interpretations could be facilitated, he believed, achieved this. However, 
he remained firm throughout his career that countertransference, the unconscious 
communications emanating from the analyst toward the patient, could be eliminated 
through the personal analytic work undertaken during training analysis.
Perhaps because of Freud’s esteemed position within the analytic community, 
amongst whom he was known as The Professor, it was many years before the utility of 
countertransference was fully explored or recognised. Paula Heimann’s seminal 1950 
paper On Countertransference is widely acknowledged to have structurally changed 
the working practices of psychoanalysts, who began to interpret their own thoughts 
and feelings towards their patients as possibly originating from the complex interplay 
between the unconscious communications of the two people in the consulting room, 
the patient and the therapist. Principally Heimann’s (1950) view differed from 
previous conceptualisations of countertransference in three discrete ways. First, it 
proposed that the entirety of the analyst’s feelings towards her patients could be 
considered as countertransference phenomenon; second and essentially, that 
countertransference could be utilised as a valuable diagnostic tool in the discernment 
of the patient’s unconscious processes; and third, that it could act as a response to the 
patient’s transferential feelings in a way not dissimilar to Klein’s (1946) 
conceptualisation of the process of projective identification in analysis.
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Working with schizophrenic and paranoiac patients, Melanie Klein identified a 
phenomenon that often appeared to occur in patient-therapist dyads, and in particular 
with seriously troubled clientele. She suggested that there are parts of the self that the 
patient finds so disturbing that they cannot be contained and accepted as part of the 
self. These aspects are therefore split off from the self and projected into others, and, 
in the case of therapy it is the therapist who then assimilates the projected trait or 
traits. Consequently, the patient identifies the projection as having originated in the 
analyst. Segal succinctly states, “In projective identification parts of the self and 
internal objects are split off and projected into the external object, which then 
becomes possessed by, controlled and identified with the projected parts” (1973: 27). 
Young suggests that the response of the therapist to the projection is not one which is 
wholly alien or external to her experience but that they arise “from the general 
repertoire of that person’s potential feelings and gets (sic) exaggerated and expressed” 
(2000: 3).
My own first recognisable experience of projective identification occurred very early 
in my training when I was being observed by a psychoanalytic psychotherapist whilst 
conducting my first assessment on placement. However, I was not unaccustomed to 
undertaking assessments because the previous year I was on a placement at a centre 
working with eating disorders and my training had mainly focused on assessment 
issues. The client attending this particular assessment was a woman with two young 
children who sought therapy because of marital difficulties. I began by following the 
structure of the assessment format and I asked questions concerning her current 
difficulties, which she attributed solely to her husband. When asked about her early 
family history she recalled details of her husband’s early family life and when asked 
about any other personal biographical details she responded by providing details of 
her husband’s biography. Questions concerning her children were met with concern 
for herself and the terrible predicament she faced due to her husband’s inhumane 
treatment of her. About half an hour into the assessment I was overcome by a 
sensation of panic. My pen ran out of ink. I froze. I was overcome by the feeling that 
I’d got the wrong patient and, probably quite significantly, that I wanted someone to 
rescue me from her cold unwillingness to engage with me in the therapeutic process. 
My response to her was to become so remote and distant that I could see little point in
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even beginning a relationship, let alone trying to sustain one. A more experienced or 
insightful practitioner might have been able to recognise this consulting room 
dynamic as an instance of projective identification. Although I wondered what had 
happened to deskill me in such a dramatic fashion I was unable to work with the 
projection in order to understand the feelings of the client and she left the interview, 
and to my knowledge the psychology service, never to return again.
Projective identification is one form of countertransference which finds its origins in 
the communications of the patient and that is why the opening quote by Searles 
concerning the patient reeling in the unconscious of the analyst is so appropriate to 
this phenomenon. Once the projection is identified however, the client’s hook is no 
longer quite so barbed and the analyst’s unconscious is free to float off and study the 
bait. It is this study that provides the analyst with the essential tools of insight and 
interpretation that, ultimately, are of such use to the client. Fortunately, I have had 
other experiences of projective identification, which I was able to utilise in the work, 
and, with the help of my supervisor, was able to work through in order to get a flavour 
of the client’s experience. One such case was a 38-year-old man who had been 
diagnosed with epilepsy at the age of 11. He had never had an intimate relationship 
with a woman and he said that he felt that this was an impossibility given his illness.
During several of our sessions I had a persistent but not overwhelming feeling that I 
might faint, although there was no reason why I should and I had never fainted before 
in any other circumstances. This so preoccupied me on one occasion that I was unable 
to attend to the session in the way that I normally would, however, I noted this at the 
time and asked if he was concerned that he might have a fit while we were meeting. 
He responded that it had been on his mind all that day and during some of our 
previous sessions. He said that if he did lose consciousness in front of me it would 
mean the end of our relationship because he could never allow himself to be seen in 
such a vulnerable way. He said that it was akin to being demasculinised. Fortunately, 
we were able to use this information to look back at snapshots of his development, and 
in particular to the circumstances of his early adolescence when he was diagnosed 
with epilepsy, to understand why he might attach such feelings of impotence to it.
11
Once the client’s fear of having a fit in my presence was communicated, my own 
concerns about fainting gradually evaporated.
In the first of the examples of countertransference provided, the experience was 
unhelpful to the client and in the second, it provided an aid to the client’s greater self- 
understanding. Racker (1957, 1968) identified both of these types of 
countertransference as impacting upon the therapeutic relationship. In the case of 
beneficial countertransference, Racker (1957, 1968) described an approximate union 
or identity between the experiences, impulses and defences of both the client and the 
therapist. He called this concordant identification and he believed that it resulted in 
empathic insights, which were facilitated by the analyst’s understanding of his own 
feelings towards his client. Racker (1957, 1968) also discussed a less useful type of 
countertransference, which he called complementary. This type occurs when the 
client represents an important object from the analyst’s past and the analyst treats the 
client according to his own previous experience of that object. This would, of course, 
mean that the analyst’s ability to empathise with the client was blocked by his own 
material. Racker (1957, 1968) believed that complementary and concordant 
countertransferences were closely linked in that any reproduction of the analyst’s past 
experience that was brought into the analytic situation would occur as a response to 
stimulus from the client.
This attempt to connect the two types of countertransference arose from a debate 
within the psychoanalytic community concerning how much or how little of the 
therapist’s feelings should be considered as countertransference. It was Racker’s view 
that the totality of experience should inform the therapists’ work and this is the 
conceptualisation that is most common in contemporary practice. It should also be 
noted that unless one has a firm grasp of Racker’s terminology the phrases he uses can 
be quite confusing and a number of clinicians have therefore subsequently modified 
the terms whilst leaving the underlying descriptions intact. One such practitioner is 
Kahn (1997) who simplifies the description of the concordant type as “useful” 
countertransference and the complementary type as “obstructive” countertransference. 
In practice, there are many ways in which countertransference can deter, hinder or 
otherwise frustrate positive therapeutic advancement and it therefore requires of the
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therapist vigilant sensitivity to their own feelings, senses, attitudes and prejudices. 
This may be particularly difficult for trainee therapists, like myself, who occasionally 
feel flooded by both academic material and novel clinical experience.
For those who wish to enter into psychodynamic practice, this points to the need for a 
training analysis, which Freud passionately held to be vital to the budding therapist’s 
suitability to practice. In a paper that may have foreshadowed future understandings 
of countertransference, Strachey touched on the discomfort that a therapist may 
experience when leaving herself open to the vicissitudes of the client’s unconscious 
communications. He warned that “the giving of a mutative interpretation is a crucial 
act for the analyst as well as for the patient and he is exposing himself to some great 
danger in doing so” (1934: 159). This, he believed, is because the client’s id-energy is 
active, actual and unambiguously aimed directly at the analyst and therefore taps into 
the relationship that the analyst has with her own unconscious. Personal analysis 
facilitates therapists’ attunement to their own early scripts, developmental processes 
and internal objects so that they can discern what of the therapeutic material belongs 
to them and what has flowed from the client and then utilise that information in the 
client’s best interest.
It is perhaps relevant to note that this principle in not held in such regard in other areas 
of psychological practice, for instance in clinical psychology, where it is not thought 
necessary for practitioners to undergo their own therapy prior to becoming qualified to 
treat other people. If one accepts Young’s (2000) position that countertransference is 
alive in all human transactions - which incidentally is a view shared by others such as 
Sullivan, who, in 1953, described it as parataxic distortion - then surely it would be of 
benefit to any qualified clinician to have a thorough understanding of its effects. 
Perhaps then all trainee psychologists and psychotherapists should be required to 
experience some therapy themselves.
When an understanding of countertransference phenomena is lacking in the therapist, 
several unhelpful situations can arise. Analysts may under or over-emphasise issues 
according to their own scripts. For instance, a therapist who is sensitive to feminist 
issues may overlook the bullying a man endures at the hands of his female employer
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or conversely, the same therapist may stress aspects of what she views as inequalities 
in a female patient’s marriage, which wouldn’t otherwise have been of concern to that 
patient. In my own practice such a distortion might have occurred when a female 
patient told me that she had left her two children and her husband ten years previously 
to pursue a career which she felt was of greater importance to her than her family. 
Although I was quite taken aback at this revelation, the woman expressed no remorse 
or regret and attended therapy in order to come to terms with the work-related stress 
she was experiencing. It was necessary for me to note that we ascribed to different 
codes of behaviour and that it was unhelpful to judge her by my standards. Of course 
there may be times when the clinician feels unable to work with moral differences, as 
perhaps in the cases of working with paedophiles or violent criminals.
The moral position of the therapist is extremely relevant to countertransference in the 
sense that it will at least in part be determined by superego functioning. According to 
Money-Kryle (1956), if the severity of the therapist’s superego is too great then she 
will be unable to tolerate her own failings and limitations. The therapist might then 
develop a sense of guilt or defend against such feelings by attributing blame to the 
client. In either case, the therapist’s ability to utilise the countertransference would be 
impaired and she may experience a sense of frustration or stupidity when there is a 
disruption to her concentration during a session. Thus, Money-Kryle suggests that the 
therapist’s three-fold task begins with the awareness of defensive strategies in oneself, 
moves onto recognition of the client’s role in arousing those defence mechanisms, and 
finally, there should be a conscious awareness of the effect this is having on the 
therapist.
Vigilant attendances to one’s own inner voice concerning feeling states about the 
client are essential to the use of countertransference. Pick believes that “constant 
projecting by the patient into the analyst is the essence of analysis” (1985: 37). The 
fundamental occupation of therapy is attendance to the countertransference in order to 
discover what lies beneath the client’s transference so that mutative interpretations can 
be made. Countertransference, therefore, is the essence of the therapeutic 
relationship.
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The Therapist as an Instrument of Change
In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not dependent upon the therapeutic system 
o f delivery but on the active components that directly challenge the client’s faulty 
appraisals. Discuss.
The above statement concerns the role of the therapist as an instrument of change in 
the client’s cognitive and behavioural functioning. According to Clark, “the role of 
the cognitive therapist is to offer corrective information and experiences that realign 
individuals’ interpretations so that they arrive at a more adaptive understanding of 
their personal reality” (1995: 156). What, then, is involved in the therapist’s offering 
of this “corrective” information and experience? Is it the therapeutic system of 
delivery that leads to “more adaptive understanding” or is it the active components 
drawn upon in psychotherapeutic work that produce the beneficial effects?
In order to answer these questions, I will first define the key terms ‘cognitive therapy’ 
and ‘therapeutic system of delivery’. A brief historical overview of Aaron Beck’s 
(1976) development of cognitive theory and practice will then be outlined. This 
overview is essential to the discussion because the questions raised by the above 
statement move beyond the sole domain of cognitive therapy and reach to the very 
heart of contemporary debates concerning the delivery of psychological services to 
those in need. From this conceptual background will follow a review of research 
pertaining to the processes and agents speculated to be fundamental conditions of 
therapeutic change. This paper will demonstrate that the therapeutic system of 
delivery is itself a highly significant active component of change and that therapists 
use it in order to challenge clients’ faulty appraisals. Moreover, it will be shown that 
the utilization of the therapeutic relationship is a practical skill that facilitates 
beneficial changes in clients’ functioning.
Because the statement, and the debates that arise from it, strike beyond important 
considerations about how best to effect change in those who seek or require it, they 
enter the realm of the political and the historical. They are debates about how we 
have defined ourselves as psychologists in the past; about how we hope to be 
perceived as psychologists in the present and they have, of course, repercussions for
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the future delivery of psychological services. In that sense, the changing face of 
psychology will have implications for its practitioners and for those who utilize their 
services as it moves toward the development of more adaptive practices and better- 
deployed therapeutic services in the future. This paper will therefore conclude with a 
discussion of the important issues raised by the above statement because they concern 
the profession of counselling psychology as it seeks to forge a public identify in this 
post-modern, post-structural era of conflicting theoretical ideologies regarding the 
very nature of science itself.
In its traditional form, cognitive therapy is an umbrella term for those therapies that 
offer a highly structured, problem-solving approach to clients’ difficulties. 
Treatments are normally short-term and sessions are focused on assisting clients to 
identify, and subsequently to modify, their maladaptive and dysfunctional thought 
processes. Cognitive therapists believe that those who suffer from psychological 
distress or disorder have developed a system of faulty appraisals that maintain their 
disturbed or distressed psychological states through the selective abstraction of 
negative thoughts. Diaries are often kept in which clients note their negative 
automatic thoughts and attempts are made both during and outside of therapy sessions 
to challenge those thoughts with more positive, adaptive ways of thinking (Beck, 
1996; Beck et al., 1979; Hawton et al., 1989).
The term cognitive therapy is often interchangeable with Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT) as cognitive clinicians believe that adjustments to maladaptive 
behaviours will follow from, or arise concurrently with, more adaptive thought 
processes (Milton, 2001). Sometimes this change is speculated to occur in the reverse 
order and more adaptive behavioural patterns, particularly those occurring through 
environmental manipulations, can result in the modification of cognitive patterns 
(Hobbs, 1962). Thus, the skilled cognitive therapist relies on her training and 
experience of maladaptive, and sometimes distorted, thought processes in order to 
meet the often-creative challenge of enabling the client to re-evaluate faulty appraisals 
in favour of more functional means of thinking and, by extension, of being.
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The therapeutic system of delivery employed for the purpose of advancing this work 
could refer to two fundamental psychotherapeutic concepts -  the therapeutic 
relationship, often called the therapeutic or working alliance in cognitive therapy 
(although in practice the terms relationship and alliance are often used 
interchangeably); and the therapeutic frame, aspects of which are sometimes described 
in cognitive terms as ‘therapist proxemics’ (Goldstein, 1974; Morris & Magrath, 
1983). Because the contribution of the relationship to the therapeutic endeavour is the 
more rigorously debated of the two notions, it will form the primary focus of this 
paper. In cognitive therapy, the relationship is often defined as the collaborative 
partnership developed between therapist and client (Jacobson, 1989; Lambert, 1983; 
Overholser & Silverman, 1998). It is a relationship based on the notion of 
collaborative empiricism in which the client and therapist work together to test out the 
client’s predictions, assumptions and beliefs about himself and the world (Amkoff, 
1983; Clark, 1995; Horvarth & Greenberg, 1994).
However, the therapeutic relationship has not always been, and is not always now, 
conceptualised in those terms by psychologists. Historically, the therapeutic 
relationship arose as a fundamental and critical concern of psychoanalysis (Freud, 
1913). Freudian theory postulates that the hidden or secret - and potentially 
problematic - desires of the child begin with the Oedipal Complex at the age of about 
three when undesirable wishes or impulses are repressed from conscious thought. It is 
these repressions that form the basis of ongoing dysfunctional behaviours as the client 
is believed to respond in therapy according to a pattern of behaviour established in 
relationship prototypes learned in early childhood. However, the client is said to be 
unaware that they have developed these relationship structures and, often because of 
childhood trauma, they are believed to repress the knowledge of their own defensive 
functioning. Theoretically, when these relational styles are presented to the client they 
bring greater understanding of the nature of their own behaviour and a choice can be 
made as to whether or not to initiate change. Ultimately, the central task of 
psychoanalytic or psychodynamic therapy lies in uncovering what has been repressed 
and buried in unconscious thought.
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Differences in the systems of delivery used by cognitive and psychodynamic 
therapists therefore converge upon the centrality of the relationship as an instrument 
of therapeutic change. As an element of change, the emphasis placed upon the 
relationship by individual cognitive therapists is, at least to some degree, elective and 
idiosyncratic and thus is likely to vary considerably from practitioner to practitioner; 
but, the overwhelming majority of psychodynamic practitioners will regard their 
relationship with the client as the site of richest reward in their quest to enhance their 
clients’ lives. This disparity of approaches did not arise as an accidental by-product of 
disparate psychological enquiries. Rather, many of those initially involved in the 
development of the cognitive model of treatment first trained as psychoanalytic 
practitioners (Milton, 2001).
Aaron T. Beck, who could be described as the founding father of CBT1, was one such 
clinician. Following his training as a psychoanalyst, he became disillusioned with the 
emphasis that psychoanalysis placed upon infantile psychological development and 
unconscious processes (Milton, 2001). Additionally, Beck (1976) sought to expand 
methods that were outside of the treatment realm of behaviour therapy and which 
imposed much greater focus on the client’s immediate problems than did
•  9  •  •  •psychoanalysis. He took as a starting point for his therapeutic developments the 
assessment of his own depression and somatic phobias (Weishaar, 1993). Beck 
(1976) proposed a theory of emotional disorders that detailed the mechanisms actively 
maintaining problematic cognitions and behaviours, together with a manualized 
system of treatment that offered specific and detailed instructions about how to 
challenge them. He therefore relocated the focus of psychotherapy from more global, 
complex relational issues onto the practical management of symptoms occurring in the 
everyday lives of those affected by psychological difficulties. Speculations about 
deep, inner psychic processes like the unconscious drive to repeat relational patterns 
were eschewed in favour of the use of pragmatic techniques in which therapists could 
take a ‘hands-on’ approach to problems, offering information, guidance and advice to 
their clients.
1 Other important contributors to the model were Albert Ellis (1972) and Donald Meichenbaum (1985).
2 Although at this time behaviour therapists had experienced some success in the treatment of phobias, 
they had made little impact in other areas of psychological disorder, like depression. See Rachman, 
(1996) for a discussion of the contribution of behavioural techniques to cognitive therapy.
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From its early development, theories of CBT drew upon the ‘information processing’ 
model of memory that influenced psychological investigations of the time. This, 
together with its advantages as a model that required relatively fewer resources than 
psychodynamic therapy, was perhaps why many psychologists so enthusiastically 
embraced it. Less training was needed in order to practice CBT and courses of 
treatment could be completed in weeks or months rather than in years. In addition to 
being a cost-effective approach to psychological care, it also had particular appeal in 
the public health care sector because it could easily be incorporated into the medical 
model of treatment. Outcome studies have shown that CBT is an efficient and 
efficacious treatment and, according to Salkovskis, “cognitive therapy has become the 
single most important and best validated psychotherapeutic approach” (1996: xiii). 
Further, he concluded that Beck’s understanding of emotional problems and his focus 
on symptomology represented a paradigm shift that had important repercussions for 
psychotherapeutic practice and that now, ‘the paradigm has truly shifted’ (1996: xiii).
So, are the research results really so unequivocal as has been suggested and if so, what 
makes CBT such an effective form of treatment? Consistently, meta-analyses 
comparing different forms of psychotherapy have shown little actual variation in 
therapeutic gains across treatments but appreciable gains for psychotherapy compared 
with control groups (see Luborsky et al., 1999; Smith & Glass, 1977; Stiles, et al., 
1986; United States Department of Health and Human Sciences, 1993). Following 
their meta-analysis, Bergen and Garfield (1994) concluded that, “We have to face the 
fact that in a majority of studies, different approaches to the same symptoms, (e.g. 
depression) show little difference in efficacy” (1994: 822). It therefore seems highly 
probable that the most beneficial components of psychotherapy are those common to 
all forms of therapeutic treatment.
Further research into the variables consistent across all of the major therapeutic 
approaches has shown that the working alliance is probably the single most important 
factor in therapeutic outcome (Horvarth & Symonds, 1991; Luborsky et al., 1999; 
Orlinsky & Howard, 1986; Stiles et al., 1986). Horvarth and Greenberg have been 
particularly interested in the study of the therapeutic alliance believing that, “the 
alliance is currently the best model of the in-therapy, pan-theoretical process variable”
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(1994: 2). The majority of practicing therapists today, with some notable exceptions, 
accept that a generally positive working alliance is a necessary condition of 
therapeutic change. Amongst those exceptions, for instance, is Albert Ellis who 
developed Rational Emotive Therapy. Ellis (1999) disagrees with the research 
findings mainly because of the self-report measures employed in most of the 
investigations into the working alliance. He argues that merely because clients report 
feeling better does not indicate that they actually are significantly better. In Ellis’s 
view psychological improvement does not occur unless the main presenting symptom 
is reduced, together with other related symptoms. This improvement in 
symptomology should be maintained for several years even when the client 
experiences major and severe adversity in their lives, according to Ellis (1999).
However, Ellis’s (1999) assertions do not take account of research evidence indicating 
that therapists whose qualities of warmth, genuineness and empathic understanding 
achieve more positive therapeutic results (Bachelor, 1991; Foreman & Mannar, 1985; 
Luborsky et al., 1985; Marziali, 1984). A number of alliance scales have been 
developed for the purposes of isolating specific alliance components and these include 
the Penn Scales (Luborsky, 1976), the VPP/VTAS (Gomes-Schwartz, 1978); the TAS 
(Marziali et al., 1981), the CALPAS/CALTRAS (Gaston, 1991) and the WA1 
(Kokotovic & Tracey, 1990). Common to these scales, two components were found 
to be the best predictors of positive therapeutic outcome. They are the personal 
attachment or bond established between the therapist and the client, and the 
collaboration or willingness of both parties to invest in the process of the therapy. 
Jacobson has concluded that, “the therapist-client relationship is often systematically 
utilized to bring about changes in core beliefs and underlying assumptions” (1989: 
88). Saffan concurs with this view, and emphasizes, “any ‘relationship act’ is 
ultimately a cognitive intervention” (1990a: 119). In other words, the therapeutic 
relationship - or what might be called the therapeutic system of delivery - is an active 
component that is utilized to directly challenge the client’s faulty appraisals.
The statement under discussion could therefore be viewed as a problematic one. 
Despite evidence to the contrary, it assumes a dichotomy between the system of 
therapeutic delivery employed to effect therapeutic change and the practical skills
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utilized to challenge faulty appraisals. In fact, the importance of relationship factors 
to psychotherapeutic change has been so widely assimilated into the culture of 
psychological practice that major adaptations to the original CBT model have resulted 
in the recent development of several new and innovative therapies. These include 
Schema-focused Therapy (see Safran, 1990a; 1990b; Padesky, 1994; Young, 1990), 
Cognitive Analytic Therapy or CAT, (see Denman, 2001; Ryle, 1995), and Dialectic 
Behaviour Therapy or DBT, (Linehan, 1993). Not only do these psychotherapies 
emphasize the importance of the therapeutic relationship, they all incorporate 
psychoanalytic notions into their principles. Schema-focused work, for instance, 
utilises the notion of the patient’s ‘hook’3 in order to discern the particular 
interpersonal ‘pull’ or pattern that emerges in the therapeutic relationship (Safran, 
1990a). Similar to the theory of psychodynamic therapy, clinicians using a schema- 
focused approach believe that this pattern of relating is problematic for the client 
outside of the consulting room. This type of therapy was developed specifically for 
clients with highly complex and lifelong problems, such as personality disorders. It is 
therefore not uncommon for schema-focused therapy to take a long-term approach, 
extending over several years. CAT incorporates psychoanalytic principles, like 
transference and countertransference, whilst also emphasizing cognitive procedures 
such as the completion of homework tasks. A feature of DBT is the Kleinian 
psychoanalytic notion of ‘splitting’ in which the patient displays dichotomous 
thinking and this model too was developed for those with complex psychological 
difficulties.
Major criticisms have been levied against standard CBT because of its failure to 
incorporate some of the more basic psychoanalytic principles into its original theory. 
Although Clark (1995) is a CBT practitioner and advocate, he acknowledges that CBT 
has fundamental limitations and he summarises these as follows: it ignores the 
therapeutic alliance; it fails to recognize unconscious processes; it has a limited view 
of human emotion; and its practitioners have an inadequate understanding of the 
impact of interpersonal factors. All of these failures of the CBT model are inter-
3 The use of the term ‘hook’ was first expressed and developed in 1958 by Harold Searles in order to 
describe the psychoanalytic notion of countertransference (ie. the way in which patients elicit particular 
responses from their therapists). He began his elaboration of countertransference with the words: ‘The 
patient’s hook catches its fish in the analyst’s unconscious and reels it in’ (p247).
related and their recognition is an acknowledgement of the importance of 
psychoanalytic principles to the enhancement and further development of 
psychotherapeutic practice. In fact, it was the recognition of the importance of 
relationship factors to psychotherapeutic practice and outcome that led, over a decade 
ago, to the creation of the Division of Counselling Psychology within the British 
Psychological Society. Many within the Division subscribe to the view that aspects of 
the relationship that result in the most significant and enduring improvements to the 
client’s psychological well-being cannot be isolated, specified or quantified by 
scientific study (Spinelli, 2001). Spinelli believes that it is the “special and specific 
‘moments’ in the therapy when the client and therapist experience an authentic 
person-to-person connection that alters the relationship and, as a consequence, the 
client’s sense of self’ (2001: 7).
It is this interpretation of the therapeutic relationship as a meaningful encounter that 
defies scientific measurement, which is at the heart of recent deliberations in 
counselling psychology. On the one hand, currents trends within the NHS towards 
evidence-based practice mean that psychologists are increasingly called upon to 
demonstrate the effectiveness and utility of their chosen approaches. Scientific 
documentation of the component factors of therapeutic change is likely to be an 
unavoidable corollary to contemporary practice, particularly where there is 
competition amongst and within psychology departments for resources. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the scientist-practitioner model needs to inform the ethos of 
counselling psychology. On the other hand, there are convincing arguments that this 
model reduces the complexity of emotional distress and psychological disturbance 
into simplified, knowable and isolated variables wherein individual identity is 
collapsed by group averages (Kaye, 1995; Stem et al. 1998; Williams & Irving, 1996).
The debate therefore concerns whether or not we believe that the relationship we offer 
our clients is greater than the sum of its component parts. If the answer to that 
question is yes, then the value that counselling psychologists place on their identities 
as paradigmatically quantitative scientist-practitioners may be somewhat diminished. 
Former chair of the British Psychological Society’s counselling psychology division,
i
Pam James, has stated, “there is a need to clarify who we are and what we do” (2001:
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2). In addressing that concern, it should be remembered that qualitative research 
methods attempt to honour the voice of individual clients and their perceptions of self­
experience. So, although the uncapturable aspects of human interaction limit our 
investigations, qualitative psychological research can contribute to our understanding 
of what works in therapy. Criticisms of traditional CBT approaches and their reliance 
on a realist paradigm have led to the development of integrative therapies like 
schema-focused work and DBT. Qualitative psychological studies, focused as they 
are on the subtlety of human relationships, may also yield further advancements in the 
services counselling psychologists are able to offer their clients.
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The Dialogic Unconscious: 
The Missing Link or a Contradiction in Terms?
“It is not the therapist’s theoretical orientation that is as crucial in the healing 
process, as is the wholeness and availability o f the self o f the therapist. ”
Hycner (1991: 12/13)
The above quote has been chosen as a starting point for this paper because I do not 
intend to claim that the approach on which my theoretical stance is based, and which 
supports my clinical work, is a conclusive end product of study or that it in any way 
reflects an ‘answer’ to the struggles faced in therapeutic encounters. Rather, it 
provides a fluid, adaptive framework for the investigation of the client’s distress, their 
needs and their preferred lifestyles and choices. In that sense, the notion of the 
‘dialogic unconscious’ - the approach that informs my theoretical and clinical 
integration of models - provides a lens through which attempts to focus attention on 
the client’s lived experience can be made.
The dialogic unconscious brings together one of the core clinical theoretical models 
taught on this course, the psychodynamic approach, with one of the core theoretical 
research epistemologies also taught on the course, the discursive approach. 
Developed in 1997 by Billig, the dialogic unconscious represents the integration of 
two quite diverse psychological schools. Theoretically influenced by aspects of 
philosophy, sociology and linguistics, discursive psychology is underpinned by a 
social constructionist perspective. This perspective can be identified by four essential 
characteristics: it questions the taken-for-granted assumptions on which conventional 
knowledge is based; it views ways of understanding as being historically and 
culturally relative; it considers ‘truth’ to be constructed in social process and, it 
understands social actions as being conjoined with systems of knowledge (Burr, 
2000). Normally, discursive psychology constrains investigations of constructs like 
the mind and the unconscious. Instead, it looks to the socially occasioned nature of 
speech acts to account for psychological phenomena. Language therefore takes centre 
stage as the medium through which people make sense and meaning of the world 
around them.
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On the other hand, psychodynamic practitioners, and in particular adherents of the 
Freudian model, privilege investigations and speculations concerning the mind, 
accepting as ‘facts’ the universality of psychological processes and mechanisms. For 
instance, every child at the ‘oedipal’ age of about three is presumed to negotiate a 
psychological, and sometimes a physical, state of sexual desire for the parent of the 
opposite sex. In therapy it is often speculated that developmental problems arising 
from such negotiations underlie adult psychological ‘dysfunction’ in such a way that 
problematic behaviours are repeated within the therapeutic relationship. Freud (1924) 
called this a ‘compulsion to repeat’.
In the dialogic unconscious, Billig (1997,1999,2001) brings together these apparently 
conflictual approaches and bridges their theoretical differences. Fundamentally, he is 
concerned with maintaining a social constructionist stance. However, Billig argues 
that the discursive approach fails to account for what is left unsaid and he suggests 
that he has found an explanation of this in Freud’s theory of repression. According to 
Freud (1915, 1924), repression occurs when thoughts, ideas or impulses are not 
allowed into conscious awareness because they would be a source of anxiety or 
distress. Billig (1997, 1999, 2001) appropriates the concept of repression and, 
applying it to discursive acts, contends that language has repressive as well as 
expressive possibilities. Initially, the performance of repression, he maintains, is 
learned throughout childhood mainly through parental attempts to teach children how 
to suppress rudeness and how to conform to the rites, rituals and customs of speech 
that maintain and replicate cultural prescriptions of politeness or, what Garfinkel 
(1967) termed, ‘everyday morality’.
This understanding of discursive practice had strong resonance with my own nascent 
conceptualisation of dynamic social interaction. But, why should that be when the 
merging of the two ideologies appears to be so untenable? It is their very 
incompatibility that explains the attraction to this model. Like salt and vinegar, the 
distinctive flavour of each theory combines to make more palatable what might 
otherwise seem appealing but unseasoned or incomplete. The reasons why I attempt 
to combine these two seemingly inconsistent approaches are most likely related to my 
own personal history and experience. According to Larsen (1996), all psychological
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theories are a reflection of their creators’ life experience. Of course I do not claim to 
have hit upon the notion of the dialogic unconscious myself but, like all therapeutic 
practitioners, its interpretation and application are a reflection of my own idiosyncratic 
reading of it.
For a number of years, several times a week, I took my place on the couch for 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. This experience was foundational to my current view 
that the ‘undoing’ of repression is probably the single most crucial aspect of the 
therapeutic encounter. In therapy I had a voice that was not permissible in any other 
time or in any other space and it was this discursive freedom that was the amalgam 
binding my therapist and myself to each other. It would be misleading to suggest that 
I had the courage to fully embrace every opportunity for self-disclosure but as time 
passed so too did my reluctance to explore what might elsewhere be socially 
prohibited. According to Milton (2001), when the client reaches the stage of being 
able to say whatever they like to the therapist they probably no longer need therapy. 
This supports the conviction that what cannot be said is particularly salient to the 
therapeutic endeavour.
Many psychodynamic clinicians would concur, arguing that by examining the client’s 
unconscious communications, their defensive repressions can be exposed whereupon 
they can begin to be cured of their individual psychopathology. However, when the 
client’s self-identity is seen as multiple, fragmented and changeable, as well as being 
historically and culturally dependent, then the ‘undoing’ of repression takes on diverse 
meaning and purpose. Selfhood can be explored and experienced in new and alternate 
ways as discursive possibilities are broadened. One of the dictums of Billig’s (1997) 
theory is that linguistic rules learned for the production of conversation with others 
will match those used in the production of inner dialogue. Therefore when the habits 
of external speech are changed and new voices emerge in conversation with the 
therapist, it follows that changes, however gradual, will naturally occur in unspoken, 
self-talk, potentially providing the client with a more positive experience of their inner 
and outer worlds.
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How might this work in practice? Both psychoanalytic therapists and discursive 
psychologists attend as closely as possible to what, precisely, is said in conversation - 
the therapist using process notes and the discursive psychologist analysing 
transcriptions of dialogue. The process in both cases is similar, as the respective 
practitioners examine not merely the content of the spoken words but what the speaker 
is accomplishing by uttering them. In working with the dialogic unconscious it is also 
necessary to attend to the process and to explore the ways in which a client might 
attempt to shut down or close off areas or topics of conversation. By attending to this 
process, therapists can become aware of how a client will construct themselves as a 
moral being by reproducing the customs of speech which, for them, conform to the 
cultural prescriptions of everyday morality.
Moral positions are therefore accomplished between the client and therapist as each 
utilises their own familiar, discursive frameworks. It is the tension that arises between 
these two frameworks that facilitates and draws out the meaning and importance of 
specific discursive repressions for the client. In other words, the freedom offered 
within the therapeutic space can be used as a means of altering the client’s perception 
of what he is permitted to say, and also how and when it might be said. For instance, 
in mundane social conversations a pause of more than a second normally poses a 
problem for speakers (Jefferson, 1989) however, in the therapeutic encounter longer 
silences are tolerated in order to indicate that the client has a greater share of speaking 
time (Sacks, 1989). The client’s response to silence in therapy may reveal something 
about their ability to adapt to contexts where the rules of discourse shift in unfamiliar 
or seemingly unusual ways.
How the dialogic unconscious has informed my therapeutic practice might be best 
illustrated by a clinical example. Mr Fischer1 attended therapy with symptoms of 
anxiety. He was unable to endure being in public place like sandwich bars, cafes or 
train stations. He was also finding sleep difficult and he would spend much of the 
night ruminating on thoughts about his boss whom he disliked or about his weight, 
which, although it was average, he considered to be too high. These difficulties were 
detailed and explained as unwanted but at the end of each description he would claim
1 The client’s details have been altered to protect confidentiality and the name used is a pseudonym.
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that they were “not a problem”. The story he told of his life was filled with sadness, 
loss and frightening drama. From his earliest memories his father had been physically 
violent and psychologically aggressive toward his mother. When he was aged ten, Mr 
Fischer was admitted to hospital with near-fatal renal failure and put on a life support 
system. The following eight years of his childhood were taken up with inpatient and 
outpatient care and medical interventions and then, three weeks after his consultant 
discharged him, his grandfather died. Yet, all of these events were “not a problem”.
I asked myself what Mr Fischer might be doing by uttering these words and I realised 
that each time I was prevented from pursuing that particular area of conversation more 
fully. If it wasn’t a problem then there was no need to talk about it. Rather than 
isolating our relationship and focussing on potential problems between us - as might 
have been done in psychodynamic therapy - we explored what it would mean to him if 
these childhood experiences were a problem. How would things be different? Mr 
Fischer talked about listening to his father beating his mother, over-hearing his 
consultant tell his mother he was near death, and learning only hours beforehand that 
his grandfather was about to die. These difficulties had been managed in his family 
by silence and denial of pain. He believed that it was acceptable to say what had 
happened to him but to open these events up for discussion was too threatening. 
Token acknowledgements could be made but there was an unspoken code prohibiting 
any further dialogue.
Gradually Mr Fischer began to talk more about his vulnerability -  both physical and 
psychological -  and eventually he was able to voice the thought that he had probably 
been repressing for the greater part of his life. He said that he was to blame for his 
father’s violent outbursts and for the pain that this had caused his family. He added 
that everyone would have been better off if he had died that day in hospital. Mr 
Fischer’s saying of what, for him, had previously been unsayable was a mutative 
experience. From that point he was able to begin to speak about himself in ways that 
were more reflexive about issues of blame and responsibility. The opening up of 
discursive possibilities unsettled Mr Fischer’s previous assumptions about himself and 
allowed him to ponder alternative identities.
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Of course like any client, Mr Fischer’s case might be formulated in any number of 
ways, utilising a variety of approaches. Both the psychodynamic approach and the 
dialogic unconscious take a developmental perspective but departures in focus arise 
when constructions of meaning rather than presumptions of ‘compulsion to repeat’ are 
privileged in the therapeutic encounter. To return to the statement at the beginning of 
this paper, the availability of the self of the therapist is perhaps more important to the 
healing process than is the particular approach of the therapist. Therefore, the 
therapist’s struggle to provide clients with the best possible outcome may lie in 
identifying the approach that is, for them, most wholly self-utilising. For me that 
approach is often the dialogic unconscious. From it I can draw upon my own 
experience of therapeutic discourse and it’s corollary of psychological freedom and 
change, together with preserving my theoretical commitment to the endeavours of 
social constructionism. Far from being a contradiction in terms, the dialogic 
unconscious provides a complimentary link between my personal processes and 
professional doctrines.
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Out of His Mind: 
How Freud’s Thinking Helped to Set the Context 
of Counselling Psychology
Freud said human cognition could be either realistic or fantastical How has this 
two-fold distinction influenced the context o f counselling psychology and is it 
adequate to our understanding o f the client?
Freud (1924) maintained that human cognition was either entirely realistic or entirely 
fantastical. This paper will explore how this two-fold distinction has influenced the 
context of counselling psychology and whether or not it is adequate to our 
understanding of the client. For many years, psychologists tended to accept that the 
distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘fantasy’ was concrete and immutable (Edwards, 
1997), as did Freud (Gay, 1989). Reality, they suggested was comprised of physical, 
social and psychological materials that exist and have independent properties in the 
world regardless of any theoretical discourse or varying concepts about them 
(Greenwood, 1989). This reality was held to be observable and definable through 
strict adherence to scientific methods (Feigl, 1970) and assertions that could not stand 
up to such scrutiny were considered to be unscientific. Fantasy, on the other hand, 
referred to the conceptualisation of that which is not immediately apparent, whether 
objects, symbols or events. ‘Pathological fantasy’ was believed to develop from the 
tendency to withdraw from, rather than accept, ‘reality’ (Reber, 1995) and this 
perspective prevails in many therapeutic settings today. According to the predominant 
ideology of Freud’s time, fantasy often tended towards the pathological (Puttnam, 
1978) and Freud came to regard it as a defence mechanism through which unsatisfied 
needs could be gratified (see A. Freud, 1966).
In developing his ‘talking cure’, Freud made a significant contribution, not only to the 
foundational framework of psychoanalysis, but also to the context in which that 
analysis is set. For the purposes of this discussion, context primarily refers to the 
broad macro-level structure of counselling psychology and it concerns an analysis of 
theories and epistemologies, which ultimately situate people within particular 
therapeutic settings. These settings occur at local, micro-levels and might include 
GP’s surgeries, NHS psychotherapy or psychology units in hospitals as in-patients or
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outpatients, private clinics, voluntary agency services or within religious counselling 
practices. The context in which Freud developed his distinction between ‘fantasy’ and 
‘reality’ will first be discussed, as it is historically relevant to contemporary 
therapeutic settings. Challenges to the Freudian model of scientist practitioner will 
also be considered, particularly the social constructionist approach that regards truth 
as a fluid, subjective concept.
Freud’s own background
Freud’s own contribution to the field of psychology relied upon assumptions that 
arose from the combination of his scientific background and his position of relative 
social power. Most importantly, these factors were complemented by a broad and 
fertile imagination and together fuelled his insights into the mechanisms that, he 
speculated, drive human consciousness. For this reason, Freud’s own history provides 
a pertinent background to the development of the medical model generated by a realist 
scientific epistemology. The empirically based scientist practitioner model still 
remains at the forefront of psychology in the fields of theory, practice and research 
today. Primarily, Freud considered himself to be a scientist (Ewen, 1994), but at the 
same time, didn’t conform to all of the strict requirements of the Popperian scientism 
that began to dominate during his period of practice (Bowlby, 1969). In choosing not 
to use falsifiable methods for instance, Freud can be identified as holding an elitist 
position within the power structure that created those methods. Social positions are 
enabled by the historical and cultural context in which one lives (Foucault, 1974) and 
by the power ascribed within that context (Parker, 1996), and these, combined, dictate 
perceptions of what is real (Shotter, 1995). Fisher believes that, “a self defined by 
social and political processes or voices or descriptions of sociological power roles, is 
one defined by ascriptions of privilege” (1995: 396). Freud held a position of 
privilege, first within his own family and subsequently, within the scientific 
community that ascribed to his theoretical positioning (Morea, 1990; Storr, 1989).
In constructing his theory of psychosexual development for example, Freud (1953) 
related stages of oral, anal and genital bodily functions to interpersonal family 
relationships and dynamics, taking the perspective that these are stable features of 
each human being that influence psychological development. The irony of Freud’s
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argument is that he relied upon a position based on realist, empirical traditions of 
scientific observation while at the same time his own position of power exempt him 
from strictly adhering to the conventions of that tradition. By positioning himself in 
such a way, Freud was able to successfully create a new scientific ‘reality’, that of the 
genesis of psychosexual development and the efficacy of transactional psychoanalysis 
in the treatment of its disorders. Freudian interpretations of psychosexual 
development still remain an important part of the treatment agenda in many medical 
settings in which psychodynamic therapy is offered and it also informs much of the 
curriculum of trainee counselling psychologists, including my own training on the 
PsychD Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology course.
The Development of Freud’s Theories
The treatment of ‘pathologies’ and the understanding of human behaviour generally 
were shaped by Freud’s development of constructs like, the id, the ego and the 
superego. According to Mead (1934), the mechanisms of reflective thought - the 
combining of such processes as imagination with an epistemology - are a fusion of the 
contextualised framework within which one is socially situated, together with the 
unique character of one’s own local circumstances. It is the combination of 
situatedness and self that often defines an epistemology (Shotter, 1992) and Freud 
subscribed to that of scientist practitioner. Science, in its turn, rewarded Freud’s 
endeavours by adopting his views as part of its own evolving epistemological stance 
and hence, from a perspective that was based at least in part on his own constructions, 
new ‘realities’ like that of the id, the ego and the superego were formed. The scientist 
practitioner was ascribed an exalted position at the macro-level of scientific 
investigator, and, as will be illustrated later, at the micro-level of ‘knowing guru’ in 
relation to individual clients.
The scientist practitioner sought to understand and interpret human behaviour in such 
a way that made sense of people’s attitudes - for instance concerning sexual conduct. 
Freud’s theory of psychosexual development was one that explained gay and lesbian 
sexual practice as a psychopathological consequence of the failure to overcome 
infantile fantasies related to the resolution of oedipal impulses. In harmony with the 
prevailing social perspective of the time, gay sexuality was viewed as a perversion
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arising out of the ‘wrong’ sort of fantasies and some subsequent psychological 
treatments included the use of aversion therapy in the form of pornographic images of 
women and the use of female surrogates (see Masters and Johnson, 1979). The 
introduction of ‘homosexuality’ as a classification within the American Medical 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of the American Medical Association 
(DSM) located gay men and lesbians within the context of the mentally ill. Its 
removal as a diagnostic category in 1973 not only illustrates how, at a micro level, 
social notions affect the context of the medical reality into which a person is fixed at a 
particular historical juncture, but at a macro level it demonstrates that the theories 
themselves are grounded in prevailing cultural attitudes. Although most counselling 
psychologists would not now attempt to provide a ‘cure’ for ‘homosexuality’, many 
who subscribe to Freudian ideologies continue to consider this sexual orientation as a 
developmental failure (see Dean and Lane, 2001, for a review).
Challenges to Freud’s Approach
Not surprisingly, Freud’s theories have been criticised as damaging to large segments 
of society (Masson, 1990; Millett, 1970; Mitchell 1974). One of the main criticisms 
rests in the position of power that he ascribed to the analyst as mediator in the 
discernment of truth and fantasy in psychoanalytic settings (Masson, 1990). In the 
case of his patient Dora, Freud initially responded positively to her distress at having 
been sexually abused in childhood but he later conducted a famous U-turn dismissing 
her claims as the product of her own maladapted sexual longings, essentially as being 
nothing more than fantasies (Chodorow, 1991). This U-tum effectively empowered 
all analysts to disbelief their patient’s reports regardless of whether they had 
accurately recalled actual events (Storr, 1989; Masson, 1990). The two-fold 
distinction between fantasy and reality was therefore maintained without regard for 
the client’s own concerns (Ussher, 1991). Much of the process of psychoanalysis and 
psychodynamic psychotherapy is still predicated upon the notion that the client’s 
unconscious fantasies about the therapist need to be explored and resolved in therapy.
Women and ethnic minorities, particularly those not conforming to a conventional 
heterosexual orientation, comprise the majority of those treated for psychological 
disorders (Armitage et al, 1979; Goudsmit & Gadd, 1991; Goudsmit, 1994). Sayce
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(2000) believes that there is a direct link between common racial discrimination and 
perceptions of those diagnosed as mentally ill. She cites the graffiti daubed on a street 
where a mental health service was planned to open: ‘Schizophrenics go home’ as 
having parallels with racist invectives that voice similar sentiments towards black 
people. Again, it could be argued that social attitudes converge with psychological 
theory to formulate medical ‘truths’ - in the above case regarding psychological 
perceptions of black minorities as being more ‘mad’ than white people.
Young (1996) argues that sexual representations of black men and women have their 
roots in white, colonial fantasies, which sought out signs of physical difference as 
being the antithesis of an idealised white ‘self. According to Fanon, the debased 
desires of white men for participation in illicit sexual acts like incest and rape are 
projected onto blacks in such a way that, “the white man behaves ‘as i f  the Negro 
really had them” (1986: 176). White men’s fantasies thus become the ‘reality’ of 
black sexuality upon which stereotypes of black behaviour are transfixed. These 
stereotypes are aided by psychoanalytic and psychological perspectives, which set out 
to demonstrate the biological basis for such beliefs (Gilman, 1985). In this way, the 
distinction between reality and fantasy could be said to be blurred but made to appear 
scientifically clear through the construction of a reality for socially marginalised 
people, based on the fantasies of those in a more privileged position and reified by the 
theories of scientist practitioners. Those placed within the context of the mentally 
disturbed therefore perform the social function of maintaining the status quo by 
departing from conventions of normality (Foucault, 1974).
Similarly, stereotypes of women have informed medical practice such that they too 
have been psychologised, according to Goudsmit, who suggests, “women’s illnesses 
are assumed psychosomatic until proven otherwise” (1994: 76). She, and other 
feminist writers (see Hepworth, 1999; Showaiter, 1997; Ussher, 1991), argue that the 
‘medical gaze’ has historically pathologised women. Women’s reproductive systems 
were perceived as problematic in physical ways, which, it was professed, had 
simultaneous emotional and psychological consequences. It was not uncommon in 
Freud’s day for women with gynaecological problems to be viewed as mentally ill 
(Bordo, 1993), and Freud admitted his own lack of insight when he described women
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as ‘the dark continent’. Having focused upon women as problematic, the medical 
establishment has however been unable to demonstrate any inherent or convincing 
physiological weaknesses based on biology. But, with the aid of Freud’s theory of 
psychosexuality which posited a developmental defect based on gender alone, the 
medical ‘gaze’ was fixed on women’s minds, where, according to treatment statistics, 
it has rested ever since (Chesler, 1987).
Although some psychologists and psychoanalysts have resisted Freud’s interpretations 
of the ‘female mind’, others have employed psychoanalytic theory to account for the 
contribution of patriarchal values to women’s distress. Chodorow, 1991; Orbach & 
Eichenbaum, 1995; and Mitchell, 1974, among others, use Freudian analytic theory to 
explain women’s tendency to present for mental health services more frequently. 
Developmental difficulties, they suggest, culminate in psychological suffering that 
centres on relational issues and especially those concerning the mother/daughter dyad. 
However, this theorisation has had little impact on the numbers of women presenting 
for psychological care, and there has been an increasing trend towards women caring 
for women and female specialists in women’s psychological treatment (Ussher, 1991). 
This has taken the form of, for instance, The Women’s Therapy Centre, set-up by 
Eichenbaum and Orbach in the 1980’s, famous for its connection with the bulimic 
problems of Princess Diana. To put women’s treatment into context then, Freudian 
theory significantly contributed to the modern-day view that women are 
psychologically defective and therefore the establishment of treatment centres, both 
public and private, has been fuelled by women’s perceived greater vulnerability to 
psychological distress.
Psychological Care Then and Now
Historically, psychoanalysis was conducted in private, often at the home of the 
practitioner, with diagnosis and treatment occurring within a setting of relative 
privacy. This was a costly and time-consuming process, normally confined to the 
upper and middle classes. However, with the introduction in the 1980s of political 
measures to ensure that health care facilities offered patients a comprehensive service, 
counselling and psychological treatments entered the primary care agenda. Since that 
time, more than a third of all GPs surgeries are believed to offer a counselling service
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with the result that psychological care is now, more than ever, a public affair (East, 
1995). Assessment, diagnosis and treatment of psychological problems have 
increasingly become part of patients’ primary care documentation as psychological 
histories are recorded in tandem with medical notes.
Often, psychological disorders are evaluated according to a reality testing in which the 
patient is meant to provide accurate inferences concerning perceived external realities. 
The classic symptoms of such ‘psychosis’ may be defined as regressive behaviours, 
extreme mood, hallucinations, delusional thoughts or beliefs or incoherent speech. In 
the medical literature, these disorders are often listed as schizophrenia, mood 
disorders, organic mental disorders, brief reactive psychosis or bipolar disorder. The 
DSM-IV and the World Health Organisation’s classification of mental and 
behavioural disorders (ICD-10), as the main diagnostic tools for the classification of 
mental pathologies, have far-reaching consequences for anyone under psychological 
scrutiny. The descriptions within the manual can be pivotal for the client as they 
ultimately determine the context into which they are placed or, whether they will be 
provided with a service at all. That DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria can be interpreted 
variously by diagnosticians, and with disturbing repercussions for the client, has been 
widely debated (Parker, 1999a). Yet, the distinctions that they make form the basis of 
most treatment schedules for care and inform almost all contexts in which that care 
will be offered.
As Foucault (1974) suggested, maintaining social, political and economic power 
relations depends upon maintaining cultural divisions, including the separation of 
those deemed to be sane from those categorised as mentally ill. The distinction 
between those who have ‘psychosis’ and those who do not, provides the background 
against which diagnosis can be made and which will determine the context into which 
the ‘ill’ person is placed. From the early 1960s, R. D. Laing criticised the ‘Us’ and 
‘Them’ categories that positioned schizophrenics as polarised and opposite to the rest 
of a sane society. Recognising the difficulty of maintaining such distinctions, Farber 
offers for consideration an incident that occurred between a schizophrenic patient and 
his ‘mad’ psychotherapist. The psychotherapist loaned a favourite pen to his 
institutionalised patient but was unable to convince the patient to return it. He
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therefore broke into the unsuspecting patient’s room and retrieved the pen whilst the 
startled man was pinned securely to the floor by a pair of burly attendants. The 
psychiatrist parted with his patient’s words, “My, God, what a madhouse! All this fuss 
about one little fountain pen!” (1972: 82) ringing in his ears. The point here does not 
really concern who is the crazier of the two, but of the necessity of divisions in 
reinforcing power structures. As keepers of the diagnostic tools, the DSM-IV and the 
ICD-10, psychiatrists and to some extent psychologists, are armed with the weaponry 
of knowledge and become the arbitrators of sanity. Depending on the perceived 
severity of the ‘cognitive impairment’, those classified as having a psychotic disorder 
can be treated with surgery, pharmaceuticals and various types of psychotherapy or 
combinations of the three in a wide variety of contexts, sometimes under section and 
therefore without the person’s consent.
The Multi-Levelled Psy-Complex
Parker believes that “diagnostic systems are fragile things without systems of power to 
hold them in place” (1999b: 107). He suggests that the DSM-IV and the ICD-10 
depend for their power on quite narrow conventions of a local historical, cultural and 
subcultural nature. Taken together, they provide the fabric that weaves together the 
disciplines of psychology, counselling and psychotherapy theory and practice. 
Together, they are bound by strict regulatory practices for clients as well as clinicians, 
who themselves are subject to the scrutiny of regulatory professional organisations. 
Micro-level systems of power are therefore supported and policed by macro-level 
organisational structures that rely upon local historical, cultural and subcultural 
conventions, according to Parker (1999b). Distinctions between the sane and the 
psychologically disturbed are therefore part of a complex infrastructure of what has 
been termed the ‘psy-complex’ (Rose, 1985). The effect of the psy-complex on
i
individuals is that their social position can be determined by conventions of normality 
or abnormality. As a normalising practice, psychotherapy makes several basic 
assumptions concerning the treatment of ‘abnormality’: it seeks out an underlying 
cause of pathology; it locates that cause within individuals and their relationships; it 
purports to diagnose the cause within a psychological framework; and it provides a 
designated set of techniques for treating the pathology (Parker, 1999b). Parker 
concludes, “the issue of what constitutes the normal or the deviant, the functional or
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dysfunctional is as much a sociocultural variable as a medico-psychological constant” 
(1999a: 21).
The recognition by some psychologists - particularly in the field of social psychology 
- that context-laden methods are employed in research for the evaluation of a 
knowable ‘reality’ has meant that psychology’s historic alliance with the approaches 
used in physical science is increasingly being questioned. As Shorter commented, 
“physical scientists don’t have evaluations placed upon them by their subject matter” 
(1992: 179). He argues from a social constructionist position that the lived experience 
of human beings cannot be taken in any way as basic or implicit and that it is the 
methods employed by psychology that often deny the ‘reality’ of people’s 
experiences. Scientific methods that observe behaviour and form from them 
generalised theories are regarded as subscribing to a monological paradigm (Shorter, 
1995) which ignores, or at best diminishes, the primary point of human contact, that of 
conversation (Harre, 1992). The development of methods, which are jointly 
negotiated and linguistically formulated, adhere to a dialogical paradigm through 
which it is possible to discover foundations of human behaviour with a regard for the 
contextual background to life, according to Shorter (1995).
The Effects of Social Constructionism on Theory and Practice
This relatively recent movement within psychology has challenged the notion that one 
single, recognisable and reportable truth can be discerned through the examination of 
human ‘subjects’ (Harre, 1992; Potter, 1992; Shorter, 1992, 1995). The social 
constructionist approach has challenged the value of discriminating between types of 
cognitions - whether they are real or imagined - and it privileges social interactions, 
particularly those occurring in speech acts. The widespread debate concerning the 
conceptualisation of reality, which is currently resounding throughout the therapeutic 
and psychological communities, is strong evidence that the two-fold distinction 
between reality and fantasy does not provide an adequate basis for the understanding 
of people (Greenwood, 1989). Traditional approaches to psychotherapy have come 
under attack for the way in which individuals are regarded in isolation from their 
social environments (Cecchin, 1992; Gergen, 1991; Masson, 1990; McLeod, 1997) 
and pathologised according to socially constructed prescriptions of normative
48
behaviours (Gilman, 1985; Hepworth, 1999; Spence, 1987). As a radical rethink of 
positivistic approaches to psychological phenomenon gives way to post-modernist 
ideologies, so too the assumptions underlying the therapeutic encounter are challenged 
and social constructionist perspectives are becoming incorporated into both theory and 
practice.
Practitioners adopting a post-modern stance have acknowledged that the experiences 
of those marginalized by the dominant social order because of gender or racial 
prejudice can be so demeaned as to be considered pathologically fantastical (Chesler, 
1987; Ussher, 1991). From the social constructionist viewpoint, foundations of 
thought and behaviour are perceived as arising from socially informed narratives 
about the self, reflected in language and speech. Narratives then, are situated within a 
social context and are seen as jointly negotiated enterprises that provide a sense of 
meaning and understanding to human encounters. The therapeutic encounter, as part 
of this linguistic system of meaning-making, provides an opportunity to facilitate a 
dialogic process of co-creating new narratives and alternative agencies (Lax, 1992). A 
dialogic paradigm is employed by social constructionists to show that language itself 
is a deeply influential determinant of perceptions (De Beauvoir, 1974; Sampson, 
1993).
In order to overcome the inherently flawed assumptions of traditional Freudian 
analysis, new techniques based on post-modern, social constructionist philosophies 
have been emerging under the broad title of narrative therapies. These therapies tend 
to regard narratives, or stories, grounded in personal experience and social interactions 
as enabling the person to make sense of their world. In this way, narratives are 
regarded as neither real nor fantastical, but as fluid and changing. Stories told about 
the self are heard within the therapeutic encounter, where alternative narratives may 
also be presented. Narrative therapeutic concepts were originally incorporated into 
family systems therapy as a means of avoiding the pathologisation of a particular 
family member and as a way of regarding the family as part of an interactive social 
system (White and Epstein, 1990). Anderson (1991) further developed therapeutic 
strategies that placed clients within a wider social context by allowing families to 
observe what therapists within a ‘reflecting team’ had to say about them. Family
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members were provided with the opportunity to participate in this process at a level on 
a par with that of the therapist. This technique has been adopted by conventional 
treatment centres like The Tavistock Clinic, in London, and indicates a move away 
from the clinician as knowing expert. Social constructionist perspectives are therefore 
having some effect upon the traditional approaches.
Clearly, current debates in psychology have arisen out of concern for the effects of 
theories and methodologies that privilege some accounts as real and some as fantasy, 
thus demonstrating that this two-fold distinction is not adequate to our understanding 
of the client. Although Freud imposed this distinction, it has undermined a more 
multi-dimensional understanding of people’s lived experiences. The failure of 
psychological science to fully appreciate the complex nature of human phenomenon 
has been promulgated by research studies applying scientific methods which make 
presuppositions about the nature of reality and fantasy, regardless of the participants’ 
own interpretations. The psy-complex has been structured around the scientist 
practitioner model and is a self-maintaining system that acts as an arbitrator of 
normality and abnormality. The context into which a particular ‘patient’ will be 
situated at any given time is a function of the scientist practitioner approach to 
counselling psychology, maintained by the psy-complex and based on local 
conventions and values. Social constructionists who regard dialogue as the primary 
point of human contact through which a sense of self is engendered, fostered and 
maintained are challenging this model. However, therapeutic contexts are primarily 
informed by dominant ideologies and these can be maintained and reproduced in 
therapeutic practice. Social constructionist ideology has begun to penetrate traditional 
therapy customs such that, the spectre of the neurotic patient struggling to grasp what 
the enlightened practitioner already knows about them, is no longer an adequate 
reflection of all psychotherapeutic practice.
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Therapeutic Practice Dossier
This dossier contains information about the clinical work I have undertaken during the 
three years of my psychotherapeutic training. It includes a description of each of my 
clinical placements followed by a final clinical paper, which provides an account of 
my professional practice, including the integration of theory and research into my 
work.
Further details of client studies, process reports, placement logbooks and supervisors’ 
evaluation forms pertaining to this dossier are available to the examiners in a separate 
appendix. Due to the confidential nature of the material contained within this 
appendix, it is not available for public access.
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First Year Placement 1: Primary Care 
October 1999 -  August 2000
This placement occurred in a primary care setting, which was attached to a local 
mental health trust. In this outpatient service there were three General Practitioners 
(GPs) making referrals to their internal counselling department, staffed by one 
psychoanalytic psychotherapist and myself. The surgery is a teaching practice 
attached to the local health authority and patients are therefore aware that training is 
an integrative part of the surgery’s structure. The counselling service was initially 
concerned with assessment of patients for brief therapy but onward referrals to other 
psychiatric services or for longer-term psychotherapies were also made. The main GP 
practice was located on the ground floor of the surgery with the counselling service 
being situated in a small upstairs room adjacent to the administration offices. This 
could make the service inaccessible to clients who were disabled or infirm. Patients 
referred for counselling had from one to three assessment sessions with a possibility 
of up to 12 more therapy sessions. The client group was largely middle class, coming 
from the surgery’s catchment area within an affluent suburb of a large city. 
Presenting problems included depression, anxiety, relationship difficulties, 
bereavement, alcohol dependency and health-related issues.
Other placement activities included a seminar on ‘Primary Care Mental Health 
Services for Children: Development and Practice’ at the local mental health trust 
hospital. There was also a full-day workshop on defence mechanisms and in 
particular projection and projective identification were discussed. Quarterly group 
supervision was also provided at the hospital.
First Year Placement 2: Eating Disorders Centre 
October 1999 -  August 2000
This placement concerned only one client who I began to see prior to starting the 
course, whilst I was on a placement working at a Centre for those diagnosed with 
Anorexia Nervosa, Bulimia Nervosa and Binge Eating disorders. Clients attending 
from the Centre were seen in the trainee’s homes for regularly weekly sessions. 
Although supervision was taken externally, the Centre provided a series of lectures on 
practitioner skills for eating disorders.
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Second Year Placement: Psychotherapy Department 
October 2000 -  August 2001
This placement occurred in the Psychotherapy Department of a regional facility for 
both day and inpatients. It was housed in a separate building from the large General 
Hospital to which it is attached. The Head of the Department was a consultant 
psychiatrist who was also a psychoanalytic psychotherapist. In addition to having one 
full-time secretary on staff, there were eight other part-time psychotherapist staff 
members. They included a group therapist, a sex therapist, a couples therapist and 
five other general psychotherapists. There were two Counselling Psychologists in 
Training on this placement and the Senior Therapist provided supervision.
The Psychotherapy Department was housed in two separate areas. Part of it was on 
the same floor as the Psychiatric Outpatient Department and the other, larger part was 
adjacent to the Psychology Department, the Eating Disorders Service, the Electro- 
convulsive Therapy (ECT) Service and the Forensic Inpatient Ward. Following 
assessment, patients were offered either individual or group psychotherapy, if there 
was a place. Group therapy normally lasted for a period of two years. The 
Department also offered brief 16-session therapy and longer-term therapy; the exact 
duration was usually dependent on the needs of the patient. Patients mainly suffered 
from long-term illnesses, relationship problems and anxiety disorders. This was not 
normally their first experience of therapy.
There were many opportunities for becoming involved in a wide range of 
departmental activities, some of which were requirements of the placements and 
others were optional. Meetings included weekly departmental business and clinical 
meetings, at which I would often make client presentations. Group supervision was 
attended with other members of the department. There were also monthly meetings 
regarding the establishment of a Personality Disorders Service. I was a key member 
of this group and assisted in the preparation of a major proposal for this service. My 
participation included budget planning, planning of staff services and scheduling of a 
timetable of patient services. I was on the committee that assessed the administration 
of the CORE psychometric testing of patients. Several times I met with the Head of
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Inpatient Services in order to gain an understanding of the facilities offered by the 
hospital. Also, I observed patients undergoing ECT.
Third Year Placement: Co-ordinated Psychological Treatment
Service & Community Mental Health Team
September 2001 -  August 2002
The setting for this placement was at a Co-ordinated Psychological Therapies Service 
for those with complex needs, both psychological and social. The service was housed 
on the second floor of a building on the hospital site of a large inner city but it was 
housed in a separate facility away from the main building. The Community Mental 
Health Team (CMHT) normally made referrals to this service and clients presented 
with problems including schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, bipolar 
disorder and psychotic depression. The service mainly provided short-term individual 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) lasting from six to 20 sessions and, where 
appropriate, clients were offered the opportunity to attend an anxiety management 
group lasting seven sessions with a follow-up session four weeks later. Cognitive 
Analytic Therapy (CAT) was offered to some patients depending on whether or not 
their difficulties included repeated patterns of behaviour. The duration of CAT was 
16 sessions, with one follow-up session a month later. Either the head of the 
department or the senior therapist provided supervision, both of whom were clinical 
psychologists.
A therapist attached to the CMHT provided supervision for group work and a 
specialist clinical psychologist provided supervision for CAT. Weekly departmental 
meetings were attended as part of the training and I presented both clinical material 
and theoretical papers at these meetings. Weekly lunchtime lectures were given at the 
main hospital site and subjects included, for example, the treatment of psychosis and 
assessment and referral procedures. There was also the opportunity to attend ward 
rounds at the inpatient unit.
59
On Learning to be an Ice-Skating Integrationist
“Between nature and nurture it looked quite grim. I ’d been for some time, as I  put it 
to myself all right. But how could I  be, genetically and psychologically, with parents 
like that? I  came from a family o f suicidal hysterics. I ’d been suicidal and hysterical 
in my time, then taken stock and made a decision, or just grown out o f it, but now I  
felt, as I  walked back to the car, that for years I  had been deluding myself into the 
notion that I  had a choice. I  felt myself to have been all along skating over the 
thinnest sliver o f ice; believing that it was solid when it was only ever a brittle and 
probably diminishing floe... Thank you, Darwin; thank you, Freud. ”
Jenny Diski, Skating to Antarctica, 1997: 194/5.
Introduction
The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of my development as a counselling 
psychologist, particularly with respect to how I have integrated theory and research 
into my clinical work and approach to practice. I have begun with the above quotation 
as a reminder of how alienating our theories can sometimes be to the client in the 
room and how these theories therefore need to be applied sensitively and with regard 
to the effects they may have on the vulnerable people who seek our help. For many 
years the author Jenny Diski suffered from depression, having several episodes of 
inpatient care and sampling many of the various types of therapy on offer, both 
privately and within the NHS. For me, her lament, centring around the notion of 
choice, echoes that of many of my clients who feel hemmed into particular ways of 
being either by developmental process or biological determinants or sometimes by 
limited social opportunity. Clarkson eloquently states, “People and their problems 
come before any theories or techniques. The latter exist solely to serve the former, 
and any useful integration will always honour this position” (1998: 260).
To a large extent my therapeutic work has been about considering the idiosyncratic 
meaning of a client’s current life situation or dilemma/s; investigating how they may 
have arrived at this particular place and at this particular time; speculating about what 
it might mean for the client to feel that choices are available to them; and finally, 
where appropriate, attempting to implement change or modifications to existing ways 
of being. I endeavour to do this whether working psychodynamically, cognitive 
behaviourally or dialogically. (The latter approach will be explained more fully later 
in this paper.) The particular approach of choice for each client depends upon their
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personal aims and goals for therapy, the degree to which they demonstrate 
psychological-mindedness and the time constraints imposed either by the client’s or 
my own professional or personal circumstances or the resources available within the 
NHS. Because my work is informed by a diversity of theories, I would describe 
myself as an integrative practitioner. However, the work conducted in the consulting 
room with the client tends to be either directive or non-directive as I believe that 
movement from one position to the other may leave an already confused client feeling 
baffled about the very nature of therapy itself.
My view on the integration of the various theoretical positions is that sound clinical 
strategies should underpin client work and inform therapeutic interventions in a 
coherent and consistent manner. That is not to say that a client’s presenting problems 
should not be formulated from a number of different theoretical perspectives but that 
what is brought into therapy and presented to the client should be clearly planned and 
based upon an a priori hypothesis that reflects an intended stratagem for the 
attainment of psychotherapeutic goals. The integration of theories into practice 
without the articulation of such reasoned judgements could leave the client feeling 
bewildered and baffled by the process, confused by it and possibly even alienated, as 
in the case of Jenny Diski. She, perhaps mistakenly, believed that she was not at 
liberty to locate psychological theory according to her own ideological stance but that 
psychological theory located her within its own sedimented, irrepressible, culture.
For me, integration can be a deeply unsettling process, particularly when, as often 
happens, the client is unsure about what they would like to achieve in therapy. 
Sometimes it may seem that a cognitive approach would assist the client best by 
helping them to manage their distressing symptoms but a few sessions later, a focus 
on transference issues could appear to offer the client a deeper insight into their 
difficulties. Before ultimately deciding upon an approach, I therefore deliberate about 
how best to meet the client’s needs, and how to achieve, or approximate achieving, the 
client’s aims in a way that makes sense to the client based on their perception of their 
difficulties, and to me, based on my understanding of what the various approaches 
have to offer. Of course this integration is an ongoing process combining elements of 
further understanding of theoretical perspectives, an expanding base of research
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interests, experience with clients who have a great diversity of problems and concerns, 
and personal development. In other words, as I leam so too do I integrate, but with 
caution. “Any good, competent and growing counselling psychologist is always 
integrating themselves whether between or within ‘schools’, their professional and life 
experiences or between themselves and the learning they forge in the relationship with 
their clients”, according to Clarkson, (1998: 260).
Lazarus posed the question “What treatment, by whom, is most effective for this 
individual, with those specific problems, and under which set of circumstances?” 
(1995: 38). Although he asserts that full theoretical integration is not possible, he 
does argue that to answer this crucial question requires of the therapist a knowledge of 
a number of models. By examining outcome studies, Roth and Fonagy (1996) have 
attempted to answer the question, What Works for Whom and their findings have 
sometimes helped to provide me with a rationale in the decision-making process about 
how and when to integrate. Where the presented research data positively resonates 
with client material it seems appropriate to inform therapeutic practice with studies 
based on clinical effectiveness and efficacy.
Clarkson (1998) has suggested that there are two pathways to the learning and 
assimilation of integration into practice. The first requires the trainee to begin to 
practice using a range of skills borrowed from a number of therapeutic approaches, 
essentially to take integrative therapy as a starting point for practice, and the second 
involves the trainee in the sequential practice of one core model prior to moving on 
and learning to practice in another. Prior to beginning this course, I spent some 
months using the former method in the treatment of those with eating disorders. I 
found this approach confusing because I lacked a coherent theoretical foundation on 
which to base my therapeutic interventions and I was therefore confused about my 
role in the treatment plan. Because of this experience I decided that whilst on this 
course I would seek placements that allowed for a concentrated effort on a single, core 
approach. My practice focussed on psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural 
approaches and it assimilated the basic principles of a humanistic approach. I will 
discuss the process of my development as an integrative practitioner including my
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strengths and weaknesses, taking each core model learned in turn and illustrate this 
with case examples.
The Humanistic Approach
The central tenets of this approach lend themselves to incorporation into most 
psychotherapeutic models and encourage a number of practical skills that can usefully 
be employed by clinicians when working with a diverse range of theories and clients. 
The contributions of both Maslow (1943a, 1943b) and Rogers (1951, 1961) to the 
discipline of counselling psychology were seminal in providing a number of core 
conditions for the establishment of a positive therapeutic relationship. These include 
the congruence or authenticity of the therapist, the unconditional positive regard of the 
client as a person of worth and an empathic stance towards the client’s difficulties 
(Rogers, 1951). The specific skills of reflecting back to the client what they have said, 
checking that what the client has said has been understood, mirroring the client’s 
posture and tone of voice and noting and developing the client’s use of metaphor are 
encouraged as a means of facilitating a relationship that honours these core conditions. 
Obviously, these are basic skills that can inform any clinical work without requiring 
the practice of humanistic therapy. What sets the humanistic approach aside as a 
discrete therapeutic practice is its philosophical assertion that the person is an 
organismic self, seeking an essentially positive development and self-identity. Meams 
and Thome claim that, “left to itself the organismic self knows what it needs for its 
enhancement both from its environment and from other people” (1988: 8). As my 
work in therapy often seems to be about sharing the client’s confusion concerning 
what is best for them, I do not share this view. So, although my work is informed by 
humanistic principles, I am not a humanistic practitioner.
Although during the initial stages of the course I was practicing psychodynamically, 
as a naive practitioner it was helpful to maintain a stance of unconditional positive 
regard and empathy towards my clients. This was particularly useful in the case of 
Miss A1 (see Client Study A, Appendix). Miss A was a middle-aged lesbian woman 
who had recently lost her business, her partner and the flat that they had shared
1 Clients’ details have been altered to protect their confidentiality and names used are pseudonyms.
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together for several years. She had begun drinking heavily as a means of blotting out 
the sense of loss that seemed to accompany her every waking moment. Establishing a 
therapeutic alliance with Miss A was initially difficult because she had an 
unapproachable demeanour and would change the subject when it came to the painful 
issues of her life. However, by putting myself in her shoes and wondering where I 
myself might be given her biographical past, as is suggested by the humanistic 
philosophy, I was able to approach Miss A’s perspective with a deeper, more 
compassionate understanding despite her communications to me to stay emotionally 
distant.
It was clear that Miss A was an angry woman and that she vented her rage against 
those with whom she had, or wished to have, close emotional attachments. Miss A 
seemed to have become quite a callous person, having little regard for the feelings of 
others and little empathy with those around her who might also be suffering. This was 
particularly so with her partners’ young daughter who was nine years old. It was 
tempting to regard Miss A as unworthy of psychological treatment because her 
thinking was concretised and she often seemed oblivious to the pain she caused to 
those around her. I had no doubt that she had been unkind to her step-child, perhaps 
verging on the cruel in some respects, and that this probably contributed to the demise 
of her relationship with her partner. However, throughout Miss A’s own childhood 
there had been abuse of almost every description -  physical, emotional, psychological 
and sexual.
Miss A was not a stranger to loss, separation, rejection or abandonment as she had 
experienced these in great measure throughout the whole of her somewhat brutalised 
life. I found it difficult at first to have an empathic regard for Miss A but eventually I 
found a point of contact when I realised that my wariness of her was perhaps a 
reflection of her own fear of making intimate contact with me. By employing the 
humanistic values of unconditional positive regard and the acceptance of the client as 
a person of worth, I was able to attempt to approximate Miss A’s psychological state 
within myself and therefore to understand and, importantly, to accept, why she might 
appear to be so unpleasant and to lash out at those around her. This was a rare 
experience for Miss A and she gradually responded by having an improved sense of
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her own self worth, which was, in turn, eventually reflected in her attitude towards 
other people, including myself. I felt it was a strength that I could resist the 
temptation to judge Miss A harshly and instead to understand that her criticisms of me 
came from her own experience of being relentlessly criticised in childhood.
The Psychodynamic Approach
Both my first and second year placements were in settings that were strongly 
psychodynamically oriented, with both of my supervisors being psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists and initially I was probably most comfortable working within this 
paradigm because of my own experience of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. This 
approach takes a developmental perspective on psychological function and 
dysfunction, looking to early childhood experience to explain behavioural patterns of 
relating in the present. The client/therapist relationship is itself the subject of analysis 
as the client’s communications to the therapist are believed to reveal the unconscious 
psychical processes motivating the client’s behaviour. Transference and 
countertransference also feature as a focus of therapy as each contributes to an 
understanding of the therapeutic relationship and is analysed as a means of perceiving 
the client’s unconscious communications to the therapist. Although these processes 
(with the exception of countertransference) were developed and elaborated by Freud, 
Klein’s contribution to psychoanalysis is one of the most influential, informing the 
majority of contemporary formulations (Fonagy, 2001).
According to the Kleinian view, the first two years of life are foundational to later 
psychological functioning and this early stage of infantile anxiety must be analysed in 
order to confront and understand the unresolved aggressive drives that are responsible 
for prohibiting a person’s successful engagement in adult relationships. In other 
words, the way a mother attends her newborn infant is of paramount importance to 
later adult development and will influence all subsequent relationships. A problematic 
early relationship with mother will therefore leave the person with relationship deficits 
throughout their entire lives unless or until they have an analysis or experience a 
reparative relationship with someone else. Jenny Diski might have appropriately 
applied her metaphor of skating on thin ice to Melanie Klein’s view, and thanked her 
too, given the Kleinian perspective of psychological dysfunction. This theory is, of
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course, deeply mother-blaming, taking little account of the person’s other 
environmental circumstances or of the client’s early relationships with other adults or 
siblings. Father seems to take on importance only if there has been some form of 
abuse experienced at his hands, and as the theory privileges mechanisms of sexual 
aggression, this sort of abuse is viewed as most deeply wounding to the child.
I was troubled by the focus of Kleinian psychotherapy on the infantile mother/child 
dyad and although I found supervision to be a difficult process, I highly valued my 
supervisor’s sensitive application of this theory. Particularly in my first year of 
training, my supervisor was able to temper the more harsh focus of Kleinian therapy 
with an empathic understanding of the client’s developmental processes. Although I 
felt challenged both professionally and personally by this work, my perseverance with 
the psychodynamic paradigm was recorded in my trainee evaluation form by my 
supervisor who said, “Debora’s work was very good and in some aspects (capacity for 
empathy and ability to establish a therapeutic alliance) above the expectation for her 
level of training...I particularly would like to mention her capacity for criticism”. It 
was during my training as a psychodynamic practitioner that I learned the usefulness 
of inviting criticism in order to grow as an experienced clinician. This of course had 
drawbacks too, in that persistent criticisms would sometimes contribute to my 
overwhelming sense of inexperience and lack of insight into the client’s processes. In 
my worst moments I would be paralysed by indecision about what I should say to the 
client or whether or when I should make a particular intervention.
Kohut’s (1977) contribution of self-psychology to the psychodynamic paradigm was 
especially influential in aiding my clinical ability to form a purposeful therapeutic 
relationship. This theory suggests that emotional and psychological needs can arise at 
any point during a person’s lifetime and that once these needs are satisfied the person 
can then form fulfilling relationships with those around them. Empathic 
understanding of the client’s world is a key feature of this approach, which, in contrast 
to Kleinian dictums, suggests that the fulfilment of the client’s needs is required of the 
therapist rather than their frustration. The case of Miss D (see Process Report A, 
Appendix) illustrates an attempt to understand the client’s expressed needs more 
clearly and exemplifies my struggle to address those needs within the therapeutic
encounter. Miss D was at a stage of transition in her life. She was about to complete 
her A level studies and then move away to attend university quite some distance from 
home. It seemed important that, not only should her needs be met as nearly as 
possible, but that she should also better understand her needs so that she could fulfil 
them with others in the future. In the submitted work, I concentrated on Miss D’s use 
of metaphors and I also endeavoured to understand how she perceived our 
relationship.
This is illustrated in the following extract from Process Report A. The P refers to me 
and the D refers to the client:
P14: Yeah, sure, but you you were saying last week when we were talking about the 
taping, um, that you wonder how I  do it all You wonder, you know, how I  cope with
the family, and cope with seeing clients, you know, and the course, a n d   I  was
wondering, you know, after you left, whether you think about how much room I  have 
in my headfor you with all o f that other stuffgoing on in my life.
D14: ... We’ve talked about this before and I  don’t think that you should be thinking 
about me all the time and I  accept that you have, we have our allocated time and 
that’s fine .. because I  can tell that you’re concentrating on what I ’m saying because 
(laughs) you always remember everything and I  don ’t remember about myself and
PI 5: Mmm hmm
D15: it doesn ’t feel like you ’re more interested in someone else.
PI 6: Mmm hmm   Yes and I  wonder, you know, i f  that’s quite gratifying to have
someone pay attention to you for that period o f time. But I ’m wondering i f  it would 
also be nice to have it a bit more often and to know that perhaps I  am thinking about 
you from time to time and I  am wondering how the concert is going, how the play is 
going or whether you get on with your new art teacher.
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D16: Yeah that would be nice but I  don’t want to get too attached to you because I  
don't want to get too sad i f  we have to break off our meeting or, don't know ,it's, it 
would be nice i f  you were thinking, 7 wonder how the concert's going’.
Much of my underlying thinking was based on Kohutian ideas that some clients have 
a need to experience a positive transference toward, or even to idealise, their therapist. 
As this appeared to be the case with Miss D, it seemed helpful to probe the areas 
where her parental and other relationships had been less than ideal. For me, the work 
with Miss D represents a successful therapy because she has subsequently contacted 
me from time to time with news of her progress, which appears mainly positive. Also, 
she experienced a reduction in her binge eating symptoms and she has had no 
subsequent contact with mental health services to my knowledge.
Although I was unaware of my therapist’s particular psychotherapeutic genealogy for 
the greater part of my time in analysis, I was surprised to learn that he had been 
supervised by one of Kohut’s own supervisees, who also worked with Kohut for many 
years. This helps to explain why it appeared that I had naturally gravitated to Kohut’s 
work and why it had immediate appeal and meaning for me. Unlike several of my 
associates who have had psychoanalytic psychotherapy or analysis, I did not feel 
alienated by the process or painfully confronted by a ‘blank screen’. My experience 
was of warmth, compassion, empathy and a belief that I was a person of worth and, 
perhaps most importantly, of promise. Kohut (1977) asserted that, ultimately, the 
therapeutic alliance is the cornerstone of psychological repair and growth and it was 
through my experience as a patient that I too came to understand the significance and 
power of that relationship. Nonetheless, there are aspects of Kohut’s self-psychology 
that, for me, distract from the positive contribution he has made to theory. For 
instance, he insists that the only pathogen of childhood conflict is parental failure 
(Tolpin, 1980) and he therefore fails to account for other significant psychological 
factors. However, in my view, no single psychological theory can offer a complete 
explanatory framework for the understanding of human thought and behaviour.
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The Cognitive Behavioural Approach
The transition from psychodynamic to cognitive behavioural (CBT) and cognitive 
analytic work (CAT), which I undertook in my final year of training, was a difficult 
one for me. For the most part, I liked the intensity and closeness of the relationship 
that built up over the long-term in my previous work and I was therefore reluctant to 
embark on a programme of brief interventional work that foreground psychoeducation 
and practical interventions. Therefore, I also undertook some longer-term schema- 
focused work. One of my schema-focused therapy clients, Mr N was a 30-year-old 
man with a recent diagnosis of bipolar disorder. A schema-focussed approach was 
chosen for this client because he had previous experience of CBT, which he had found 
to be mostly unhelpful. He said that there had been a therapeutic agenda and that he 
was “incidental to it”. Additionally he did not perceive his depression as having a 
significant developmental component, viewing his problems as being largely genetic. 
It seemed that Mr N, like Jenny Diski, felt that he too was skating on the thin ice of 
psychological theory, wanting help but feeling frustrated by the focus of both 
psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural approaches.
During our third assessment session the nature of his problem with CBT became 
apparent: he was terrified of challenging his automatic negative thoughts because this 
might cause him to begin to think optimistically, which potentially could trigger a 
manic episode, or so he thought. Employing a schema-focused approach appeared to 
work well with Mr N because it meant that we were able to speculate about the effects 
that his symptoms had on the way that he was living his life. He lived quietly, trying 
not to stimulate himself in any way, lest he should begin the upward spiral into manic 
depression. Although Mr N was initially unable to verbalize his feelings and 
emotions, he was able to use guided imagery to describe his experience of both manic 
and depressive episodes. Gradually, he became more comfortable with altering his 
perception of himself as a person who was paralysed by mental illness.
Mr N needed to work slowly and to feel contained and held during the therapeutic 
hour and the longer-term approach of schema-focused work therefore seemed an 
appropriate choice of therapeutic strategies. Whilst working with Mr N, I was also 
mindful of the social constructionist stance that his perceptions might be limited by
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the culturally prescribed repertoires concerning psychological problems (see Harre 
and van Langenhove, 1999). I was therefore particular in addressing the specific 
meaning Mr N’s symptoms had for him. I asked him what it would mean never to 
experience the intense feelings of exhilaration that he had experienced before his 
diagnosis. Over time we came to talk about, not only the loss of the good emotions, 
but also the loss of the depressive feelings. It was as if we grieved that loss together 
in therapy before we went on to talk about the new ways of being that might be open 
to him. Because he seemed to need it, I shared my view of him with him, when I said, 
“I have positive feelings about you”. Mr N responded by saying that his experience of 
our time together had been positive and that he felt it had been a useful means of 
finding that “I’m not the bad person I used to think I was”.
The Dialogic Unconscious
The proposition that most closely approximates my own ideological stance and 
experiential background is that of the dialogic unconscious (Billig, 1997a, 1997b, 
1999, 2001). Because I have written quite extensively of my interest in the dialogic 
unconscious elsewhere in this Portfolio (see ‘The Dialogic Unconscious: The Missing 
Link or a Contradiction in Terms \ p.32 and my research paper, ‘How Rude Can You 
Get? The Dialogic Unconscious in Therapy \  p. 164), I will only briefly summarise 
this concept. The dialogic unconscious combines the Freudian notion of repression 
with the social constructionist perspective that conventional knowledge is based upon 
society’s taken-for-granted assumptions; that ways of understanding are historically 
and culturally relative; that ‘truth’ is constructed in social process and, that social 
actions are conjoined with systems of knowledge (Burr, 2000). Billig (1997a, 1997b, 
1999, 2001) uses the notion of repression to explain language as having repressive as 
well as expressive functions. The benefit of this approach is not only that I feel 
epistemologically coherent in its use but also that it explains deficits in the theories of 
psychoanalysis and social constructionism. It articulates the ways in which speakers 
are able to suppress certain topics of conversation without being aware that they are 
doing so. These repressions occur in conversation with other people and internally, as 
part of a person’s inner dialogue. This is useful therapeutically because it provides 
insight into the nature of the problems clients encounter in the self-identities they 
construct in both internal and external conversations.
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As an example, after about a month in therapy, Miss M consistently came late to her 
sessions. It was my sense that she was angry that I had not provided her with any 
concrete ‘answers’ to her problems and that she was essentially voting with her feet. 
When I suggested to her that she might be angry with me, she accepted that the 
therapy fell short of her expectations but she denied that she would act on these 
feelings. Miss M always constructed what seemed to be reasonable reasons for her 
lateness and my interpretations aroused a great deal of anxiety in her. The depth of 
her anxiety and her concern that I should be convinced that her lateness was 
unavoidable confirmed my view that she was both angry and unaware of her anger. It 
felt as if I was working very hard with this client, only to have my efforts rebuffed and 
this was often a frustrating and sometimes an annoying process. I experienced Miss 
M’s politeness as exaggerated and insincere. Miss M had been adopted as an infant 
and she seemed to have spent the greater part of her life trying to be polite and helpful 
to her parents as a means of showing gratitude for her adoption. She appeared to have 
constructed an identity that prohibited any experience of herself as rude or impolite. 
She was always deeply apologetic about her lateness.
By being attuned to the difficulty that Miss M had in verbally expressing and 
presenting herself as someone who could only be compliant, I was better able to 
appreciate why she was depressed. She felt that she was someone who tried very hard 
to please other people but who was unappreciated by those around her. The dialogic 
unconscious provided a framework for the conceptualisation of Miss M’s difficulties 
as arising from dialogic repression and I was able to formulate a treatment plan that 
focused on the rituals of politeness that informed her everyday speech acts. I asked 
her what it would be like not to apologise for being late. She said that I might not like 
her and that I might even stop seeing her. I asked how she was so sure that her 
assumptions were right and also that it was inevitable that we would stop meeting 
even if she always did everything that I considered to be ‘right’.
After some months in therapy she acknowledged what she had been unable to say 
previously, perhaps even to herself - that she felt that she had greatly disappointed her 
adoptive family and that they had wished for a “trophy child” to make them look 
good. She said that she had spent the entire of her childhood attempting to
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compensate for this without acknowledging that she was doing so. Miss M left 
therapy at a time of crisis -  her father had become terminally ill - and it was difficult 
to get a sense of her progress. Although she reported “feeling better” I was unsure as 
to whether or not she perceived me in the same way that she had experienced her 
family -  superficially positive, but all the same disappointed in her. However, I was 
equally unconvinced that another theoretical approach would have reaped greater 
rewards.
Perhaps the greatest problem with working with the dialogic unconscious is that it is 
not widely understood or employed in therapeutic practice and therefore obtaining 
supervision that corresponds to its central tenets is not possible. Hence, I have no 
means of checking or evaluating my work with the dialogic unconscious except 
through my sense of attunement with the client or through informal dialogues with 
social constructionist practitioners or through the use of follow-up clinical measures 
like the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation System (CORE, 1998). These 
measures are somewhat unsatisfactory because, although they may indicate that a 
client’s condition is improved, they fail to capture the specific agents of change. My 
utilisation of the dialogic unconscious is therefore a work in progress that could be 
enhanced by the input of other professionals.
Conclusion
My development as an integrative practitioner has been cautious. I have attempted to 
learn to practice first from a psychodynamic perspective and then from a cognitive 
behavioural perspective. I have also been deeply influenced by the social 
constructionist view that many versions or accounts might abound concerning a single 
phenomenon. Theories should act as a structure to support the client. Like a solid 
floe of ice, they may not be entirely without ruts or catches or cracks but they should 
help to prevent the client from slipping helplessly into the black and treacherous 
waters of anxiety, depression or suffering, below. While I continue my development 
as a counselling psychologist, I hope to be able to generate, within myself, new 
understandings of what it means to make the journey into the Antarctica of the client’s 
distress and to help them face the challenge and risk of gliding uncertainly across the 
therapeutic ice.
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Research Dossier
Three research reports are included within this dossier, one from each year of the 
PsychD programme. The first two papers are linked by their common interest in 
eating disorders and by their critical stance to contemporary treatment models. All of 
these papers are epistemologically coherent in their adoption of a social 
constructionist ideology. However, the final paper in this collection adapts the social 
constructionist approach to incorporate the psychoanalytic concept of repression.
The first paper reviews the literature in the area of eating disorders and, taking an 
historical perspective, it spans a time frame beginning with the medieval saints and 
moving through to the present day. Subheadings have been altered from the original 
submission in order to comply with suggestions made by Markers. For the same 
reason, I have taken a more straightforward approach in my description of Hilda 
Bruch’s psychoanalytic theory. My original paper also included a quote from Ian 
Parker regarding the considerable influence of Lacan on contemporary psychotherapy 
practices and, because it seemed an overstatement, this has now been omitted.
Therapist’s constructions of anorexia nervosa and their own roles in its treatment are 
investigated in the dossier’s second paper. This work examines the texts of individual 
therapists in order to take a critical stance on clinical practice. Markers were 
concerned that the criticisms made in this paper might be open to the misinterpretation 
that I was being judgemental and devaluing of those individuals who participated in 
the research. I was as eager to avoid that misconception as were the markers and I 
have therefore rewritten the Personal Overview section of the paper. It is made clear 
in this section that the detailed study of texts required by the research methodology is 
not undertaken as a means of attacking specific therapists but it acts as a device for the 
underpinning of philosophical and theoretical assertions.
The final paper on the dialogic unconscious represents an attempt to identify whether 
or how a novel theoretical concept, requiring the modification of both psychoanalytic 
and social constructionist perspectives, might be applied to clinical therapeutic 
practice. Because of its innovative stance, markers were somewhat unsure of how to
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evaluate this paper and, in the original submission, suggestions as to how this might 
be done were inadequately addressed. This area of the paper has been elaborated, and 
hence improved, by this inclusion. Many other aspects of the research have also been 
substantially altered. The main criticism of the work, as previously submitted, 
concerned some seemingly reality-based readings of the text, which are impermissible 
in discourse analysis. The analysis has been honed and sharpened in order to make 
the social constructionist epistemology underlying the work more readily apparent. 
However, any incorporation of a psychoanalytic concept into this ideological 
framework seems likely to unsettle some advocates of the discipline. Vivien Burr 
(1995) has suggested that social constructionists are a diverse group who can be 
identified by their ‘family resemblance’ to one another. This paper introduces the 
dialogic unconscious as a challenging newcomer to the traditions of this family.
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From Fasting Virgins to Faulty Mothers: The Social and Historical
Construction of and Therapeutic Approaches to Eating Disorders
This article examines the social and historical foundations o f eating disorders and 
considers their implications for theory and psychotherapeutic treatment. Selected 
historical literature concerning constructions o f self-starvation from the Middle Ages 
through to the first recorded diagnosis o f anorexia nervosa in the 18th century is 
discussed. Comparisons are drawn between the social conditions that informed early 
practices o f self-starvation among holy women and the social conditions that inform 
contemporary conceptualisations o f eating disorders. The effect o f dominant 
ideologies, especially that o f mother blame, on the delivery o f treatment for eating 
problems, is considered. ‘Feminist ’ psychoanalytic approaches to eating disorders 
are examined and criticised for their reliance on concepts and practices that oppress 
and subjugate women. A social constructionist, narrative approach to therapy is 
considered to be significantly less problematic for feminist therapeutic practitioners 
working with women with eating disorders.
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From Fasting Virgins to Faulty Mothers: The Social and Historical
Construction of and Therapeutic Approaches to Eating Disorders
Since the 1960s there has been increasing psychiatric, psychological and public 
interest in eating problems and the factors that may be responsible for initiating and 
sustaining them. At first, attention was directed towards the increased incidence of 
anorexia nervosa (AN) which has the highest mortality rate of any formally 
categorised psychiatric condition, with deaths occurring in 15-20 per cent of the 
affected population (Crisp et al., 1992; Sacker and Zimmer 1987). In the 1980s, eating 
patterns which incorporated a binge/purge cycle were identified separately from AN 
as bulimia nervosa (BN) and they too became the subject of much media and medical 
scrutiny. This cultural fascination and preoccupation with eating disorders (Malson, 
1997) has been accompanied by an ever-expanding market of private and public 
professional facilities for both in-patient and outpatient treatment. As 90-95 per cent 
of AN sufferers and a similar percentage of those diagnosed with BN are women, 
explanations that account for the gender-specific nature of these conditions are of 
particular concern to feminist scholars and therapeutic practitioners.
Criteria for a diagnosis of AN have been defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as a 
refusal to maintain body weight over a minimally normal weight for age and height; 
an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight; undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or denial of the seriousness of 
the current low body weight; and in women, absence of at least three consecutive 
menstrual cycles. Two subtypes of AN are defined in DSM-IV as being bulimic, in 
which recurrent episodes of binge eating take place, and nonbulimic, in which these 
episodes are absent.
Diagnostic criteria for BN are more complex. It is defined in DSM-IV as recurrent 
episodes of binge eating which are characterised by both eating in a discrete period of 
time an amount of food that is definitely larger than most people would eat in a similar 
period of time and a sense of a lack of control over eating during the episode. An 
average of two binge-eating episodes per week for at least three months together with
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a self-evaluation that is unduly influenced by body shape and weight are required. 
These disturbances must not occur exclusively during episodes of AN and there are 
two types. Individuals exhibiting the purging type engage in self-induced vomiting or 
laxative or diuretic use and those exhibiting the non-purging type use strict dieting, 
fasting or vigorous exercise but do not engage in purging.
Moving beyond the standard medical and psychiatric understandings of AN and BN, 
these conditions have been examined in critical and political ways by feminist 
scholars. As the female body has been identified as a prime site of women’s 
oppression (Bordo, 1993; Coward, 1987; Lawrence, 1987; Ussher, 1989), the social 
representation and construction of the female body has been of interest to feminists 
concerned with eating disorders. Implicit in feminist theory is that female biology has 
historically been and continues to be problematised within the culture of medical 
science (Goudsmit, 1994; Goudsmit and Gadd, 1991). The historical analysis of eating 
disorders by Bell (1985), Hep worth (1999) and others - beginning with the self­
starvation of holy women in medieval times through to the examination of AN and 
BN in more recent times by Bordo (1993), Malson (1998) and colleagues - has 
illustrated the effects that cultural assumptions can have on women’s suffering. That 
medieval fasting practices are directly connected with modem day expressions of self­
starvation is a widely drawn conclusion that invites further analysis into the social 
conditions that may be relevant to the aetiology of eating disorders in the past and 
currently. In both cases, there are a number of interrelated cultural factors that appear 
to be connected with an increase in the disturbed eating patterns of women. In order to 
specify and analyse them, feminist writers have often adopted a social constructionist 
approach, informed by the work of Michel Foucault. His work suggested that 
dominant ideas are rooted in the cultural maintenance of power relations. Foucault 
(1983) was interested in how individual people constituted forms of power and how 
they were, conversely, constituted by power relationships. In delineating the 
relationship between the socio-symbolic meaning of women’s disordered eating 
practices and the relevance this has had in supporting patriarchal authority, feminists 
have identified how women with eating problems are enmeshed within a self­
regulating power structure.
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Crucially, the dominant ideologies of any particular historical period have been shown 
to be maintained and reproduced in theories of the mind and body and, in more recent 
times, in the therapeutic practices that evolve from them (Parker, 1999; Parker et al., 
1995). It is the aim of social constructionism to redefine constructs like ‘the mind’ in 
order to uncover the cultural foundations that inform the practices of psychology and 
psychotherapy. The present article broadly aims to explore the cultural foundations of 
eating disorders and evaluate how the resultant narrative might contribute to a 
reformulation of theory and treatment in relation to these conditions. Firstly, a brief 
discussion of selected literature concerning historic constructions of self-starvation 
from the Middle Ages through to the first ever diagnosis of AN will be presented. 
Comparisons will then be made between the social conditions that led to that 
diagnosis and the conditions implicated in more modem presentations of eating 
disorders. This will include an analysis of the effects that have followed generally 
from the works of Sigmund Freud and John Bowlby and, more specifically, from the 
practices of Hilda Bmch.
An examination of the subsequent application of psychoanalytic principles in the 
treatment of eating disorders by two feminist practitioners, Susie Orbach and Karin 
Bell, will follow. Finally, the contribution of social constructionist analysis to the 
reconceptualisation of therapeutic conventions will be examined with particular regard 
to the treatment of women with eating disorders. A connection will therefore be made 
between historic practices and assumptions concerning women’s eating behaviours 
and psychologists’ understandings of eating disorders as individual pathologies. To 
demystify eating disorders by exposing their historical relationship with dominant 
power structures may encourage the psychological reconceptualisation of what are 
considered to be amongst the most serious ‘psychopathologies’ of our time. For 
Malson (1998), an historical analysis is essential to psychological inquiry and practice 
generally as it can provide the theoretical underpinnings for the development of new 
or at least better informed strategies for treatment.
Constructing Gendered Eating Patterns: From God to Gull
Bell (1985), Garrett (1998), Hepworth (1999) and others have highlighted how, as 
long ago as the 12th and 13th centuries, self-starvation was socially constructed as a
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particularly desirable and aspirational state for holy women. Those who could endure 
and continue to exist through long periods of time with little or no nourishment were 
highly revered and were regularly rewarded with consecration into sainthood 
subsequent to their often premature deaths. According to Bell (1985), this self­
starvation was frequently accompanied by bulimic practices in which nuns would 
gorge themselves on large amounts of food which would then be expelled by self­
induced vomiting. As the fasting customs of these holy women so closely resemble 
the dieting regimes of contemporary AN sufferers, some diagnosticians have made 
retrospective diagnoses of AN (Bliss and Branch, 1960; Lacy, 1982; Rampling, 
1985). At the time, it was believed that the ability to self-starve was sustained by 
profound religious insight. Contemporary researchers have also made associations 
between the degree of weight loss in AN sufferers today and the depth of their 
religious beliefs. For example, Joughin et al. (1992) suggested that religious 
asceticism can be invoked to justify, supplement or replace the defense of weight loss 
in AN.
Bell (1985) has asserted that, regardless of the specific historical period in which food 
refusal is expressed, the body becomes the tabula rasa on which women attempt to 
compose a meaningful female identity against the backdrop of a male dominated and 
regulated society. He has deconstructed the meaning of self-starvation for women then 
and now so that eating practices can be understood in the contexts from which they 
have emerged. However, his ideas rely heavily on the notion that self-starvation was 
an elective strategy employed as a means of protest against patriarchal religious 
practices. This seems unlikely given that holy women embodied the social values of 
their time and only rarely attempted any radical church reforms.
The perspectives adopted by Hepworth (1999) and Malson (1998) have more apparent 
merit in that they examine past and current discourses of femininity - and masculinity 
- in order to expose the cultural assumptions on which those discourses were based. 
According to these writers, during medieval times, women’s opportunity for 
renunciating material goods was confined to food, in contrast to men who were able to 
exchange their worldly possessions for the promise of eternal salvation. Saint 
Christina the Astonishing wrote that she ‘gave up food because she had nothing else to
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give up for Christ’ (cited in Malson, 1998: 50). The male position of the time was an 
elevated one in which religious and economic power over women was maintained at 
both local and institutional levels. Foucault (1988) has described a technology of the 
self in which the practice of subjugating the self occurs through disciplines of the 
mind, body, spirit, behaviour and thought. The disciplines of self-starvation, which 
characterised the behaviour of the saints, can be interpreted as a technology of the self 
in which the power of the church was maintained by the self-subjugation of holy 
women. The technology of the self coexists, according to Foucault (1988), with the 
technology of power in which people are subjugated through techniques which 
monitor and control many elements of their lives by making continuous comparative 
references to the standards of others.
Medieval women who had little or no wealth were judged according to a male 
standard of self-sacrifice, which constituted as positive their ability to deny 
themselves even the basic requirements for existence. The male model of behaviour 
was the yardstick by which women were then judged as being different; Hepworth 
(1999) and Malson (1998) have suggested that women’s comparative differences were 
so culturally reified as to form the fabric of social thinking. Hepworth (1999) has 
convincingly argued that these early constructions of ‘good’ holy women provided the 
preconditions for later polarised constructions of women as evil heretics. It seems 
plausible that dead and starving women, in the form of saints and the religiously 
compliant, helped to maintain rather than threaten the prevailing social order of male 
hegemony.
As keeper of the social order, the religious establishment was the ultimate arbiter of 
normative and non-normative behaviour, good and evil, sanity and insanity. During 
the 15th and 16th centuries, the social construction of many women as deviant, devil- 
worshipping sorceresses culminated in their torture, burning and drowning in witch­
hunts. Ehrenreich and English (1979) believed that women - particularly peasant 
women - were becoming increasingly skilled as lay healers and midwives at this time 
and that this posed a challenge to the knowledge and power bases of the prevailing 
Christian authorities. When invoking the help of God failed to overcome pain and 
suffering, the herbal medications supplied by peasant woman were sought. As
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women’s healing powers became more and more refined, so too did their persecution 
by the church. Hepworth (1999: 17) has suggested that the medieval practice of 
persecuting women as witches became ‘an organised, large scale system of governing 
women and “deviants’” . She proposed that this is directly relevant to the ways in 
which women were later perceived as having a corporeality that was out of control 
and which culminated in sexual and eating difficulties (see Ogden, 1997, on the theme 
of control in eating disorders).
Both Hepworth (1999) and Malson (1998) have created a link between early 
constructions of femininity and later expressions of women’s ‘madness’, including 
AN and BN, through the notion of hysteria. Witchcraft was believed to be caused by 
hysteria, a word that was coined from a Greek word meaning ‘womb’. Thus the 
female reproductive system was targeted as the site of female instability, wickedness 
and insanity. As Hepworth (1999: 18) observed, ‘Hysteria constituted a major attack 
on women that was aimed at that which was most specific to women and symbolic of 
feminine power: the womb’. This idea proved most persistent, so that even in 1819, 
the French physician, Jean-Baptiste Louyer-Villarmay, could still declare that ‘A man 
cannot be hysterical. He has no uterus’ (cited in Showalter, 1997: 64). There is much 
evidence to support the view that early discourses privileged men’s reproductive 
powers and oppressed women by pathologising theirs (Ehrenreich and English, 1979; 
Martin, 1989; Showalter, 1985).
King’s (1983) analysis of early Roman society has demonstrated that women were 
defined according to their reproductive capacities from that time. Clothing was used to 
denote the reproductive stage of life a woman had entered and separate living 
accommodation was provided for those in the premenarche, menarche and post­
childbirth stages. Until a woman had borne a child, she was not permitted to enter 
society fully and those who never experienced menarche or childbirth were considered 
to be lunatics and lived separately in compounds for the insane. This research suggests 
that a system of governing and regulating women that relied on ideas concerning their 
reproductive systems existed much earlier than Hepworth (1999) has acknowledged. 
Moreover, it may also have been the case that the increasing deification of female 
saints amongst the lay population in medieval times presented a threat to the
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hierarchical practices of the male-dominated Christian church and that this contributed 
to the development of a polarised view of women as being demonic.
More generally, the premise that women’s biological functioning is intimately 
connected to their level of psychological (im)balance was a strongly-held belief that 
informed much of the later medical literature from the 17th and 18th centuries. For 
example, according to Martin (1989), at that time specific states and traits such as 
poor judgement, lack of co-ordination, dizziness, fainting, mood swings, depression 
and anxiety were constructed as being particularly feminine traits that arose out of a 
fragile and vulnerable reproductive system. This link is still observed in ‘raging 
hormones’ theories, which aim to explain pre-menstrual syndrome and postnatal 
depression (George and Sandler, 1982; Golub, 1992; Mauthner, 1993; Romito, 1990; 
Walker, 1997).
Using the Foucauldian rationale of the technology of the self, Bordo (1993) asserted 
that individuals would self-orient to prevailing culture practices. She quoted Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s 1792, and now classic, articulation of women’s surrender to 
preconditioning: ‘Taught from their infancy that beauty is woman’s sceptre, the mind 
shapes itself to the body, and, roaming round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its 
prison’ (Bordo, 1993: 18). During the early part of the 18th century, the malaise that 
women experienced as a result of their cultural oppression was associated with 
medical and psychiatric conditions that constructed them as incapable and susceptible 
to fainting spells, inertia and lack of motivation. This tendency to pathologise 
women’s behaviour led to the first ever diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, according to 
Hepworth (1999). She has suggested that when medical causes for female 
dysfunctions like self-starvation were not readily apparent, physicians sought 
explanations in the developing ‘science’ of psychiatry.
In 1874, William Gull reviewed the first case of what he termed ‘anorexia nervosa’, 
which he believed was characterised by loss of appetite, although it is rarely the case 
that those with anorexia stop feeling hungry. At the time and despite having seen only 
two cases of food refusal, Gull described AN as afflicting mostly young middle class 
women and this characterisation of the condition is still evident in the medical
literature today. He also drew upon notions from the medical literature which 
problematised women’s personalities and morality when he suggested that priests and 
moral advisors should attend afflicted women in order to promote moral rectitude. By 
depicting AN in this way, Gull promoted a view of femininity that conformed to 
stereotypical notions of women’s conflictual and irrational natures and, probably 
because this view resonated with popular medical opinion, he was able to convince his 
colleagues of his diagnostic and treatment acumen in the area. At the same time, he 
was able to elevate his position and influence within the medical community.
According to Showalter (1997: 17), ‘a doctor or other authority figure must first 
define, name and publicize the disorder and then attract patients into its community’. 
She also suggested that their efforts are rewarded, as they become known as leading, 
distinguished and renowned experts in their areas of medicine or psychiatry. At the 
same time as Gull was promoting his ideas about AN, a French counterpart was also 
theorising about cases of self-starvation. The medical literature records a debate 
between the two physicians concerning who first discovered and documented AN and 
Hepworth (1999) believed that the two were locked in a battle to become known as 
one of the 19th century’s ‘Great Men of Science’. By providing an historical analysis 
of religious and medical discourses and an analysis of the discourses of femininity and 
masculinity which may have significantly informed present-day conceptualisations of 
AN and BN, feminists - and in particular Hepworth (1999) and Showalter (1985, 
1997) - have provided greater transparency to psychological understanding of the 
aetiologies of these conditions.
Although these historical and social deconstructions may not provide ready solutions 
to eating problems, they have helped to illustrate the effect of religious practices on 
eating behaviours and their connection with the effects of medical practices on the 
psychological evaluations of women with eating problems. The effect of the 
construction of AN as an illness which afflicted mainly adolescent and young women 
who were exhibiting hysterical symptoms and who were therefore seen to be mentally 
unstable was to confirm an ideology of femininity as weak, child-like and dependant 
upon male authority and control. Defining anorexia nervosa in such a way also
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authenticated an ideology of masculinity as insightful and understanding of the female 
condition.
Eating Disorders as Gendered Psychopathology: The Contribution of Freud and 
Bruch
Like Gull, the culture into which Sigmund Freud emerged - and which he was later to 
dominate - was one in which the notion of hysteria had already been assimilated and 
was being reproduced by its populace. Also like Gull, the way in which Freud 
interpreted women’s behaviour generally was to have an enduring effect on the ways 
in which women’s eating behaviours would be pathologised and treated. As the 
explanations Freud (1955) offered for hysteria and neurosis were based on theories of 
infantile sexuality and psychosexual development, they were shocking to the society 
of the time. However, it was probably because they emerged from commonly accepted 
assumptions regarding women’s inherent personality defects and men’s superior 
moral and psychological functioning that Freudian principles were palatable enough to 
be sanctioned by the scientific community and consequently to gain general social 
acceptance. When Freud (1953) proposed that adult personality and behaviour was to 
a large extent contingent upon early infantile sexual experience and development, he 
carved out separate psychosexual pathways for men and women. Men and boys were 
defined by the presence of the penis and women and girls were defined in relation to 
their lack of a male sexual organ, in terms of ‘phallic lack’. Freud (1953) argued that 
successful resolution of the Oedipal complex, which was said to occur at about the age 
of three, was crucial to a boy’s healthy adult development. For girls, Freud (1953) 
offered a theory that situated and fixed gender identity within the notion of ‘penis 
envy’. Women, according to Freud, were inferior to men, vain, lacking in superego 
development and thus deficient in moral reasoning. They had, he said, a natural 
orientation to heterosexuality in their experience of the vaginal as opposed to the 
clitoral orgasm and ultimately they only partially reconciled their inherent sexual 
inferiority in the production of a child, preferably male. In this way, Freud offered a 
plausible explanation as to the underlying mechanisms and psychology of social 
norms, including male hegemony, by describing it as the outcome of normal 
psychosexual development.
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Despite many criticisms from many quarters, Freudian theory has had a deeply 
influential effect on the theoretical assumptions and treatment approaches of both 
mainstream and feminist practitioners with an interest in AN and BN. Critics of Freud 
have suggested that he was the product of a middle class, Victorian, sexually 
repressed society and that the prevailing patriarchy of the time is reflected in his 
doctrines (Leahey, 1997; Lemer, 1986a; Masson, 1990; Ramas, 1983). In 1903, seven 
years after proposing that the sexual violation that some women experienced could 
lead to physical and behavioural problems, Freud withdrew his seduction theory in 
favour of one which labelled reports of abuse as fantasy. The effect of this shift was 
that individual dysfunction was reinstated as being predominant to psychopathology. 
The effect of that U-turn is nowhere more present than in the treatment of eating 
disorders, which often relies on psychoanalytic theory in practice.
When, in the 1960s, greater popular awareness of AN developed and the condition 
was represented as the affliction of the modem generation of adolescent girls and 
young women, the treatment of choice was Freudian psychoanalysis. Together, the 
core components of free association, an open and unconstrained dialogue generated by 
the patient, the analyst’s interpretation based on this dialogue and the patient’s 
emotional response to the analyst (called ‘transference’) are presumed to aid the 
discovery of the unconscious influences which motivate the behaviour of the 
individual (Dryden, 1996). Despite the common acknowledgement that cultural 
factors are heavily implicated in the aetiology of eating disorders, the psychoanalytic 
principle of seeking causation in individual pathology is usually relied upon in 
treatment.
Hilda Bruch, the first of the more recent psychoanalytic practitioners to publicise her 
interest in eating disorders, embodied the qualities that Showalter (1997) regarded as 
essential to the creation of modem day analogies of hysteria. As Professor of 
Psychiatry at a medical school in Texas, she was already an established figure in the 
psychiatric community and her theory of AN resonated with the female adolescent 
population for whom the condition was believed to be a problem. For her efforts she 
became known as ‘Lady Anorexia’. Populist images of adolescent girls portray them 
as stmggling to fulfil a great many conflicting cultural expectations including that of
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achieving success as an independent woman with a promising career ahead whilst also 
remaining tied to home and family commitments. Adolescent girls are depicted as 
having romantic ideations, increasing sexual awareness and a need to establish self- 
identity within a family that misunderstands them, and Bruch incorporated these 
elements of perceived adolescent development into her theory of AN.
Comparisons have been made between Bruch’s (1978) characterisation of anorexic 
girls and the personalities and circumstances of young women created within romantic 
fiction written for an adolescent female market. A parallel between the inner world of 
the anorexic as described by Bruch (1978) and the inner world of the heroines of some 
romantic novels has been drawn by Brumberg (1988). She described the ‘plots’ as 
having a notable similarity with the characters in both being attractive, intelligent, 
high achievers who are misunderstood by their families, particularly their mothers. 
Their ability to achieve success in dieting is taken too far as a result of the 
complications of adolescence and, in both portrayals, the girl becomes afflicted with 
AN. The publicity surrounding the disordered eating patterns of possible role models 
for adolescent girls - such as the late Diana, Princess of Wales and Calista Flockhart - 
reinforces an idealised and fanciful perspective of AN and BN. Showalter (1997) has 
suggested that the romanticising of these conditions in popular fiction and in Bruch’s 
theory, together with their connection with highly successful and prosperous media 
personalities provides an alluring image which seduces the adolescent girl into 
identification with them.
Bruch (1985) reported that, in the 1980s, patients ‘tried out’ anorexia after having 
watched a TV programme or, rather bizarrely, after assembling a science project. 
Although she acknowledged the effect of publicity on the conditions, she attributed 
the growing incidence of eating disorders to unspecified changes in the clinical and 
psychological ‘picture’. Her identification of the etiological factors implicated in what 
she termed ‘primary anorexia nervosa’ is, however, quite clear. The theory of AN with 
which Bruch was first acquainted when she began her practice in the 1930s was based 
on Freud’s theory of psychosexual development. For the anorexic, eating was 
considered to be symbolic of impregnation and fatness as symbolic of pregnancy. 
Rahman et al. (1939) proposed that the condition served as a protection against the
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assumption of normal sexual relationships and Waller et al. (1940) provided an 
elaborate account of the condition in terms of fantasies of oral impregnation and of 
rejecting the idea of having a child in the abdomen. Classic psychodynamic 
interpretations of AN considered the disorder to be a defence against unacceptable 
sexual impulses and this view continued to be predominant until Bruch reinterpreted 
the symptomology.
Whereas psychoanalysis traditionally considered female psychosexual development to 
be inherently deficient, Bruch (1974) suggested that poor mothering could account for 
AN. She described a process wherein the infantile mother/daughter relationship was 
characterised by ‘absence of regular and consistently appropriate responses to the 
infant’s needs, particularly to the need for food’ (Bruch, 1985: 13). This, she argued, 
deprives the growing child of the basic requirements for the healthy development of 
body identification and later emotional self-expression. The fundamental problem, 
according to Bruch (1978), is not one of disturbed eating function but is one which 
centres around the mother’s difficulties in responding to her child’s needs, effectively 
leaving the adolescent with no core personality of her own. Although this theory 
departs from earlier psychoanalytic views, it maintains the thread of female hysteria as 
causative of psychological dysfunction and in that sense it is a case of history 
repeating itself. Once again, the prevailing cultural assumptions concerning women’s 
inferiority and their need to be kept under strict social control for their own edification 
were incorporated into a theory offering psychological restoration.
Another theme that was repeated from the analysis of the fasting holy virgins of the 
Middle Ages and appears to have influenced Bruch’s (1985) views is that of the 
idolisation of the self-starving. There is a substantial corpus of literature stemming 
from Bruch’s first clinical experience of eating disorders, which suggests that thin 
women embody the most desirable of feminine qualities. A longitudinal study by 
Gamer et al. (1980) showed a gradual but definite trend towards increasing thinness in 
women as a cultural ideal from the early 1960s and, since then, the media have 
continued to promote and reinforce increasingly skeletal images of women (Bordo, 
1993; Hamilton and Waller, 1993; Lawrence 1987). Bruch (1985) also appeared to 
elevate the status of women who display the resolve and control required to self-
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starve. She perceived those with AN as being in a prestigious position by comparison 
with other women who aspire to such determined self-discipline. Of bulimics she said, 
‘They make an exhibitionistic display of their lack of control or discipline, in contrast 
to the adherence to discipline of the true anorexics...Though relatively uninvolved, 
they expect to share in the prestige of anorexia nervosa’ (Bruch, 1985: 12).
The theory Bruch offered also coincided with the social view that was emerging 
during her first encounters with eating disorders in the 1950s that working mothers 
were responsible for their children’s psychopathologies. It has been argued that, in 
post-war Britain, a political agenda existed which sought to return women to the realm 
of the domestic and restrict the industrial world to the work of men (Bims, 1999; 
Franzblau, 1999). John Bowlby was commissioned by the World Health Organisation 
in the early 1950s to study the effect on children of mothers being in the workplace 
rather than in the home and he concluded that the experience of maternal deprivation 
caused such serious and lasting trauma to the child that it could result in psychosis and 
criminality (Bowlby, 1969). Social and political pressures on women to remain in the 
home in order to raise their children became commonplace when Bowlby 
recommended that financial resources be directed away from daycare facilities and 
toward providing home care services. Bowlby used psychoanalytic principles to 
inform his research and he based his deductions on the Freudian assumption that the 
infant’s relationship with its mother established the prototype for all later 
relationships. Lemer (1986b) has contended that, as a result, contemporary women 
have been left the legacy of a mother-blaming society in which their every action is 
scrutinised and found to be destructive or damaging to their children. The theme of 
mother blame was central to Bruch’s argument concerning the causes of AN. She 
suggested that the aetiology of eating disorders is only marginally affected by cultural 
pressures to attain an unrealistically low body weight but that other social forces more 
actively promote eating problems. Her view implied that working mothers are not 
sufficiently placed to provide for their daughters’ psychological and emotional needs 
and that they are also inadequate as role models. Finally, she concluded of disordered 
eating patterns that their ‘frequency during the past 20 years appears to be related to 
psycho-sociological factors, chiefly to those of the women’s movement’ (Bruch, 1985: 
18). So, in this analysis, working mothers are responsible for their daughters’
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psychopathologies because only they can appropriately attend to their needs - but it is 
feminism that has corrupted motherhood.
Bruch’s (1985) contention that the women’s movement has destabilised the domestic 
welfare of children raises some interesting questions concerning her own position as a 
highly successful career woman and mother. Was she suggesting that other women are 
not as capable as she was in balancing the requirements of home and job or did she 
regard herself as one who, by virtue of her elevated status amongst a largely male 
professional population, was positioned outside her own proscriptions? There are 
other problems associated with Bruch’s (1974, 1978) theory. It fails to account for 
why the overwhelming majority of those affected by eating disorders are female and it 
offers no similar developmental pathology for boys whose mothers fail to respond to 
their needs. Similarly, no satisfactory explanation is offered as to why sufferers are 
mainly adolescent or why the illness should be increasing in other age groups as well. 
Also, there has been a considerable body of research demonstrating that attachments 
are fluid and that relationships with others can be as important as attachments to 
mothers (Dunn, 1993; Rutter, 1995). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the theory 
lacks specificity to AN and Bruch (1985) did not identify the developmental processes 
pertinent to BN because she questioned its inclusion as a separate diagnostic category. 
Her theory therefore fails to explain why two separate pathologies (according to 
DSM) should arise at the same historical juncture.
Some Feminist Psychoanalytic Approaches to Eating Disorders: Orbach and 
Bell
Bruch (1974, 1978) was not alone in adopting psychoanalytic thought as the basis of a 
theoretical approach to eating problems. Despite the long-standing and sustained 
feminist attack on Freud’s ideas, feminists began to reinterpret aspects of his theory to 
explain women’s social and relational difficulties. Baker Miller (1976, 1994), 
Chodorow (1989, 1991), Mitchell (1974) and Sayers (1982, 1990) have argued in 
favour of Freudian analysis as a valuable resource in the psychical understanding of 
both genders and as a means to deconstruct the personal and cultural oppression of 
women. Their belief that elements of Freud’s psychosexual theory of development 
could be incorporated into feminist theory and that psychoanalytic techniques could
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be appropriated for use in the treatment of psychologically distressed women was 
welcomed by many practitioners working with eating disordered clients.
Notable amongst those who embraced the principles of psychoanalytic theory was 
Susie Orbach who has achieved recognition as an author of feminist works and as the 
therapist who helped Diana, Princess of Wales, with her eating problems. At a macro­
level, Orbach (1985, 1993) has located the ultimate source of eating problems in the 
socially prescribed roles in which women are conditioned to participate. She believed 
that women experience their own bodies according to comparisons they make between 
themselves and the ‘thin-as-ideal’ media images that constantly bombard them; in this 
respect, she accords with the Foucauldian notion that social control is maintained by 
self-regulation and referral to the standards of others. She is also mindful of the post­
war drive to return women to the domain of home and to a domestic servitude in 
which the care needs of others supersede their own requirements. However, rather 
than dismissing as politically motivated the mother blame which was attached to post­
war conceptualisations of women and families, Orbach (1985, 1993) has engaged in a 
critique of the social conditions that have led to mothers being responsible for their 
daughters’ eating problems. At a micro-level, she has employed a psychoanalytic 
approach to argue that the preconditions for eating disturbances begin early in the 
mother/daughter relationship.
In common with Bruch (1974, 1978), Orbach (1985, 1993) identified the mother’s 
unwillingness or inability to respond to her daughter’s needs for nourishment and 
autonomy as fundamental to the development of an eating problem. Daughters, 
according to Orbach (1985,1993), stir up conscious and unconscious reactions in their 
mothers who respond to them with a lack of consistency and attention. The symbolic 
expression of mother-love is reified in food and the feeding relationship becomes one 
in which, from birth, boys normally experience total gratification whereas girls learn a 
lesson of deprivation (Orbach, 1993). Although Orbach has attempted to explain the 
psychological mechanisms that culminate in individual experiences of AN and BN, 
she has been unable to integrate her macro and micro-level arguments in a coherent 
and convincing way. In treatment and in practice, girls and their mothers are viewed in 
isolation from the rest of their families and from society. Little account is taken of the
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influence of fathers, siblings, extended family relations, peers or the school 
environment - all of which have been shown to have a significant influence on 
adolescent development (Adams et al., 1994). It might therefore be the case that a 
thoroughly systemic approach might be more helpful (Dallos and Draper, 2000).
Much of Orbach’s (1985, 1993) evidence is taken from anecdotal reports of client 
sessions in which mother blame is a Salient feature. One wonders how else a troubled 
woman would interpret her position in relation to a daughter with an eating disorder in 
a society saturated by the accepted wisdom that mothers are responsible for their 
children’s psychological well-being. Benveniste et al.’s (1999) investigation into lay 
theories of AN has found that these theories reproduce and maintain existing concepts 
and practices that inform popular conceptualisations of the illness. Also, Orbach’s 
case for the centrality of the mother/daughter dyad to the specific mechanisms of AN 
and BN has been somewhat diminished by the assumptions of her latest novel. 
Although essentially fictitious, Orbach’s (2000) The Impossibility o f Sex is a catalogue 
of case studies in which the mothers’ inadequacies leave their children scarred and 
dysfunctional. Her premise that discrete social factors can interact with the 
unconsciously motivated behaviours of mothers to produce specific pathologies like 
eating disorders seems to have given way to a more general psychoanalytic view that 
women’s psychologies are inherently defective.
When prominent supposedly feminist voices like Susie Orbach’s speak of the validity 
of traditional methods in the treatment of women’s distress, it can seem that 
mainstream theories are foundational to or can at least be incorporated into feminist 
thinking. Theories that draw upon and echo cultural assumptions such as mother 
blame can seem to be legitimised as feminist practice. Other psychoanalytic therapists 
have claimed to adopt a feminist approach to eating disorders, which in effect, appears 
to be indistinguishable from traditional psychoanalytic psychotherapeutic approaches. 
As an example, Karin Bell’s case study 4On the relationship between daughters and 
mothers with regard to Bulimia Nervosa’ will be examined in some detail. Bell’s 
(1994) account of an adolescent’s development of BN appeared to be more concerned 
with the mother’s psychological state than with her client’s, whom she called 
‘Martha’, and throughout the narrative there are clear references to the mother as the
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source of the pathology. Bell (1994: 21) began by saying that it is ‘excessive 
stimulation in the early mother-daughter relationship which renders it impossible for 
the infant to withdraw’ and she seemed to concur with Bruch’s (1985) view that 
working mothers are unable to fulfil their daughters’ needs. Martha’s problems are 
constructed as arising from her own mother’s problems of individuation and 
separation and also from her mother’s return to work when she was aged three. 
‘Martha’s model is a woman who only feels satisfied when she has a baby to look 
after’, she wrote (1994: 25). However, this point was contradicted in the next sentence 
when she stated that ‘Martha was bom when her older sister reached the age of 
puberty’ (ibid.). Martha’s mother therefore had a gap of about ten years between her 
children, which does not suggest that she was a woman who was unable to sustain 
herself without caring for an infant. When Martha’s mother returned to work and 
enlisted her own mother’s help in caring for her daughter, this was perceived as over­
identification and an inability to accomplish separation: ‘A further indication of the 
difficulties Martha’s mother has with separation and individualisation is that she 
returned to her own mother’s house shortly after her marriage’ (1994: 27).
Bell suggested that the age of three is an extremely difficult one for mother and child 
to negotiate and that ‘there are mothers who reject in this phase and mothers who 
monopolize’ (1994: 26). When it appeared that there were no apparent problems 
between Martha and her mother at this time, Bell wrote that ‘it is precisely the 
inconspicuousness of this phase which would seem to us to be an indication of a 
possible disturbance’ (ibid.). Due to the fact that Martha’s mother expressed some 
anxiety about returning to work, Bell (1994) concluded that ‘Martha’s mother is to a 
great extent committed to an excessive, motherly ego-ideal, including its negative 
individuation in favour of caring for others: she cannot handle disappointment and 
rage’ (1994: 28). Martha’s own recollection of her past was therefore restructured by 
Bell who offered another version, i.e., that there were infantile developmental 
problems, which is more amenable to psychoanalytic interpretation.
Even when Bell considered the effect of the paternal relationship on her client’s 
difficulties, it was with reference to the faults of the mother. Martha’s father was 
described as an alcoholic who had made disparaging remarks about her body.
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However, Bell construed his position as being warranted by the actions of the women 
in the family: ‘While the women have a “really good” relationship, the men are more 
or less left out in the cold. The father is consciously left out of things’ (1994: 28-9). 
Martha’s father’s alcoholism was suggested by Bell (1994) to be symbolic of the 
family’s struggle to be free from emotional entanglement and it was therefore 
constructed as a response to his wife’s over-dependence. The mother then was 
positioned as the culpable source of her family’s dysfunction. This version of 
adolescent BN was located within the context of a feminist perspective on the grounds 
that it purported to allow for the effects of social expectations on woman as mothers, 
wives, caregivers and providers. These however, are the very social conditions it 
appears to ignore.
Orbach (1985, 1993), Bell (1994) and many other feminist therapists, including Baker 
Miller (1994), Chodorow (1989, 1991) and Sayers (1990) seem to face a common 
problem in both working within a psychoanalytic model of treatment and 
acknowledging women’s oppression and marginalisation within a male-oriented 
society. Although both Orbach (1985, 1993) and Bell (1994) accepted that cultural 
pressures may be implicated in the onset and development of eating disorders, neither 
has recognised that one of the most pervasive and pernicious assumptions informing 
women’s subjugation is that of mother blame. Perhaps this is because the notion of 
mother blame is so central to the psychoanalytic method that to disentangle it from the 
theory would involve re-examining the entire foundation on which that theory is 
based. In attempting to appropriate psychoanalytic concepts to explain the aetiology of 
eating disorders, some feminists seem to have engaged in a dialogue of mother blame, 
which may only reinforce the notion of mother as originator of psychopathologies. 
Seen in its historical context, this notion was alive in cultural assumptions at the same 
time as theories were being expounded about the nature of eating problems, just as, in 
Gull’s era, the notion of female hysteria was reflected in social thinking. In both 
instances, prevailing social discourses concerning disordered eating patterns have 
been absorbed into theories about aetiology, which in turn inform treatment practices.
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Reconceptualising Eating Disorders: Social Constructionist and Narrative
Perspectives
The radical psychoanalyst, Lacan (1979), criticised the language of psychoanalysis for 
reinforcing hegemonic values. He suggested that Freudian analytic terminology 
imposes a concrete and immutable reality onto the psyche which is represented as 
striving towards coherence and consistency when, he contended, it is actually 
perpetually divided against itself. This interpretation of the psyche as fluid, changing, 
adapting constantly to circumstances and expressed through a language that is jointly 
negotiated with others, raises concerns about the central premise of psychoanalytic 
theory that the monologue of the self principally informs every individual’s behaviour. 
Lacan (1979) has argued for a more pluralistic understanding of the self as socially 
influenced. According to Parker (1997: 483), the significance of Lacan’s interpretation 
for the delivery of psychoanalytic treatment lies in its widespread acceptance in 
practice: ‘The Lacanian school has at present...the allegiance of half the practising 
analysts in the world’, he has asserted.
The problem with Lacanian theory is that it continues to rely on Oedipal principles to 
explain normative development and it is therefore not specific to the expression of 
particular disorders like eating problems. Crucially though, it recognises the 
importance of discourse, a concept that is also central to social constructionist 
principles. One of the fundamental precepts of social constructionism is that people’s 
world views are created in historical processes and in interactions between dominant 
and marginalised groups of people (McLeod, 1997). It is therefore essential to the 
understanding of people’s world views of eating disorders to examine the historical 
and cultural circumstances in which these particular pathologies have been named and 
have arisen as part of the social conditions of the time. Social constructionism also 
takes a critical position on the taken-for-granted assumptions that maintain social 
hierarchies and it questions the traditional approaches that fail to examine those 
assumptions (Burr, 1995; McLeod, 1997).
One of the therapies that has arisen as a response to the philosophical stance of social 
constructionism is narrative therapy. It proposes that many versions can be generated 
about any single phenomenon or event and that these versions are jointly negotiated in
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discursive interaction. Thoughts and behaviours are believed to arise from socially 
informed narratives about the self and these are reflected in language and speech. 
Narratives, then, are situated within a social context and are seen as jointly negotiated 
enterprises that provide a sense of meaning and understanding to human encounters. 
The therapeutic encounter, as part of this linguistic system of meaning-making, 
provides an opportunity to facilitate a dialogic process of co-creating opportunities for 
new narratives and alternative agencies (Anderson and Goolishian, 1992). By 
examining their narratives, clients can become aware of the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that have impinged negatively on their lives. As narrative practitioners, 
Swan (1999) and White (1991) help to alert their clients to the effects of technologies 
of the self and technologies of power. In their stories about themselves, their clients 
often report how they develop self-concepts by comparing themselves to others and by 
having a sense that others are continuously evaluating them. One such case is White’s 
(1991) client, known as ‘Amy’, who was experiencing problems with AN. By 
examining the ways in which she disciplined her life, Amy was able to recognise the 
attitudes that contributed to her anorexia and then to resist them by developing 
alternative narratives and knowledges that provided a different course for her life.
This approach has been criticised for its failure to attack the social problems 
responsible for individual suffering (Hepworth, 1999) and because it offers to help 
individuals who then must continue to live within the society that was apparently 
responsible for their oppression in the first place (Fish, 1993; Madigan, 1992). If these 
criticisms are accepted, then the option is either to ignore individual suffering 
altogether or to employ in treatment the mainstream approaches that are implicated in 
the reproduction of subjugation. Kitzinger (1993) and Kitzinger and Perkins (1993) 
have advocated the abandonment of the therapeutic enterprise in favour of political 
actions that would alter and equalise power relationships. Given that eating disorders 
appear to be socially engendered and reinforced dysfunctions, it seems likely that 
purposeful social restructuring would alleviate the problem. Unfortunately the 
numbers of women suffering from an eating disorder are currently reported to be at 
epidemic levels (Wakeling, 1996) and the consequences of political change are 
unlikely to be felt immediately.
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Another consideration is the possible resistance to personal and political change 
amongst women generally and amongst women with eating disorders themselves. 
Those with eating disorders have been considered ‘difficult’ patients because of their 
attempts at avoiding the treatments imposed upon them and because of their desire to 
maintain low body weights (Lemma, 1996). The holy women of the 12th and 13th 
centuries literally embodied the social values of their time. Likewise, AN and BN 
sufferers today have adopted the socially prescribed philosophy of the self that is 
promoted in the culture of dieting and weight restriction (Bordo, 1993). Are eating 
disordered women today the fasting virgins of the Middle Ages who willingly 
deprived themselves of nourishment in the hope of greater social recognition? Are the 
sometimes painfully thin, waif-like female ‘stars’ of today the equivalent of the 
fasting virgins of the past, whose strict adherence to culturally sanctioned practices, 
including that of emaciating their own bodies, brought them status and glory? If so, 
then those who have successfully used this value system are unlikely to undermine it 
and those who aspire to use it may also resist change.
The desire to be thin is socially constructed as being laudable and necessary for 
women’s success (Bordo, 1993; Coward, 1987; Lawrence, 1987). The self-harming 
behaviours of women with AN and BN may have been adopted for what appear to 
them to be very sound social reasons and not because their mothers were inadequate 
or because, as in Freudian or Lacanian theory, their sexuality became problematic 
around the age of three when they realised that they were female. Feminist therapists 
need to acknowledge this. By using socially aware therapy (such as narrative and/or 
systemic approaches) to examine their immediate worlds, eating disordered women 
may become better acquainted with the multiplicity of social and personal factors that 
drive their behaviours and then choose to resist them or not.
[Personal Overview
I am writing this overview two years after submitting this piece of work for comment 
by the Course Team and therefore my reflections may not be representative of other 
positions I might have adopted at that time. As a first year trainee who had never 
undertaken a project of such magnitude I found this task an extremely daunting 
challenge. As an undergraduate I had attained quite high standards - finishing with a
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First Class Honours degree - nonetheless the first major research project undertaken at 
doctoral level was a sobering prospect. It should be noted that the Course Team were 
extremely helpful and supportive at this early stage of training, taking a long-term 
view of our research interests and where those interests might eventually lead us. One 
of the most memorable comments made by Dr Adrian Coyle, my supervisor, after 
reading a first draft of my work was, ‘where is your authorial voice?’ The mere 
asking of the question reminded me that I had been a long time without a voice and it 
acted as an incentive for the assumption of the committed epistemological stance that 
I took in this work.
The actual writing of this paper was a pleasurable and satisfying exercise. I had 
developed several interests whilst still an undergraduate and these included eating 
disorders, narrative therapies and feminist issues concerning religion, motherhood and 
reproduction. In one way or another all of these interests converged in this review of 
the eating disorders literature. Of course the perspective that I took in the paper was 
influenced by my previous studies and probably in particular by the women’s studies 
component I elected to undertake as part of my undergraduate degree. My decision to 
take up women’s studies was almost certainly influenced by the cultural and historical 
circumstances of my childhood development. I grew up in a small rural town in 
Ontario, Canada, where the overt monitoring of women’s behaviour was the strict 
norm. For instance, women who wanted to drink in a bar could only do so when 
accompanied by a man, normally a husband or boyfriend, who would take them 
through one of the two entrances these establishments were legally required to 
provide. One door was always clearly marked, ‘Ladies and Escorts’ and the other 
served as a warning to errant women who might be tempted to think about themselves 
as individuals in their own right. It said, ‘Men Only’ - this was also the name of a 
prominent pornographic magazine of the time, which I understand is still in existence 
today. This segregation and exclusion of women started early. Even my primary 
school had separate entrances for boys and girls and our playground activities 
reflected enforced gender distinctions. The boys played baseball or ice hockey while 
we girls held hands and watched, chanting rhymes and sometimes shouting 
encouragement from the sidelines. As girls we knew our place and it was 
considerably lower than that of our male counterparts. On reading this passage one
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might be tempted to think that the writer must be really quite old, but this was not so 
many years ago -  only as far back as the 1960s and 70s.
I didn’t take up women’s studies because I was outraged by these circumstances and I 
wanted to change the world. I was merely curious about what feminists might have to 
i say about the ways that we lived in the past and the ways that we are living now. It 
was only after I had heard their stories and read their literature that I became 
passionate about improving the living conditions of oppressed or marginalized or 
displaced women. And then, yes, I did want to change the world. After all, I have 
served my time in small-town Ontario where being female meant having no place in 
the dynamic world and where women’s voices were silenced, especially if they 
threatened to be strong and authorial and they advocated change.]
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Size Matters:
Psychotherapeutic Discourses of Anorexia Nervosa
This study takes a social constructionist approach to the investigation of therapists’ 
accounts of Anorexia Nervosa (AN) and their own roles in its treatment. The research 
examined how these accounts were jointly produced in therapist and interviewer 
conversational interactions. Eight therapists -  all currently working with AN clients - 
were interviewed using a semi-structured format. Transcriptions based on tape 
recordings of these conversations were made and analysed using discourse analysis. 
This analysis took a Foucauldian approach and was concerned with the ways in which 
dominant cultural ideas and assumptions are rooted in the maintenance of power 
relations. Several readings of the data allowed for the extraction of texts in which 
patterns related to therapists’ constructions and interviewer/therapist subject positions 
recurred. Three extracts were selected for the final analysis. Two extracts showed 
that therapists constructed anorexia as a disturbance of the ‘self passed from an 
‘unhealthy’ mother onto her victimised daughter. In the third extract, the therapist 
contrasted constructions of a female client who is ‘saved’ from anorexia by her 
heterosexual romance, with a therapeutically ‘unsuccessful’ male client of anomalous 
gender traits. Criticisms were made of therapeutic discourses of ‘recovery’ that locate 
women within disadvantageous power relations.
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Size Matters:
Psychotherapeutic Discourses of Anorexia Nervosa
Over the past forty years there has been an increasing cultural fascination with eating 
disorders and especially with Anorexia Nervosa (AN). This interest has been 
demonstrated in the widespread media coverage of all aspects of AN and links have 
been made between anorexia and the allure of catwalk fame and television stardom. 
For instance, actresses Calista Flockhart and Sarah Jessica Parker have been noted for 
their drive to achieve increasingly diminished body sizes. AN has therefore been 
endowed with a glamorous image associated with star status and professional success, 
thereby setting a standard against which other women measure their own social and 
personal worth (Bordo, 1993). Because the overwhelming proportion of those 
diagnosed with AN are women, feminists have been concerned with explanations that 
account for the gender-specific nature of AN and they have critically examined social 
and political constructions of the female body and its problematisation, particularly 
within the culture of medical science.
Bordo (1993), Hepworth (1999), Lawrence (1987) and Ussher (1989) have identified 
female biology as a site of women’s oppression and demonstrated that a number of 
interrelated cultural factors are connected with an increase in distressed eating 
practices. According to Parker (1999) and Parker et al. (1995), dominant cultural 
ideologies are reproduced in psychological theories of the mind and body and in the 
therapeutic practices that evolve from them. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
together with the public preoccupation with AN has come an intensified medical 
interest in the psychological study of eating ‘disorders’. Anorexia has been the 
subject of extensive research, treatment planning and resource allocation in both the 
NHS and in private clinical practice. Although there is no consensus as to the number 
of people currently struggling with an eating problem, there is agreement that the 
problem is widespread (see Bordo, 1993; Wakeling, 1996). It seems likely, therefore, 
that most counselling psychologists at some point within their careers will encounter 
patients diagnosed as eating ‘disordered’.
I l l
Attempts by psychologists, psychotherapists, psychiatrists and other clinicians to 
account for the phenomenon of ‘disordered’ eating have resulted in paradigmatically 
modernist approaches to treatment (see Gamer et al., 1997; Treasure, 1994). 
According to these models, inner psychic processes are held to be crucial to the 
experience of a disturbed body image, which results in a weight phobia (for instance, 
Rosen, 1990; Slade, 1994). The modernist view is that eating behaviours become 
disordered as a result of dysfunctional cognitions, schemas or concepts and that they 
require alteration so that more functional patterns of eating can be initiated. This 
trend towards cognitively-oriented psychotherapies has developed, even though it 
cannot be demonstrated that any single or combined treatment or approach alters the 
AN sufferers long-term eating behaviours (Hepworth, 1999).
Often other modernist models are drawn upon in order to complement the cognitive- 
behavioural view currently favoured within the medical culture. Psychodynamic 
approaches have been developed with the specific intent of accounting for 
‘maladaptive’ eating practices. This theory suggests that the AN sufferer develops an 
eating problem as a means of preventing the maturation process and to avoid 
becoming a sexually functioning adult woman (Crisp, 1988)1. Bruch (1974, 1978, 
1985) incorporated the notion that disturbances in eating patterns are the result of a 
mother’s inadequate response to her child’s feeding and emotional needs. Treatment 
programmes therefore often include a component of family systems therapy (see, for 
instance, Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1978). Strategies based on this modernist paradigm 
have done seemingly little to impact positively on either the severity of symptoms or 
on the numbers reported as suffering from AN and it is therefore unsurprising that 
treatments are often regarded as unsuccessful (Fleming, unpublished manuscript, 
Sacker & Zimmer, 1987). The predominant medical approach endorses a view of 
objective ‘truths’ and causal ‘facts’ about AN but these theories have left startling 
omissions concerning aetiology. For instance, between 90% and 95% of sufferers are 
women, many of them adolescent and the theories upon which treatments are based
1 Earlier Freudian theories explained AN in terms of fantasies o f oral impregnation (Rachman et al., 
1939; Waller et al., 1940).
2 AN has the highest mortality rate o f any condition categorized as psychiatric with deaths occurring in 
up to 15-20% of the affected population (Crisp et al., 1992; Sacker & Zimmer, 1987) and its incidence 
is reported to have increased annually since the 1960s (Pawluk & Gorey, 1998).
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fail to provide a convincing rationale for the age or gender-specific nature of the 
illness (Bordo, 1993; Malson, 1998). Also, it is often the person, rather than the 
intervention, that is perceived as problematic when treatments fail to have a positive 
impact on the sufferer (Gamer et al., 1997; Lemma, 1996; Selvini Palazzoli et al., 
1978).
[My own experience of working with AN clients prior to beginning to study for the 
PsychD was that they were often baffled by their own food refusal. Despite this 
confusion, I was expected to begin treatments with an approach that required, and 
sometimes demanded, that clients accept their thought processes as maladaptive. This 
was customary even though the social messages they received in newspapers and in 
magazines, on television and through the media generally indicated that, to coin a 
phrase, ‘you can never be too rich or too thin’. Rather than focusing on the meaning 
of the client’s eating practices for them, I was taught to ignore the social cachet that is 
attached to extreme thinness. Outside of the therapeutic context, I knew that size 
mattered greatly and that women were under tremendous pressure to conform to ideals 
of thinness that were attainable to only a small percentage. Inside the therapeutic 
setting, extreme thinness was pathologised as arising from within the individual and I 
was left feeling caught between two paradoxical worlds.]
Against the backdrop of the traditionally scientistic medical paradigm being employed 
in the treatment of AN are recent movements amongst psychologists - particularly in 
the area of social psychology - towards post-modern, social constructionist analyses. 
This shift from the modem to the post-modem involves a change of focus from the 
internal world of the person onto their external, social interactions or ‘doings’. In 
particular, speech acts and discursive practices provide a locus of interest for social 
constructionist interpretations of the ways in which people make sense of their worlds. 
Everyday assumptions concerning inner processes that speculate about the ‘mind’ or 
about the ‘self are challenged, whereas the study of spoken norms, rules, rituals, 
customs and habits is privileged. As part of this re-evaluative process, the medical 
model of psychological function is unsettled and its biologically-based postulates are 
questioned in social constructionist critiques. Studies that articulate a social 
constructionist epistemology often rely on the theoretical writings of Foucault (1983,
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1988), whose analyses illustrate how dominant ideas are rooted in the cultural 
maintenance of power relations.
Adopting a Foucauldian rationale, Davies and Harre (2001) and Harre and van 
Langenhove (1999) illustrate and interpret how moral orders can be established and 
maintained in speech acts. According to Davies and Harre (2001), social positions are 
‘the discursive process whereby selves are located in conversation as observably and 
subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines’ (p.264). As a 
product of the sociocultural context in which they appear, those story lines are likely 
to reproduce meanings constructed from within a broad social environment and which 
reflect local moral norms. Speech acts concerning AN are therefore constitutive of the 
social positions open to the AN sufferer and those involved in their treatment. The 
study of discourse, through the method of discourse analysis (DA), has explicated 
some of the socially shared meanings surrounding AN.3
Most analyses have focused on client discourses, for instance analysing constructions 
of identity related to practices of self-starvation (Walstrom, 2000). But what of the 
subject positions occupied by practitioners working with AN? They too will be 
subject to the rights and responsibilities generated from within local moral customs 
and occurring within situated interactions and co-constructions (see Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). This is an area of psychology that has been little explored as 
constructions of the AN client, often made by the AN client themselves, have been 
foreground in most DA research. An examination of therapists’ conversational 
rhetoric concerning AN may therefore generate new understandings of professional 
constructions and also illustrate the ways in which these interactional accounts are 
accomplished. Additionally, therapists’ accounts of AN constructed within their 
interactional context - for instance, examining therapist-to-researcher discourses and 
researcher-to-therapist discourses - may aid the understanding of how such accounts 
are jointly produced.
3 For example, Hardin (2001) has examined processes of self-starvation and self-surveillance; the death 
and dying of the anorexic body has been explored by Malson and Ussher (1997); and potential 
meanings o f recovery have been articulated by Walstrom (2000).
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Research Aims
The current research aims to explore the diversity of potential discursive resources 
drawn upon by therapists and to investigate the constructions of anorexia that emerge 
from within therapists’ discourse. Inevitably, through the co-construction of 
narratives, interpretive possibilities will be opened up or made available to the 
therapist and other possible areas of conversation will not be explored or will be 
closed off (see Potter, 1996; Wetherell, 1998). This research also aims to make 
explicit those discursive resources being drawn upon by therapists and which bear 
upon the therapeutic process -  both in terms of the ways in which AN is 
problematised from within the research interview and also regarding the ways in 
which therapists position themselves relative to their clients. The research will 
explore how therapists’ constructions of AN are contrasted with their construction of 
those maintaining ‘healthy’ eating practices. Additionally, it will focus upon the 
therapists’ positioning in their talk about their work and it will also attend to the 
positions of both participants within the interview.
An examination of conversation that explicates the repertoires drawn upon by 
therapists who work with AN is of interest to counselling psychology in several ways. 
Firstly, it strives to make transparent some of the assumptions and expectations of 
those described as having the ‘pathology’ anorexia, held by those who have 
significant social and - for their clients - personal influence in this area. Potentially, 
the discursive practices invoked in therapist elaborations of AN will be endorsed by a 
complex health care network. Consequently, should therapists position themselves 
relative to a particular ideological framework, this could affect assessment of the 
client’s suitability for therapy, the treatment processes thought appropriate and also - 
most pertinent to the client/therapist endeavour - the evaluation of therapeutic 
outcome.
Secondly, this research may yield fresh insights into the therapist’s position as 
‘helper’ or ‘facilitator’ in relation to the client with AN. It is possibly through an 
elucidation of their own discursive practices that therapists working with AN may be 
better enabled to grasp more fully what it is they are ‘doing’ in therapy. Finally, such 
research may contribute to current debates in which narrative, constructionist
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therapies (see McNamee & Gergen, 1992; McLeod, 1997; White, 1991) are contrasted 
with more traditional approaches. The former explore a number of narrative 
possibilities within the therapeutic space whereas the latter are concerned with 
replacing the AN sufferer’s ‘maladaptive’ schemas with more functional ones. 
Therapists’ constructions of their role in facilitating client change may elaborate this 
debate on therapeutic function.
Method
Participants
Psychologists and psychotherapists who specialised in the treatment of those 
diagnosed with AN by a qualified medical practitioner - a GP, psychiatrist or other - 
were selected for participation in the study according to their range of experience with 
AN. A total of eight were interviewed: four psychotherapists, two consultant clinical 
psychologists and two counselling psychologists (all are described as ‘therapists’ 
throughout this paper). Four of the interviewees were working in private practice, 
three in NHS specialist units and one in both the NHS and private practice. Four 
participants described themselves as integrative therapists, one as a CBT practitioner 
and three as psychodynamic. All participants were female; seven were white and one 
was Asian. Ages ranged from 39 to 59, with the mean age being 51. Number of years 
in practice ranged from nine to 22, with the mean being 15.5 years.
Procedure
Permission to undertake the study was granted by the University of Surrey’s Advisory 
Committee on Ethics (see Appendix A). The interviews were conducted by the 
researcher, a third year trainee in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology, 
whose demographics were not dissimilar to those of the majority of participants. 
Although I am a Canadian, like most of the interviewees, I am a white, middle class 
woman and therefore to some extent I represent the profile of the typical therapist 
working with anorexia.
Prior to undertaking the interview, each participant signed a consent form authorising 
the use of the data for research purposes. (See Appendices B and C for consent form 
and demographics questionnaire respectively.) They were informed that the
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interviews would be audio taped and transcribed (see Appendix D for a sample 
transcript) and that they should change some of the details of cases being reported in 
order to preserve the anonymity of their clients. A semi-structured format was 
adopted for the interviews as this allows flexibility of questioning within a fixed area 
of topical exploration. The interview schedule was developed to include questions 
that encouraged therapists to elaborate on AN and on their own roles in its treatment. 
Questions focused on therapists’ views of the cause/s of AN, their perceptions of their 
own role in treatment plans and on their interpretations of therapeutic success (see 
Appendix E).
The interviews were conducted at the therapist’s place of work and the length of the 
interviews ranged from 45 to 75 minutes, the mean length being 60 minutes. 
Interview tapes were transcribed using transcription conventions developed by 
Atkinson and Heritage (1984) (see Appendix F) and preliminary data selection 
procedures followed those suggested by Potter and Wetherell (1987). The transcripts 
were anonymised in order to protect the confidentiality of the therapists and their 
clients. In order to preserve confidentiality further, therapists are referred to by an 
initial throughout and I am referred to as the interviewer.
Analytic Approach
Discourse analysis is the method of analysis that most appropriately corresponds to 
the social constructionist epistemology of the current research. Davies and Harre 
(2001) and Harre and van Langenhove’s (1999) theory of social positioning is rooted 
in the Foucauldian school of DA, and the present work therefore took this approach. 
Although preliminary stages of analysis were guided by Potter and Wetherell (1987), 
Parker’s (1999) critical approach to the analysis of discourses informed this work. 
Initially, several readings of the data were made and passages related to therapist and 
interviewer subject positions were extracted, as were constructions related to the AN 
client. These early readings were particularly monitored for instances of therapists’ 
subject positions relative to their own roles in the treatment of AN. Closer readings 
yielded instances of recurrent patterns within the therapists’ discourses. More detailed 
examinations of these passages allowed for the extraction of recurrent subject 
positions and themes were identifiable within these. Finally, three extracts that
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appeared to best represent the body of text were selected. Material from only three 
therapists was used for the final analysis. Working hypotheses were formulated from 
the selected extracts and inferences were drawn about the possible implications for 
psychotherapeutic practice.
Evaluation of the Research
Although the epistemological stance of different methods of analysis will affect how 
validity is assessed, it is essential that this should be evaluated whether working 
within a qualitative or quantitative research paradigm (Osborn & Smith, 1998; Smith 
et al., 1996). DA does not endeavour to identify a single, generalizable ‘true’ version 
of findings from the data. Rather, it aims to provide a systematic account of the 
discursive practices employed within the data. Yardley (2000) suggests that four 
criteria are appropriate to the evaluation of qualitative research, including discourse 
analytic work. They are sensitivity to context; commitment and rigour; transparency 
and coherence; and impact and importance. It is her belief that rhetorical 
persuasiveness and the impact and utility of research are critical features of any 
psychological work and should be evaluated to determine the importance of a study to 
the body of knowledge. In order to attend to the issues raised by Yardley, colleagues 
familiar with this were consulted within a DA research group regarding interpretations 
being placed upon the data. This also insured against potentially idiosyncratic 
analyses of the text. The reader is invited to ‘interrogate’ the interpretations placed 
upon the data and to assess the paper’s importance by means of its rhetorical 
persuasiveness and its contribution to the existing body of knowledge.
Analysis
Throughout this interview, Therapists A’s narrative was concerned with the notion of 
agency in a number of ways. Primarily, the AN client’s agency in relation to her 
mother was problematised as Therapist A drew upon repertoires that pathologised the 
daughter/mother relationship as being overly-enmeshed and causal to the development 
of distorted eating behaviours.
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Extract 1
1 Therapist A: I am AB:solutely FA:scinated with this idea that what the um people
2 people er who suffer from anorexia have been their mother’s transitional object (.)
3 Interviewer: that people who suffer from anorexia
4 Therapist A: [anorexia]
5 Interviewer: have been their mother’s transitional object
6 Therapist A: [object] or are their mother’s transitional
7 object. (..) so what that implies that 11 we see this because we are dealing with young
8 patients and we we have a lot to do with their mums and dads of course (..) it’s the the
9 I mean this case I was just talking about is a case in point, the CHILD in the mother’s
10 frantic attempts to make sense of her sort of internal world and decide where her
11 boundaries are and things the child is pl:playing a role for her
12 Interviewer: Uh huh
13 Therapist A: and so so this fits with the child not being able to separate from mum
14 mum can’t allow her to separate .hh I mean you know children who are insecure need
15 their teddy bears you know er er sort of sort of that is an archetypal transitional object
16 (.) they need to be able to be in charge and to control it and they a:aare DE:solate if
17 they can’t see it or it is thrown away or something like that
18 Interviewer: so you are saying that for the mums the child is the teddy bear
19 Therapist A: yeah
20 Interviewer: that that has to be held on to
21 Therapist A: yeah yeah and is a sort of a way that I mean the teddy bear the sort of
22 healthy way of having something outside your body that you feel very very still very
23 much part of you and which gradually you can discard and it helps you to define your
24 sort of boundaries you know th: th it’s it’s not me it is a teddy bear and gradually as I
25 grow up I will get rid of it
26 Inteviewer: so that is part of the psychology is that the mother does then get rid of the
27 teddy bear or ,
28 Therapist A: no I think it is more that you know the children are so important to the
29 mother that they don’t they DON’T get rid of the teddy bear (..) (laughing) I mean you
30 know this is true for anorexia they can’t because they end up with this very ill child
31 and then they can’t throw it away but I mean I mean the thing is the the child is SO
32 important to the mother not in a sort of a healthy mother-child sort of way, but in the
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33 fact that the child is fulfilling some function for the mother which keeps her feeling
34 more secure in HER:self. (..) THAT that fits for me
35 Interviewer: does that I mean I don’t know if you have sort of translated that to your
36 (.) patients does that (..) fit for them do you think or
37 Therapist A: it might explain why they are terribly terribly suspicious of therapy or of
38 anybody (.) I can think of another one who is terrified of me um trying to analyse her
39 as she puts it (.) everything SAY she says you try and analyse and you make
40 something of (.) she finds it ab and she is absolutely petrified of that um (...) and so I
41 mean presumably her fear is that if I (..) um (..) I mean I think I am understanding and
42 she thinks that I am getting her wrong but WHAT :ever it is it has given me some sort
43 of control over her or something like that (.) she is giving UP it is like she feels she is
44 giving up part of herself if I am thinking about (.) what she might mean when she says
45 something you know it’s not safe for her to allow anybody (.) except her mum in fact
46 (.) to help her understand her: SELF
Initially, Therapist A draws upon a Freudian analytic discourse of psychological 
inertia or non-movement in which the transition from psychic craving to fulfilment 
cannot occur because of unresolved psychological needs. Because Therapist A 
invokes this psychoanalytic discourse without providing a detailed explanation of it, 
she positions the interviewer as an informed hearer, or as a ‘professional’ insider with 
an assumed knowledge of the theoretical stance. The proffered discourse is based 
upon Winnicott’s (1986) concept of the transitional object, which he proposed is 
created by the infant as a symbol of “its confidence in the union of baby and mother 
based on the experience of the mother’s reliability and capacity to know what the baby 
needs through identification with the baby” (p.50). Therapist A turns this theory on its 
head when she constructs the mother as infant, whilst the infant is, in turn, constructed 
as provider of psychological security (line 2): “people er who suffer from anorexia 
have been their mother’s transitional object (.)”.
Therapist A moves from the first person “I” to the inclusiveness of the professional 
“we” as she suggests that the use of the anorexic by her mother is a visual 
phenomenon that can be observed not only by herself but also by other professionals: 
“I I we see this because we are dealing with young patients and we we have a lot to do
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with their mums and dads” (line 8). Having established her status as a member of a 
professional group, Therapist A is enabled to move back into the first person “I” in 
order to warrant her claims about her own patient who suffers at the hands of her 
mother, saying, “this case I was just talking about is a case in point” (lines 8-9). The 
client’s mother is then constructed as “frantic” (line 10), “DE:solate” (line 16), as a 
person who cannot “make sense of her sort of internal world” or “decide where her 
boundaries are and things” (lines 10-11). The inclusion of the words “and things” 
suggests that this particular mother has additional defects that are perhaps too 
numerous or too problematic to be elaborated at the present time.
The therapist warrants her metaphor of the mother as insecure infant and the child as 
her comforting toy by once again invoking a psychoanalytic discourse in her repetition 
of the word “separate” (lines 13-14), which alludes to the theoretical task of 
adolescents to ‘separate’ and ‘individuate’ from their parents. She also uses the 
phrase “archetypal transitional object” (line 15), again interspersing therapeutic jargon 
into the conversation, which positions both the therapist and the interviewer as 
informed members of a professional community. A potentially problematic moment 
occurs in lines 23-26 when a contradiction arises in Therapist A’s narrative. 
Employing the Winnicottian perspective, she has suggested in lines 24-25 that 
functional dependence and independence can be negotiated through the use of the 
transitional object: “it is a teddy bear and gradually as I grow up I will get rid of it”. 
However, when the possibility of independent functioning is applied to the mother by 
the interviewer in lines 26-27 (“so that is part of the psychology is that the mother 
does then get rid of the teddy bear or”), clarification to the contrary is made in lines 
28-29: “the children are so important to the mother that they don’t they DON’T get 
rid of the teddy bear”. The therapist thus resists the interviewers attempt to 
reconstruct the transitional object as an aid to the mother’s psychological well-being. 
The anorexic’s mother is contrasted with other more functional mothers in line 32 
when Therapist A states that her interest in her child is “not in a healthy mother-child 
sort of way”. The interest of ‘healthy’ mothers in their children is thereby legitimated 
whereas the interest of the anorexic’s mother is constructed as self-serving.
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Towards the end of this passage, the interviewer questions the legitimacy of her 
theoretical claims and invites Therapist A to talk about if, and how, her theory is 
delivered to her clients: “does that (..) fit for them do you think or” (line 36). This 
raises a potential dilemma for the therapist concerning the disparity between the 
theory and practice of therapy for AN. As part of a system of medical ‘experts’, the 
therapist has been positioned as one who should provide an explanatory account of the 
relevance of her theory to her clients. If Therapist A were to indicate that her clients 
find merit in her application of this theory in their treatment, it would suggest their co­
operation with her therapeutic endeavours. This would be a problematic claim for the 
therapist as one of the predominant narratives of eating disorders practitioners 
concerns the failure of anorexics to comply with treatment (Lemma, 1996).
The therapist’s response to this dilemma is to pathologise the anorexic’s mistrust of 
her attempts at treatment and to describe her as having an undue level of fear: “ it 
might explain why they are terribly, terribly suspicious of therapy or of anybody” 
(lines 37-38). By adding “or of anybody”, the therapist diminishes the importance of 
the therapeutic context in the client’s mistrust -  anorexics don’t trust anybody, so why 
would they make an exception of the therapist? The client is then defined as 
“terrified” (line 38), “absolutely petrified” (line 40) and “it’s not safe for her to allow 
anybody (.) except her mum in fact (.) to help her understand her:SELF” (lines 45-46). 
Again a general inclusiveness prevails within the therapist’s narrative when she 
depicts the client as not being able to allow “anybody” to understand her. Burman 
(1997) notes that blaming mothers for their child’s bad or uncooperative behaviour is 
a standard discursive resource commonly drawn upon in social conversations. Here it 
is reworked as a therapeutic explanation for the client’s failure to co-operate in the 
therapeutic process. By reintroducing the dysfunctional mother/child relationship, 
Therapist A constructs anorexia as a disturbance of the self, passed from mother to 
daughter. However, the logical progression from an unhealthy and enmeshed 
mother/daughter relationship into the development of weight phobic eating practices is 
not elaborated.
Therapist A has set up a particular theoretical framework for the aetiology of AN, as a 
problem including the mother as pathologically attached and the child as a victimised
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toy, subject to the unfulfilled needs of her mother. She positions herself as a person 
entitled, through the therapeutic relationship, to challenge the mother’s place in the 
corrupted mother/child dyad. The mother, as needy child, is constructed as being 
psychologically ‘static’ and unable to move beyond her desperate need for her 
‘transitional object’. The client is constructed as being agentically thwarted, having 
developed a mistrust of all, including even those whose interests lie only in helping 
her. This construction of anorexia is applied not only to those specified within the 
therapist’s clinical examples but it is generalised across all ‘difficult’ AN patients and 
utilised as a universal description.
Extract 2
This extract is also largely concerned with agency and in particular regarding the 
negotiation of agency between the client and the therapist. In common with Extract 1, 
the dialogue concerns the client’s psychological enmeshment with another. In this 
case, the attachment to the therapist sought by a particular client is metaphorically 
described as parasitic in character. This construction is developed as a contrast 
between a ‘successful’ therapy, wherein little or no enmeshment occurs, and an 
‘unsuccessful’ therapy in which the client clings, unhealthily, onto the therapist. 
Psychoanalytic theory privileges a developmental model of psychological functioning, 
suggesting that behavioural patterns learned in childhood are repeated in adulthood. 
Known as transference, it provides a resource for the explanation of the client’s 
feelings toward the therapist. Throughout this passage, Therapist B draws upon a 
psychoanalytic discourse, invoking assumptions of transference, in order to develop 
her construction of the anorexic client as ‘leech’ (lines 24 and 26).
1 Interviewer: mm mm yes mm (.) I wondered if you could give an example of
2 successful therapy, where you felt it it had worked really well and (..)
3 Therapist B: [laughs] when I was working with somebody recently who (.) who:oo
4 was (...) got a got a TWO ONE finished, completed her course, knew what it was she
5 wanted to be DO:OING (coughs) and had moved into a flat with people she liked and
6 respected her who appreciated her boundaries.
7 Interviewer: uh:hh
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8 Therapist B: uhh. (...) then I really felt and was able to keep her mother or her
9 FEELINGS about her relationship with her HER MOTHER when they met again and
10 the same old thing happened she was able to realise that it was her mother’s (...)
11 Interviewer: uh.
12 Therapist B: u:uh. (...) I just hoped underneath the food was ok
13 Interviewer: mm. Mm (.) so the success was in the way she was able to carry on
14 Therapist B: her life, rather than someone else’s life
15 Interviewer: right (.) uh huh because that is something you have been particularly
16 talking about um and I suppose then it makes sense in terms of the merger that she
17 was able to (.) to move away from that symbiotic relationship with you and develop
18 Therapist B: WELL she didn’t become symbiotic with me
19 Interviewer: uhhuh
20 Therapist B: sh:she and I developed a more maybe she did in the beginning but she
21 resisted it (.) she and I were always able to work (.) yes in the transference there was
22 always well she really trusted me but she trusted me (laughs) she was a little bit
23 separate she didn’t become the (...) LIM:pet that this other anorexic I just talked about
24 feels like leech
25 Interviewer: mm mm
26 Therapist B: (..) sometimes I feel that she is a leech and then I am losing my (.) Hfe
27 blood.
28 Interviewer: sort of a host
29 Therapist B: yes
30 Interviewer: for her to feed off mm mm (...)
31 Therapist B: this is interesting it is like I am (laughing) doing some supervision while
32 I am talking to you
In this segment the client is discussed relative to her social accomplishments: “moved 
into a flat with people she liked and respected her who appreciated her boundaries” 
(lines 5-6). The invocation of the word ‘boundaries’ suggests a psychoanalytic 
repertoire in which the client is constructed as an individual self who has 
accomplished the psychological task of separating from others. In other words, the 
client is one who has agency and can relate to others with maturity and assertiveness.
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Having drawn upon this psychoanalytic discourse, the therapist then continues with its 
development by introducing the notion of the problematic mother/child relationship.
Therapist B moves the psychoanalytic discourse from one acknowledging the client’s 
generally ‘boundaried’ self into a discourse that identifies the mother/daughter dyad as 
a problematic struggle. She constructs the client as oppositional to her mother in lines 
8 and 10 respectively, “was able to keep her mother” and “was able to realise that it 
was her mother’s”. Thus, she relies upon a rhetoric of therapeutic success as related to 
the therapist’s skill in separating the two. Therapist B constructs herself as being 
crucial to the client’s ability to separate from her mother -  “then I really felt and was 
able to keep her mother” (line 8) -  as she draws upon the notion of repeated patterns 
of behaviour to account for the client’s problematic interaction with her mother -  “and 
the same old thing happened” (lines 9-10). A Freudian discourse -  privileging the 
psychoanalytic view that making unconscious behaviours known to the conscious 
mind can act as a curative process -  is suggested in Therapist B’s statement that “she 
was able to realise that it was her mother’s” (line 10). By constructing the client as 
one who cannot operate as a psychologically separate self whilst falling prey to her 
mother’s “same old thing” (line 10), the therapist rhetorically positions herself as 
knowing and understanding that the relationship between the two women has 
damaged the client. Furthermore, it reifies the danger that a mother presents to her 
daughter, therefore rendering appropriate the therapeutic agenda to enlighten the client 
as to this danger.
The interviewer co-operates in the development of the discourse unfolding, possibly 
as a means of indicating that she has understood its implications, when she speaks of 
“merger” (line 16) and the “symbiotic relationship” (line 17). The interviewer has 
therefore been positioned and embraces the positioning of herself as an ‘informed’ 
conversational participant, but a problematic moment emerges. This follows the 
interviewer’s validation of the therapist’s discourse when she resists and challenges 
the negative connotations being placed upon her example of clinical success: “WELL 
she didn’t become symbiotic with me” (line 18). Therapist B then provides a contrast 
between the ‘successful’ client and a client whose demands of her resources are 
construed as overwhelming and inappropriate. The ‘unsuccessful’ client is presented
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as a vitality-draining, parasitic “LIM:pet” (line 23) and “leech” (lines 24 and 26) that 
nurtures herself upon Therapist B’s very “life blood” (lines 26-27). A horror-story 
narrative akin to that of blood-sucking vampires of the gothic genre is invoked and 
herein (lines 23-30), the notion of merger and symbiosis is reconstructed. There is 
movement from the potential meaning of the symbiotic relationship as one that is 
harmonious and mutually beneficial, into its construction as a depletion of the 
therapist’s resources. Therapist B has positioned herself as one who provides 
sustenance and nourishment to the client who is consequently constructed as 
unreasonably demanding. The implication of the leech metaphor is also that it is the 
therapist who suffers when therapy fails.
At the end of this passage, there is a sudden and marked shift in the conversational 
footing: “it is like I am (laughing) doing some supervision while I am talking to you” 
(lines 31-32). This rhetorical manoeuvre on the part of Therapist B has two likely 
dialogic functions. First, it signals that Therapist B is unwilling to continue with the 
exchange as it is unfolding and second, that she is candidly acknowledging the joint 
production of the storyline. She is saying that the conversational structure resembles 
that of supervision sessions when one professional, normally of advanced experience, 
advises another on case management. Previously, Therapist B, in her horror-story 
narrative, had made an extreme case formulation. She constructed the therapeutic 
encounter as exhaustive, attacking, stressful and possibly even frightening. These are 
strong emotions that have been encountered by Therapist B in her professional 
persona, according to her account.
Part of the process of ‘doing’ therapy and of adopting a therapeutic discourse is to 
acknowledge within the supervisory context that powerful emotions arise as a 
corollary to working with those labelled as psychologically distressed, disturbed or 
pathologically-fimctioning. This rhetoric deems such ‘emotional’ narratives useful to 
the personal and professional development of the clinician (see Heimann, 1950; Kahn, 
1997; Pick, 1985; Racker, 1968). Therapist B’s comments might then be read as 
context specific in the sense that both she and the interviewer are familiar with this 
supervisory framework. By invoking this rhetoric of professional/personal 
development, Therapist B positions herself as one who is not only entitled to voice
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strong negative and critical feelings about her patients but as one who is at liberty to 
share these views with other professionals.
Extract 3
Like the preceding extract, this passage concerns a comparative discourse of a 
‘successful’, followed by an ‘unsuccessful’ therapy. In the first instance the client is 
female and in the second the client is male. Therapist C constructs the female client 
within the commonly available cultural discourse of the fairytale wherein the heroine 
is triumphantly redeemed and saved by her (hetero)sexuality. The male client, on the 
other hand, is constructed according to a rhetoric of complex and troublesome 
biology. He is depicted as being failed by his problematic ‘queer’ sexuality and as 
being left alone to cope with his overwhelming gender-related physical problems. 
Fairytales have been described within feminist literature as expressing a number of 
psychosexual realities, primarily related to the agency of the males and the passivity 
of the females within the story. Constructions of character are normally dichotomous 
with the principals being either entirely bad or entirely good and without character 
development as the story unfolds (Bottigheimer, 1987; Lurie, 1990).
The connection between psychoanalytic theory and the fairytale has been long 
established by psychoanalytic practitioners including Bettelheim, (1989), Irigaray 
(1993), Homey (1950) and others. A Freudian psychoanalyst, Bettelheim (1989), has 
argued that fairytales offer a positive psychological means through which childhood 
conflicts of sexuality and identity can be processed and resolved. For instance, he 
posits that in the story Rapunzel, the heroine is able to escape her captivity by using 
her body in order to be saved by her lover and that this provides a useful model of 
psychosexual development to the children reading the tales. In Therapist C’s 
narrative, the fairytale formula is apparent as she constructs her client as a worthy 
heroine who cannot escape her predicament without the aid of a “WON:derful man” 
(line 4). In contrast, no such redemption can be found for her unsuccessful male client 
who refuses to accept treatment for his supposed somatic abnormalities.
1 Therapist C: she had had anorexia for donkey’s years (.) she had been a ballet dancer
2 and she had a very abusive relationship with a man and she was er I had only seen her
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3 about half a dozen times and she really had worked hard and she tried very hard to
4 change some things um but then she met this WON:derful man (..) and he just she was
5 a lovely lady she really was she has gone on to help other anorexics now (.) but uh he
6 turned her around (...) there was no doubt about it he definitely turned that woman
7 around (..) well he DID (...) they met accidentally at Primrose Hill which was very
8 romantic (laughing) apparently
9 Interviewer: yeah yeah
10 Therapist C: and she had lost her ring (..) and she was looking for it (..) and he found
11 it and that is how they got talking you know um SO it is just something something
12 which gels and she started to eat (.) almost immediately and her weight went up to a
13 very respectable weight and and when I last saw her she was (...) slim perhaps only a
14 BMI of about sort of 18, most people think you should be about 20 (.) but to me it is
15 fine if you have been 11 or 12 (.) that is enough, that is fine
16 Interviewer: [Mm mm MM]
17 Therapist C: so that was another success another failure if you want one would be a
18 boy who was also a male ballet dancer and um nice bloke (.) looked very feminine,
19 very feminine voice probably very low on testosterone but didn’t want any help with
20 that (.) again his parents were separated he had a very normal sister who was very
21 nervous and anxious but still but apparently functioning very well (...) and he had
22 developed anorexia at ballet school (.) and he felt that he had bow legs as he called
23 them that his physique was not beautiful enough for a ballet dancer and that the
24 college the Royal College I think the Royal Ballet School
25 Interviewer: Mm hm
26 Therapist C: and he had been persuaded that he needed to lose MORE weight so that
27 his chest would be more in proportion (.) it’s something to do with ballet schools of
28 course and something happened (..) I’m not sure exactly what it was I think he was
29 (..) taunted by some boys at the school about being queer something like that I think
30 that’s the way he put it and then something else had happened and he got VERY
31 depressed and he he had a suicide attempt (.) which was very minor then he just went
32 right on into anorexia (.)
This extract begins with a description of the female client as a ballet dancer, an 
occupation that, for a woman, embodies the culturally desirable qualities of
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femininity, grace and charm. A sinister male character is then introduced in the form 
of her “very abusive relationship with a man” (line 2). Therapist C constructs her role 
in the treatment as minimal in lines 2-3 -  “I had only seen her about half a dozen 
times” -  possibly explaining why she had failed to have greater therapeutic impact on 
her client and why, therefore, her client needed to be rescued. This client is defined 
by the therapist in terms of her virtues, which are emphasised by such repeated terms 
as “really” and “very”: “she really had worked hard and she tried very hard” (line 3). 
Also, “she was a lovely lady” (line 4-5) whose virtues are deployed in the service of 
others: “she has gone on to help other anorexics now” (line 5). The use of the term 
‘lady’ reinforces this client’s association with feminine virtues as it implies a status 
not conferred upon those referred to as ‘women’ or ‘girls’ or ‘females’.4
Having established that her client is deserving of a masculine saviour, Therapist C 
introduces the “WON:derful man” (line 4) who “turned that woman around” (lines 6- 
7). A picture emerges of a “very romantic” (lines 7-8) scene at the top of a hill in 
which the hero helps the distressed lady to find her ring -  a traditional symbol of male 
ownership that invokes cultural associations to marriage and ‘happily ever after’ 
togetherness. As if by magic then, the client “started to eat (.) almost immediately and 
her weight went up to a very respectable weight” (lines 12-13). Despite this 
description, the client remains unusually thin “perhaps only a BMI5 of about sort of 
18” (lines 13-14). Therapist C has therefore constructed herself as one who values 
thinness, even when others are more rigid in their expectations: “most people think 
you should be about 20” (line 14). She is also invoking a discourse of power. As 
medical practitioners, Therapist C and her colleagues are endowed with the power to 
determine the limits of acceptable body size. As a member of this medical 
community, Therapist G is able to ‘bend the rules’ and deem her client’s weight 
adequate, although others may not. Despite having had almost no therapeutic input 
with this client, Therapist C positions herself as able to claim clinical effectiveness: 
“so that was another success” (line 17). The fairytale format warrants an account of
4 Feminist literary scholars have written extensively on the use of various descriptive terminologies in 
discursive constructions o f masculinity and femininity. For example, see Cameron (1998) and Coates 
(1993,1996,1998).
5 BMI refers to Body Mass Index, which measures the relationship between a person’s weight and 
height. Medical models suggest a ‘normal’ BMI should range between 20 and 25. (See Pietrobelli et 
al., 1994).
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anorexia as a particularly feminine frailty. The anorexic is constructed as a weak and 
frail princess who, despite her best efforts, succumbs to the lure of self-denial, even 
after she has been ‘saved’. As a princess, she is to be imitated: as a role model her 
message to women is of self-sacrifice.
In contrast to her worthy, sexually appropriate and successful client is Therapist C’s 
example of therapeutic futility. This is “a boy who is also a male ballet dancer” (lines 
17-18) but he is one who refuses to allow his inappropriate gender traits to be 
improved: “didn’t want any help with that” (lines 19-20). The therapist has 
emphasised that he is male despite having just described him as a boy, indicating that 
his gender is noteworthy in the context of his profession as a dancer. Before defining 
his physical characteristics, Therapist C describes him as a “nice bloke” (line 18). 
This is a form of stake inoculation, minimising the illocutionary force of her next 
statement, which might be read as critical. She reports that he is both visually and 
biologically anomalous: “looked very feminine very feminine voice probably very 
low on testosterone” (lines 18-19). The client’s sexuality is therefore constructed as a 
medical problem with a possible medical solution that is resisted by the client and he 
is thereby constructed as blameworthy for his ongoing difficulties. What was not 
constructed as problematic for her female client -  namely, her description as a ballet 
dancer -  is constructed as having serious pathological consequences for her male 
client: “it’s something to do with ballet schools of course” (lines 27-28). The “of 
course” indicates that this is a common assumption with which we are all familiar and 
which therefore requires no further elaboration.
When referring to the client’s suicide attempt and subsequent anorexia, the use of the 
words “had” and “went” (lines 30-31) construct both suicide and anorexia as external 
events over which the client has no control. He does not make a suicide attempt -  he 
“has” one; then he “just” (line 31) goes into AN -  he does not make a decision to stop 
eating. The implication is that the client is a victim of his “queer” (line 29) sexuality 
who lacks the agency to prevent his decline into self-starvation, without 
fundamentally altering his physicality by increasing the level of male hormones 
pumping through his body. The similarity between Therapist C’s two clients then is 
that in the first case, a male saves the client and in the second the client needs to save
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himself by increasing his maleness. Masculinity is therefore constructed as being the 
key to overcoming anorexia.
Overview
In an interview-style DA study, only a small percentage of data can be presented for 
analysis. Unlike quantitative studies where the aim is to make generalisations across 
populations, the aim of this research is to examine the discursive resources drawn 
upon and the subject positions taken up by individual therapists in their talk about AN. 
According to Harper (1994), such examinations are an important means of 
establishing links between ideological critiques and ‘discussions with real 
practitioners’ (p. 151). This paper has found such links between the ideological claims 
of Burman (1997), Lurie (1990), Malson (1998,1999), Malson and Ussher (1997) and 
Parker (1997, 1999) and the psychotherapeutic discourses drawn upon by the ‘real 
practitioners’ interviewed in this study. It has been noted within these critiques that 
dominant cultural ideologies are reproduced in psychological theories and in the 
practices that evolve from them. The current research has provided several 
illustrations of the reproduction of these ideologies within therapists’ talk about AN 
and, in particular, those related to the mother-blame discourses of psychoanalysis and 
the romantic discourses of patriarchy. The repertoires drawn upon by the therapists 
reported here were, in the main, typical of those drawn upon by the therapists 
interviewed.
In their discourses about AN, Therapists A and B constructed the female-to-female 
relationship of mother and daughter as deeply pathological. The predominance of 
psychoanalytic repertoires was evident, possibly because this model offers a 
discursive resource for the explanation of AN whereas other models, including CBT, 
do not. Amongst the psychoanalytic repertoires was that of mother blame, which was 
drawn upon in Therapists A and B’s talk about AN. Mother blame is a common 
discursive resource used in the explanation of children’s bad behaviour (Burman, 
1997) and it was invoked as an explanation for poor therapeutic outcome in this study. 
Both Therapists A and B positioned themselves as having the right and responsibility 
to intervene in the mother/child dyad, for the sake of relieving the child of her 
‘illness’. Parker (1999) notes that ‘bad’ mothers are commonly blamed for the
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problem of their children’s ‘madness’ and that psychotherapy offers ‘to pass as a 
solution’ (p9). This research illustrated how accounts of ‘bad mothers’ were 
constructed, together with therapists’ positioning of themselves as a healing resource.
In their conversations about mothers, Therapists A and B also constructed them as 
denying their daughters the agency to develop as persons in their own rights. Both the 
fairytale and the psychodynamic repertoires employed by therapists in their narratives 
about AN are widely culturally available. A noteworthy aspect of fairytales is the 
construction of older women as envious of the youth of young women, who are 
depicted as passive, beautiful and more sexually desirable than they are (Lurie, 1990). 
Within this discourse, older women are constructed as attempting to prevent younger 
women from becoming sexually mature and entering into a heterosexual relationship. 
Although therapists did not draw upon a fairytale repertoire to describe the 
mother/daughter relationship in this way, there is a structural similarity between 
psychoanalytic constructions of mothers and those of fairytales. In both constructions, 
older women attempt to deny the agency of burgeoning adolescents.
Therapist C did draw upon a fairytale repertoire in order to describe a client whose 
therapy she constructed as successful. Again, the fairytale framework had resonances 
with psychodynamic theory, which postulates that psychological fulfilment is possible 
only through the maintenance of a heterosexual relationship. Malson (1998) and 
Malson and Ussher (1997) argue that romantic discourses locate women within 
particular patriarchal power-relations and that these encourage harmful practices of 
body management, like anorexia. Therapist C demonstrated that romantic narratives 
are located within therapeutic discourses of recovery, suggesting that 
psychotherapeutic discourses help to maintain these damaging practices. In addition to 
drawing upon fairytale and psychoanalytic repertoires, therapists interwove 
professional discourses into their conversations in order to warrant their claims about 
their experiences of AN clients. Underlying all of these constructions is a culturally 
ascribed power dynamic that weighs heavily in the favour of therapeutic practitioners, 
placing greater value on their ‘professional’ opinions (Parker et al., 1995). It might 
therefore be concluded that what AN clients and their families have to say about
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themselves, their anorexia and, in particular, about their therapeutic experience is 
afforded comparatively little social value.
[Personal Overview
The reflections in this section may depart from a strictly social constructionist 
epistemology. However, within the institutional context of the university where my 
training is being taken, they may contribute to understandings of the research process.
In order to conduct the study, I made choices about the research topic, data selection, 
the method of analysis and, perhaps most importantly, about the specific 
interpretations to be placed upon the text. All of these choices were inevitably 
informed by my critical, deconstructionist stance toward the theories and practices of 
psychotherapy. The subject of eating disorders, so closely linked to cultural 
assumptions about women and the regulation of their bodies, was an area of interest I 
developed whilst still an undergraduate studying both psychology and women’s 
studies. However, at the time of these studies I was not also a psychotherapeutic 
practitioner, located within a mental health structure, as I am now. The greatest 
dilemmas I faced in conducting this research were connected to my identification with 
the mental health profession and with the discipline of critical psychology. The 
tensions between the two respective positions left me struggling with many aspects of 
the study and produced questions like: to what extent should I assume an informed 
stance in relation to the theories espoused during the interviews?; had I influenced the 
interviews in ways that might not be readily apparent?; and will my criticisms appear 
to reflect badly upon the individual practitioners who were good enough to offer their 
valuable time to be interviewed?
To a degree, I could resolve dilemmas of diversity in locations because I am not an 
essentialist who anticipates experiencing a consistent and coherent ‘self. Rather, I 
expect to shift my subject positions according to the discursive practices of the 
situated contexts in which I am placed or choose to be. Also, my criticisms of 
psychotherapeutic practice are never directed at individuals, only at the technologies, 
as Foucault refers to them, that regulate their practices. The aim, of course, is to 
unsettle and impact upon the discourses that prevail amongst the psychotherapeutic
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community and not to assail individual practitioners. Nonetheless, it was 
disconcerting at times to isolate certain texts generated by certain therapists for the 
purpose of maintaining a critical stance. Perhaps this was especially difficult as I 
knew four of the interviewees and had met two others within a variety of professional 
contexts, where I was always their less experienced subordinate.
i
Just as I do not take an approach that isolates pathology within the individual, I also 
do not perceive individual therapists as being culpable for assuming the social 
practices and beliefs of the culture they were bom into and are hence, as Parker (1992) 
argues, not of their own choosing. My view is that they draw upon the professional 
discourses available to them and that are expected and often required of them. As a 
person who also works within these contexts, I too am called upon to reproduce the 
psychotherapeutic discourses made available to me. This does not diminish the 
importance I place upon making the criticisms that I have made in this work. We 
need to know what we are doing when we say things to, and about, our clients and 
their families, however professionally painful that might be. To be critical is not to 
‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’ and condemn all psychotherapeutic 
endeavours as well-meaning but hopelessly wrong-footed and irretrievably 
destructive. Rather, it is to scrutinize and make transparent the scaffold of values and 
ideologies that structures our theories and we should do that with, at least, the same 
efficiency and rigour that we utilize in the investigation of our clients’ difficulties. 
After all, if we can place our client’s lives under the spotlight of intense examination, 
then surely we can accommodate some critical enquiry into our own professional 
platforms and agendas. To do this from a purely theoretical perspective is not enough. 
We must first discover the precise attitudes and ideologies that are reproduced within 
therapeutic narratives and this requires the analysis of individual therapists’ 
discourses. As for those therapists whose words came under the sharp focus of this 
analysis, I can only hope that they will appreciate the necessity of this methodology 
and its contribution to psychological understanding. My own means of trying to 
resolve the dilemmas created by taking a critical perspective lie in the searching out of 
new ways of being within my therapeutic practice. Hence for instance, the 
development of the notion of the ‘dialogic unconscious’ (Billig, 1997), which 
modifies both social constructionist and psychoanalytic approaches. (See the research
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paper entitled, How Rude Can You Get? The Dialogic Unconscious in Therapy, that 
follows in this portfolio.)]
135
References
Atkinson, M., & Heritage, J. (1984). Structures o f social action: Studies in 
conversation analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bettelheim, B. (1989). The uses o f enchantment: The meaning and importance o f  
fairytales. New York: Random House.
Billig, M. (1997). The dialogic unconscious: psychoanalysis, discursive psychology 
and the nature of repression. British Journal o f Social Psychology, 36,139- 
160.
Bordo, S. (1993). Unbearable weight, feminism, western culture and the body. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Bottingheimer, R. (1987). Grimm’s bad girls and bold boys: The moral and social 
vision o f the tales. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bruch, H. (1974). Eating disorders: Obesity, anorexia nervosa and the person within. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bruch, H. (1978). The golden cage: The enigma o f anorexia nervosa. London: Open 
Books.
Bruch, H. (1985). Four decades of eating disorders. In D. M. Gamer, & P. E. 
Garfinkel (Eds.), Handbook o f psychotherapy for anorexia nervosa and 
bulimia (pp. 7-18). London: The Guildford Press.
Burman, E. (1997). Developmental psychology and its discontents. In D. Fox, & I. 
Prilleltensky (Eds.), Critical psychology: An introduction, (pp. 163-231). 
London: Sage.
Cameron, D. (1998). Feminist critique o f language. London: Blackwell.
136
Coates, J. (1993). Women, men and language. London: Longman.
Coates, J. (1996). Women talk. Oxford: Blackwell.
Coates, J. (1998). Language and gender: A reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Crisp, A. H. (1988). Some possible approaches to prevention of eating and 
weight/shape disorders, with particular reference to anorexia nervosa. 
International Journal o f Eating Disorders, 7, 1 -17.
Crisp, A., Calender, J., Hale, C., & Hsu, L. (1992). Long term mortality in AN. 
British Journal o f Psychiatry, 161,104-107.
Davies, B., & Harre, R. (2001). Positioning the discursive production of selves. In 
M. Wetherell, S. Taylor & S. Yates (Eds.), Discourse theory and practice (pp. 
261-271). London: Sage.
Fleming, C. Theoretical models and current approaches to the treatment o f Anorexia 
Nervosa. MSc Dissertation. University of Surrey: Guildford.
Foucault, M. (1983). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress. 
In H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics, (pp. 229-252). Chicago, II.: Chicago University Press.
Foucault, M. (1988). Technologies of the self. In L. Martin, H. Gutman & P. Hutton 
(Eds.), Technologies o f the self (pp. 16-49). Amherts, MA.: University of 
Massachusetts Press.
Gamer, D., Vitousek, K. & Pike, K. (1997). Cognitive-behavioural therapy for AN. 
In D. Gamer & P. Garfinkel (Eds.), Handbook o f treatment for eating 
disorders, {pp. 94-144). NewYork: Guildford Press.
137
Hardin, P. (2001). Women, bodies, and self-surveillance: Recovery from anorexia, a 
discourse of social analysis and an analysis regarding discourse. The Sciences 
and Engineering, 61, 8-19.
Harper, D. (1994). Professional construction of ‘paranoia’ and the discursive use of 
diagnostic criteria. British Journal o f Medical Psychology, 67,131-143.
Harre, R. & van Langenhove, L. (1999). Positioning theory: Moral contexts o f 
intentional action. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heimann, P. (1950). On countertransference. International Journal o f Pyscho- 
analysis, 31, 81-84.
Hep worth, J. (1999). The social construction o f Anorexia Nervosa. London: Sage.
Homey, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth: The struggle towards self-
realisation. New York: Norton.
Irigaray, L. (1993). This sex which is not one. Cornell, NY.: Cornell University 
Press.
Kahn, M. (1997). Between therapist and client, the new relationship. New York: 
Freeman.
Lawrence, M. (1987). Fed up and hungry: Women, oppression and food. London: 
Women’s Press.
Lemma, A. ( 1996). Introduction to psychopathology. London: Sage.
Lurie, A. (1990). Don’t tell the grown-ups: Subversive children’s literature.
London: Bloomsbury.
138
Malson, H. (1998). The thin woman: Feminism, post-structuralism and the social 
psychology o f Anorexia Nervosa. London: Routledge.
Malson, H. (1999). Anorexic bodies and the discursive production of excess. In J. 
Ussher (Ed.), Body talk: The material and discursive regulation o f sexuality, 
madness and reproduction, (pp. 45-62). London: Routledge.
Malson, H. & Ussher, J. (1997). Beyond this mortal coil: Femininity, death and the 
discursive constructions of the anorexic body. Mortality, 2(1), 43-61.
McLeod, J. {\991). Narrative and psychotherapy. London: Sage.
McNamee, S. & Gergen, J. (1992). Introduction In S. McNamee, & J. Gergen 
(Eds.), Therapy as social construction, (pp. 1-6). London: Sage.
Osbom, M. & Smith, J. (1998). The personal experience of chronic benign lower 
back pain: An interpretative phenomenological analysis. British Journal o f  
Health Psychology, 3, 65-83.
Parker, I. (1992). Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual 
psychology. London: Routledge.
Parker, I. (1997). Discourse analysis and psychotherapy. British Journal o f Social 
Psychology, 36, 479-496.
Parker, I. (1999). Deconstruction and psychotherapy. In I. Parker (Ed.), 
Deconstructing psychotherapy, (pp. 1-18). London: Sage.
Parker, I., Georgaca, E., Harper, D., McLaughlin, T. & Stowell-Smith, M. (1995). 
Deconstructing psychopathology. London: Sage. 1
139
Pawluk, D. & Gorey, K. (1998). Secular trends in the incidence of Anorexia 
Nervosa: Integrative review of population-based studies. International 
Journal o f Eating Disorders, 23, 347-352.
Pick, I. (1985). Working through the contertransference. International Journal o f 
Psycho-Analysis. 66, 157-66.
Pietrobelli, A., Faith, M. S., Allison, D. B., Gallagher, D., Chiumelli, G. & 
Heymsfield, S. B. (1994). Body mass index. American Journal o f Clinical 
Nutrition, 59,307-316.
Potter, J. (1996). Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: Theoretical 
background. In J. T. E. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook o f qualitative research 
methods for psychology and the social sciences, (pp. 125-140). Leicester: BPS 
Books.
Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology. London: Sage.
Racker, H. (1968). The meanings and uses of countertransference. Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 26, 303-57.
Rahman, L., Richardson, H. & Riples, S. (1939). Anorexia Nervosa with psychiatric 
observations. Psychometric Medicine, 1, 335-365.
Rosen, J. (1990). Body image disturbance in eating disorders. In T. Cash & T. 
Pruzinsky (Eds.), Body image: Developments, deviance and change, (pp. 3- 
20). New York: Guildford Press.
Sacker, I & Zimmer, M. (1987). Dying to be thin: Understanding and defeating 
Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa - a practical lifesaving guide. New 
York: Warner Books.
140
Selvini Palazzoli, M., Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G. & Prata, G. (1978). Paradox and 
counterparadox. New York: Jason Aronson.
Slade, P. (1994). What is body image? Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 32, 497- 
502.
; 1
Smith, J., Jarman, M. & Osborn, M. (1996). Doing interpretative phenomenological 
analysis. In M. Murray & K. Chamberlain (Eds.), Qualitative health 
psychology: Theories & methods. London: Sage.
Treasure, J. (1994). The case for biology in the aetiology of anorexia nervosa. 
Psychological Medicine, 24, 3-8.
Ussher, J.M. (1989). The psychology o f the female body. London: Routledge.
Wakeling, A. (1996). Epidemiology of anorexia nervosa. Psychiatry Review, 62, 3-9.
Waller, J. Kaufman, M. & Deutsch, F. (1940). Anorexia Nervosa: A psychosomatic 
entity. Psychosomatic Medicine, 2,3-16.
Walstrom, M. (2000). Starvation... is who I am: From eating disorder to recovering 
identities through narrative co-construction in an internet support group. 
Humanities and Social Sciences, 60(12 A), 42-49.
Wetherell, M. (1998). Positioning and interpretative repertoires: Conversation 
analysis and post-structuralism in dialogue. Discourse and Society, 9(3), 387- 
412.
White, M. (1991). Deconstruction and therapy. Dulwich Centre Newsletter, 3 ,21-40.
Winnicott, D. (1986). Home is where we start from. London: Penguin.
141
Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. Psychology and Health, 
75(2), 215-228.
142
List of Appendices
Appendix A -  Ethical Approval Letter 
Appendix B -  Consent Form 
Appendix C -  Demographics Questionnaire 
Appendix D -  Sample Transcription 
Appendix E -  Interview Schedule 
Appendix F -  Transcription Conventions
143
11 January 2002 Appendix A University Registry 
of Surrey
Ms Debora Diamond 
PsychD Student
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44(0)1483 683811
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey
Dear Ms Diamond ■
Eating their words: A discourse analytic study of therapists’ accounts of 
Anorexia Nervosa (ACE/2001/98/Psvch)
I am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol (and the subsequent information supplied) and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed and 
the following condition is met:-
• That the first part of the title, i.e. ‘Eating their words’ is removed, as it is felt that 
this maybe considered inappropriate.
For your information, and future reference, the Guidelines can be downloaded from 
the Committee’s website at http://www.surrev.ac.uk./Surrev/ACE/.
This letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2001/98/Psych). The Committee should be notified of any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Contd
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CONSENT FORM
PARTICIPANT’S COPY
I fully agree to take part in this study into therapists’ accounts of Anorexia Nervosa 
and I give my consent for the researcher to use the interview material as data for the 
study. I also give my consent for the interview to be audio taped and I understand that 
the audiotape will be destroyed following the completion of the research. I understand 
that segments of the interview may be contained within the research report but that 
neither I, nor my clients, will be identified in the study.
I am fully aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time without providing 
reasons or justification and that my withdrawal will be completely without prejudice.
Name of Participant 
(BLOCK CAPITALS) 
Signed
Dated
Name of Researcher 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Dated
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Appendix C
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Please complete the following questionnaire, which will be presented in a generalised 
form within the research report.
Age:
Gender:
Ethnicity: 
(Please circle)
Black-African Chinese
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi
Black-Caribbean White
Black-Other Other:
(Please specify)
Number of Years in Practice:
Highest Educational Qualification:
Theoretical Orientation:
Therapeutic Setting in Which Your Work is Conducted:
Occupation/Job Title:
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Appendix D
1 Interviewer: Um I wondered (..) how you came to be interested in working with eating
2 disorders and particularly in anorexiaQ
3 Therapist B: (...) well what happened was when I was completing my MSc one of the
4 tutors came in and asked if there was anybody who would be interested in doing a
5 placement or working with people with eating disorders and I agreed (.) I found it
6 INT:teresting so I went along and started a placement in eating disorders (.) I then
7 traced it back to many years before when I had actually done a project with young
8 people who were overweight (.) and I had done some of the same reading and talked
9 about working with them and their weight issues (.) but that is the only connection
10 reallyQ
11 Interviewer: So you so you had an interest, but it was quite a tenuous (.)
12 Therapist B: very tenuousQ interest yes
13 Interviewer: um (..) OK(.) and so obviously when you finished doing the MSc
14 though you (..) it was an interest that was still there because you carried on
15 Therapist B: NO I started it as I was finishing the MSc
16 Interviewer: I see (.) it was offered to you as a post
17 Therapsit B: no it was offered to me as a PLAxement (..) if I didn’t because I had
18 time free (.) and do you want me to tell you how it developed and what I ended up
19 DO:ing
20 Interviewer: yeah yeah
21 Therapist B: (..) well it was a placement at at (name of hospital) which used to be the
22 in-patient unit where I was working with the consultant who was actually working
23 primarily with bulimics (.) he then um he then phoned me one day and asked me if I
24 could do a locum for him in the out-patient clinic as a bulimia therapist in this ten
25 week programme I did that and then (...) there were two two people doing it and I
26 did a locum (.) for one person and then (...) I can’t remember exactly how it went
27 now (..) the other person resigned so I applied for her post and got it
28 Interviewer: right right
29 Therapist B and uh (...) then I worked for three and a half years I was employed then
30 and we got the occasional anorexic (inaudible) an anorexic who was also bingeing and
31 vomiting and then I went to work in the (name of hospital) I was working a lot with
32 anorexics there and then I left the (name of hospital) after two years and people here
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33 find me or get referred through my uh circle or my network of eating disorders (.) but
I
34 also people come to see me or have come to see me who don’t acknowledge that they
35 have got an eating disorder or (..) they find me (.) I don’t know how (laughing) but
36 they creep in here
37 Interviewer: right (.) so so you have got experience of working um within the NHS
38 and privately with eating disorders and I am interested particularly in anorexia um
39 (...) can you say a little bit about the differences (...)
40 Therapist B: between anorexia and (...) or about the settings (...)
41 Interviewer: about the settings yes how you find working in various settings(.)
42 Therapist B: um well 11 prefer my practice because in my practice I can set the time I
43 can set the parameters it is longer term (...) anorexics you work with them for years
44 years and you don’t necessarily have that option in in the NHS(.) I know about the in-
45 patient treatment for anorexics more than I do about the out-patient (...) in the NHS
46 but I suppose that is partly (.) my PHIL:osophy is that as a result of the work that I
47 have done and the consultant that I have worked with (.) I feel that the food issue has
48 got to be ad addressed or else there is no point workingQ
49 Interviewer: right so how how do you see your role then in the treatment do you see
50 yourself your role as getting weight up or working on other issues or a lot of those
51 things are there PARTS of it you would pass on to other professionals (...) how do
52 you see that
53 Therapist B: I was just thinking of the last three that I have worked with (...) one has
54 been very much about (...) she is a bingeing anorexic and it was about containment (.)
55 with her and um SH:she (...) as she worked, she became willing (...) she got herself
56 referred to a psychiatristQ she doesn’t live in this area so she couldn’t go to (name of
57 hospital) (.) she got herself referred to a psychiatrist and a dietician but they said that
58 they did no insight work I would have to continue working with her(.) and yu you
59 know we had no contact (.) she reported to me what she was doing with the others and
60 now she very very seldom abuses the food and we have really got to the other issuesQ
61 another one had done the out-patient programme and so the bottom line was the food
62 my assumption was you are eating food(.) (laughing) the other one and the third one I
63 have finally got her to keep a diary and realised how little she was eating and so
64 slowly I said (...) I laid down a boundary and said you have I can’t continue working
65 with you unless you go to a psychiatrist and I told her(.) there were all sorts of other
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66 things that I wanted her to do (...) very much I set the agenda(.) so my feeling is
67 always that the food needs to be dealt with and with that last one it is still very much a
68 threesomeQ she sees the psychiatrist she sees the nutritionist and I am now part of a
69 team(.) rather than an individual therapist in private practiceQ
70 Interviewer: um so so yes so you see yourself (...) um well I suppose there are two
71 things I thought about whilst you were speaking(.) one of them was that um you may
72 take different roles with different clients and the other is that even if you are taking
73 different roles you would still (.) be part of a part of a team(.)
74 It depends how severe the eating disorder is (...)
75 Interviewer: right, ok
76 Therapist B: like the first person I didn’t feel it was life-threatening because it wasn’t
77 as severeQ this one it is a real abstaining anorexic and I wasn’t prepared to take that
78 risk (.) not that she would DIE or kill herselfQ she wasn’t that anorexic (.) but I
79 wasn’t prepared to collude with the half life that she was leading (.) because she
80 would muck about with her diet (laughing) instead of dealing with the feelings bottom
81 line
82 Interviewer: right (.) so in a way for you it is a way of letting someone else deal with
83 an aspect that (...) of of the disorder that um (..) doesn’t really utilise your (..) what
84 you have to offer
85 Therapist B: well when I was working at both of the (names of hospitals) we
86 combined (.) we did everythingQ the first thing a person did was they got weighed (.)
87 I weighed them as they walked in the room recorded the weight and then we showed
88 them the DIARY and we talked through the diary and then we would talk about other
89 issuesQ so there we did the whole (...) contained the whole lot(.) in the beginning
90 talked more about the foo:ood and less about the feelings and later on talked more
91 about the feelings (.) not the food
92 Interviewer: so is that something that you would work towards as well in private
93 practice
94 Therapist B: no because I only deal with food and I don’t weigh the person (.) I
95 would do a diary (.) as a way of getting information
96 Interviewer: uh hum (..) so I wondered then how you see the various sorts of models
97 fitting together in treatment(.) so for instance you may be seeing somebody who:oo
98 would be referred as well to a psychiatrist and and he would give a particular type of
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99 treatment (.) do you see that as conflicting with the treatment you are giving (.) well
100 obviously you don’t (.) but I suppose what I am asking is about your orientation and
101 how you see that in terms of the other models
102 Therapist B (...) well I feel that any work with an eating disorder has to (.) well
103 usually does contain a behavioural elements.) eating is a behaviour and that is part of
104 why I like to let that part go to somebody else (.) although I will say that the dietician
105 and I especially this one that I am dealing with right now (.) the dietician and I talk
106 every week (.) so I know what her weight is (.) and so I challenge her on her weight
107 and what is she holding back and what she is doing to OUR relationship by not
108 staying at her target weight and not eating the food (..) in terms of orientation I am
109 always (...) I’m always listening to what is going on in the transference (.) I am
110 integrative as far as training but I very much listen to what is going on in the
111 transference (.) I think developmentally um (...) I the influences my influences (.)
112 theoretical influences have been Hilda Brusch (.) do you know Hilda Brusch
113 Interviewer: yes I do
114 Therapist B: and I have heard quite a bit of Suzie Orbach
115 Interviewer: they are quite different
116 Therapist B: they are they are and Suzie Orbach probably less but I don’t know if you
117 have come across a book it is now out of print called body self and psychological
118 selves by Kruger
119 Interviewer: I have seen it yes actually
120 Therapist B: well I just think it is wonderful and there has been some reading in self
121 psychology which I think of and then (...)
122 Interviewer: Kohut
123 Kohut (.) it is in an eating disorders book
124 Interviewer: right ok
125 Therapist B: self psychology approach to working with anorexics (.) so all of that
126 informs my need from a theoretical point of view(.) I ALSO have a supervisor who
127 has worked a great deal on eating disorders (.)
128 Interviewer: do you have a VIEW about what causes anorexia
129 Therapist B: for me anorexia (...) I am treading a little bit on thin ice here because I
130 know that (name of colleague) doesn’t go along with this developmental model but for
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131 me anorexia is about is about is is (...) happens early developmentally(.) do you
132 know Margaret Mahler’s model (...)
133 Interviewer: no I don’t
134 Therapist B: about symbiosis
135 Interviewer: oh Mahler sorry yes I know who you mean but
136 Therapist B: well she talks about symbiosis up until about nine months (.) the child is
137 symbiotically merged with the mother and then separates and individuates and spends
138 the next (...) well first of all it isn’t very enthusiastic about separation and
139 individuation and then is AM:bivalent (.) and comes back and doesn’t want either one
140 and then goes on and develops (.) I feel that anorexics merge (inaudible) separation
141 and individuation (.) they remain somehow still merged with the mother and don’t
142 have a (...) keep doing this because (..) in my Gestalt training this was merger there is
143 no boundary there is no self-delineation
144 Interviewer: that merger happens (...)
145 Therapist B: well they never separate as infants and so they stay merged with the (.)
146 the mother but I also feel that it has to do with the infant’s needs being ignored and the
147 mother’s needs being need being imposed on the infant (.) the feeding takes place at
148 definite times when the mother decides not when the child the infant decidesQ I
149 ALSO THINK THAT most psychosomatic disorders (...) I like to think that
150 psychosomatic disorders are caused because the young infantchild doesn’t develop a
151 language to express internal feelings so they express it through their bodies instead
152 and anorexia is a consequence (.) I’m starving I’ve got to make myself smaller
153 because of the impinging overwhelming kind of (inaudible) all the metaphors about
154 greed and I get bigger and I can’t fill myself and I can’t have my new life (.) so that
155 informs me (.) I don’t know (.) (laughing)I’ve gone off on one of my favourite
156 theories
157 Interviewer: I wonder then about how you think of anorexia historically (.) that if you
158 feel it is the motherchild relationship and there seem to be now so many women
159 developing eating disorders and in fact when I spoke to (name of colleague) she said
160 that 80% of women have a sub-clinical eating
161 Therapist B: [somebody quoted that to me today yes]
162 Interviewer: did they because I haven’t heard it before
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163 Therapist B: yes a sub-clinical eating disorder (.) it is all tied up with body image and
164 how for me (...) I mean if we talk about the developmental model but if you take a
165 societal one or a cultural one why is it Western women and Israeli women who have
166 eating disorders (.) they don’t have eating disorders in other parts of the worldQ it is
167 like the further they come up the economic scale then people develop eating disorders
168 (.) Naomi Wolfe um about women being controlled and their way of being controlled
169 is to keep thin because then they just think about their feelings and they are so
170 emotional and that sort of thing so is that part of it (.) patriarchy (...) is this what you
171 want to be hearing from me
172 Interviewer: yeh
173 Therapist B: (laughing) alright (.) historically women started becoming emancipated
174 after the First World War so the ideal woman was thin (.) flappers aa:and the advent
175 of feminism in the 70s and women began to look thinner and thinner and younger and
176 youngerQ of course in this (intake of breath) all the fasting saints (.) and the seeing
177 visions and also the depriving body (.) surviving on the minimum (.) there has been a
178 constant (...) I remember (name of prominent eating disorders psychiatrist) used to
179 always talk that there has always been sort of a constant number (.) a constant
180 percentage of women who have been anorexic over the ages (.) ten years ago I was
181 hearing him say that the incidence of anorexia has not gone up (..) but BUT you’ve
182 got to believe that a lot of the young women that I see around and about are
183 ANOREXIC or partly sub-clinical anorexia and they don’t consider it anorexia (.)
184 they consider it as what they have to do for their jobs or to be attractive or like the
185 societal demands (.)
186 Interviewer: so I suppose I was thinking about more men being diagnosed with
187 anorexia now (.) uh uh what view would you take on that (.) why it might be more
188 men might be developing anorexia now (.)
189 Therapist B: well there are demands on men’s bodies (.) I was reading we got a FREE
190 magazine today with one of our magazines and it was on fashion and I went through
191 and there was (...) looking at the men and the same pressure on men to look beautiful
192 (.) I actually spent some time recently talking to a young male model and was asking
193 him about his lifestyle and (.) how long he had been in the profession and about what
194 he needed to do to MAIN:tain himself (.) he said that the average career is four years
195 (..) he had been in it for eight which was unusual (.) you were asking me specifically
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196 with anorexia (.) but I know that there are a lot of um athletes (.) types of athletes who
197 are bulimic (.) rowers lightweight rowers particularly (.) jockeys (.) boxers (.) because
198 they all have to keep a weight (.) if they are down with their weight they do whatever
199 it is and then they stuff themselves
200 Interviewer: so are you saying that when men develop anorexia or bulimia it is a
201 reaction to having to (...)
202 Therapist B: it is more an out there kind of thing (.) whereas I feel with women it is
203 an inside (...) it is a more internal conversation (.) men (.) young girls (.) young
204 women have eating disorders or or or muck about with food and young men muck
205 about with alcohol as a big generalisation
206 Interviewer: I wondered if given that we are talking about changes in who is
207 presenting with eating disorders (.) whether your attitude has changed about eating
208 disorders (..) I mean you have worked with anorexia for quite a long time has your
209 view of it changed from when you first started working with it
210 Therapist B: (...) um um my conceptualisation of it hasn’t (...) probably hasn’t
211 changed very much (.) that is because of my way of thinking when I am working with
212 a client (...) one of the things about anorexia (.) working with anorexia is that I now
213 can fit (...) I am very aware of how it is yes it is a separate entity but at the same time
214 it fits into a definition of a borderline personality disorder (.) maybe not a disorder but
215 in that kind of (..)
216 Interviewer: so are you saying that from the time you started you have begun to see
217 more borderline features in people with anorexia
218 Therapist B: w ell...) it is like anorexia to me used to be a separate entity but now it is
219 no longer as much (.) it is a category
220 Interviewer: right so are are you saying then that there is more co-morbidity than you
221 first (.) thought about
222 Therapist B: perhaps (.) that is one of the things (...) I am wondering whether I am
223 thinking about my bulimics rather than my anorexics (.) in terms of (.) but one in
224 particular has got very borderline characteristics (.) it is PARTLY (...) also what has
225 changed for me is I have been (...) I am always quite optimistic as the therapist (.) I
226 think you have to be but I have become aware of THE STRUGGLE of working with
227 anorexia (.) so that I have got to the point where I would say I am not going to be
228 involved with this struggle anymore (.) no more treating people with eating disorders
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Interviewer: so you feel that working with eating disorders is very demanding of you
as the therapist
Therapist B: OOHHyesyes
Interviewer: can you say a little bit about why that might be 
Therapist B: they are hard work they are hard work 
Interviewer: harder than other
Therapist B: oh yes oh yes (.) one of the big revelations I have had WAS with one 
client I mentioned earlier and I said I felt that they had to see a psychiatrist and I 
finally said alright NO MORE no more (...) you know two more appointments a 
month apart and then we’re finished kind of thing (.) she went to a psychiatrist and 
the psychiatrist recommended in-patient treatment (...) she wasn’t going to do it she 
wasn’t going to do it so I said alright we’re finishing then because it was actually 
going into I continued working with her through her in-patient stay but was going into 
the hospital and attending the ward round the part about HER and feeling the 
containment of being a member of the team really struck me because working here I 
don’t have that (.) it is part of the reason (..) it is like I by insisting that the treatment 
continues with the three of us I keep that containment for myself as well as for my 
client (.) it also breaks the merger between her and me because she then knows that I 
talk to the others and she is not included so therefore I have to be a separate person 
Interviewer: SO what you are then implying is that the problems of merger with 
mother are then translated elsewhere like here particularly 
Therapist B: yes
Interviewer: so in some ways what you seem to be saying is that it is the difficulty of 
working with that particular type of patient that has led you to maybe look elsewhere 
(.) but it is very demanding (.) particularly demanding work
Therapist B: yes and it is (...) for MYSELF I really appreciated the containment and 
the very boundARIED position that the team help in hospital 
Interviewer: was it the shared responsibility\
Therapist B: it was a shared responsibility but it was also how they could just sit there 
in silence and let (...) the way the ward round goes is that everybody puts in their 
opinion and the psychiatrist writes down the points that he has to emphasise (.) the 
patient comes in HE delivers the team’s COMBINED wisdom 
Interviewer: reflections
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262 Therapist B: reflections to the client (.) so she can’t split and therefore it was
263 important for me to be there (.) another thing about the containment is that is a
264 hospital where they all go to work and go home (.) I see my clients here (.) sometimes
265 they see my DOG sometimes it doesn’t happen very often but my husband’s study is
266 BELOW they hear the music they hear the rumble of his voice if he is on the
267 telephone they hear banging (.) they phone me (...) do I answer the phone do I not
268 answer the phone (.) could it be a client could it not be a client (.) so there is a
269 possibility for intrusion into my space which doesn’t happen to them
270 Interviewer: and you are also saying that the intrusion does give away sometimes (.)
271 that they can hear your husband or see your dog and I suppose I wondered about that
272 (.) Do you see that as an intrusion (.) do you see that as AS not a good thing
273 Therapist B: well it depends on the CLIENT and I suppose (...)
274 Interviewer: something you can’t control
275 Therapist B: yes but also with this kind of client I feel that they want to possess me
276 for themselves (.) now I will talk about what it is like to hear the noise or whatever but
277 I am then asked LI particularly with this type of client (.) I get asked all these personal
278 questions about mv life and of course I nod (.) not always but I do try and divert it
279 Interviewer: I wonder if you can give an example of say a particularly difficult client
280 in the sense of wanting you to merge (.) I mean obviously I am aware that you have to
281 be mindful of confidentiality and change details and things (.) but I wondered if you
282 could give an example of a client that was maybe particularly difficult in that sense
283 Therapist B: as you said then I suddenly thought OH MY HEAVENS (.) what about
284 this person I’ve been talking about the hospital about and I assumed that I could trust
285 your confidentiality in terms of the details
286 Interviewer [of course yes]
287 Therapist B: so I suppose I am talking really honestly to you (.) if I can make that
288 clear
289 Interviewer: well if you change the details somewhat and then I will change them
290 again (.) when I do the transcript I change the details as well
291 Therapist B: an example of how the client felt merged with me or
292 Interviewer: I suppose a client that you felt was particularly difficult particularly
293 difficult for you
294 Therapist B: ok there’s the one who brings me presents of food
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295 Interviewer: and that is difficult because
296 Therapist B: because I (...) first of all I feel uncomfortable accepting presents (.) I
297 am happy to accept a little something when they are finishing but one who walks in at
298 every celebration with FOOD for me you know packaged food (...) the last time I
299 headed it off by saying we’re coming up to Christmas again don’t bring this
300 (inaudible) it is yours (.) this went on for two or three weeks and then finally I said on
301 the last one before Christmas I said you can bring it but you are I will eat equal parts
302 of it and you will take whatever is left home with you and that (.) she was (..) that was
303 ok in terms of the merger (...) I have just been away on holiday how come I didn’t
304 send a postcard I could have sent a postcard
305 Interviewer: right so it sounds as if some of the difficulty is maybe a sense that you
306 get from a client is that you can’t give enough (.) however much you give it is not
307 going to be enough
308 Therapist B: it is not (..) it is not just how much I give isn’t going to be enough (.) she
309 tells me she wants to move in with me she wants to move in
310 Interviewer: (laughing) that’s fairly intrusive
311 Therapist B: her fantasy is that I’ll bring her to live with me yes (...)
312 Interviewer: so I suppose what I am wondering about this is in terms of the success of
313 the therapy that (...) do you feel that this merger is something you are working on in
314 the therapy do you feel it makes the therapy less successful or
315 Therapist B: I am not quite sure what you mean by your question
316 Interviewer: I suppose I am making the assumption (...) I was making the assumption
317 that a difficult client might be one whose therapy wasn’t (...) you didn’t feel was
318 successful but I may actually be wrong with that
319 Therapist B: Well, I think that the difficult client is the one who resists me and fights
320 because then I have to fight -  I have to fight part of them for the other part. So the
321 way I have been looking at it recently has been that the wanting to get better part of
322 her she projects into ME and then attacks me or fights me, rather than HER talking
323 about these two parts of herself or how many parts there are, but rather than her
324 holding her wanting to get better and my being able to work with that in her. It is like
325 I GET IT. This is something I have only recently become aware of with this particular
326 client. Of course, therefore I end up exhausted.
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327 Interviewer: mm mm yes mm (.) I wondered if you could give an example of
328 successful therapy, where you felt it it had worked really well and (..)
329 Therapist B: [laughs] when I was working with somebody recently who (.) who:oo
330 was (...) got a got a TWO ONE finished, completed her course, knew what it was she
331 wanted to be DO:OING (coughs) and had moved into a flat with people she liked and
332 respected her who appreciated her boundaries.
333 Interviewer: uh:hh
334 Therapist B: uhh. (...) then I really felt and was able to keep her mother or her
335 FEELINGS about her relationship with her HER MOTHER when they met again and
336 the same old thing happened she was able to realise that it was her mother’s (...)
337 Interviewer: uh.
338 Therapist B: u:uh. (...) I just hoped underneath the food was ok
339 Interviewer: mm. Mm (.) so the success was in the way she was able to carry on
340 Therapist B: her life, rather than someone else’s life
341 Interviewer: right (.) uh huh because that is something you have been particularly
342 talking about um and I suppose then it makes sense in terms of the merger that she
343 was able to (.) to move away from that symbiotic relationship with you and develop
344 Therapist B: WELL she didn’t become symbiotic with me
345 Interviewer: uhhuh
346 Therapist B: sh:she and I developed a more maybe she did in the beginning but she
347 resisted it (.) she and I were always able to work (.) yes in the transference there was
348 always well she really trusted me but she trusted me (laughs) she was a little bit
349 separate she didn’t become the (...) LIMmet that this other anorexic I just talked about
350 feels like leech
351 Interviewer: mm mm
352 Therapist B: (..) sometimes I feel that she is a leech and then I am losing my (.) hfe
353 blood.
354 Interviewer: sort of a host
355 Therapist B: yes
356 Interviewer: for her to feed off mm mm (...)
357 Therapist B: this is interesting it is hke I am (laughing) doing some supervision while
358 I am talking to you
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359 Interviewer: well I have to say that all of these interviews I have done have been like
360 this wonderful (inaudible) for me (.) they have been absolutely brilliant (.) I feel like I
361 get a double benefit
362 Therapist B: I don’t know how (name of colleague) works with children with eating
363 disorders (...) anyway that is just on the side (.) I don’t know how she does it but
364 anyway (.)
365 Interviewer: I wondered why (...) I mean you said earlier that you feel that there is
366 this symbiotic relationship from infancy (.) why do you think it presents at
367 adolescence usually
368 Therapist B: because they go through the same thing again in adolescence (.) it is not
369 a symbiotic relationship but usually the job (.) the task of adolescence the way I see it
370 is to separate from the family of origin and go off and do whatever (.) but to separate
371 and that is (..) to me that is where the struggle is(.) so that is where the ambivalence is
372 (...) can I go out and become my own person and the anorexic stays at home (.) not
373 always but if you look at the anorexic girl the woman turns herself into a girl (.) the
374 soft hair and the loss of the sexual characteristics and the drive to be out in the world
375 and to be going from (..) Eric Erickson talks about going from the LAT;ency period to
376 the more (inaudible) (..) going from the latency period into identity and then into
377 intimacy (.) alone (.) you know women (laughing) fortunately go a completely
378 different way (.) to me to a certain extent an anorexic avoids growing up (.) by
379 keeping her body small (.) but I also think that it is about fear of death (.) that by not
380 growing up they don’t have to knowledge that they are going to die (.)
381 Interviewer: do you think that there is anything particularly that brings about that kind
382 of dynamic
383 Therapist B: I haven’t really thought about it often I HAVEN’T thought about what
384 brings it about (..) but I do think one of my clients I feel that (.) I certainly find that
385 when I go away when we have a break I die for her or I am dead for her because I am
386 not available (..) it is not that I am away or that I am not available for a while (.) it is
387 like I am dead
388 Interviewer: so if you’re not there you don’t exist
389 Therapist B: you don’t exist yes (.) it is interesting because we have been talking a lot
390 about this (.) about life and there was a bit from Yalom I am a Yalom enthusiast for
391 his well known (.) the meaning of Hfe (.) when he actually talks about how how
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392 people who have fully lived life are more able to accept their death (...) it is difficult
393 for the people who have only partially lived their lives (.) death death becomes a much
394 more frightening prospect (.) to me sometimes I think of anorexia as a way of
395 avoiding ageing and death
396 Interviewer: yes right so you take in that sense an existential view
397 Therapist B: yes (.) that is another (laughing)another way of thinking about it (.) yes
398 another way of conceptualising it
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Appendix £
Interview Schedule
1) How did you come to be interested in working with anorexia? The client 
group, job availability etc?
2) Is this a client group that you would like to continue to work with?
3) How demanding of you, as a therapist, do you feel this particular work is?
4) Are you interested in one type of treatment or do you use a combination?
5) Do you feel your work is different than working in other areas of therapy, with 
a different clientele? (Prompt: How so? or what ties these therapies together?)
6) Why do you feel that adolescents frequently present with the symptoms of 
anorexia? (Also depending on response to first question)
7) Have your views of anorexia changed over the period of time that you have 
been working with this client group?
8) How do you feel that your interventions make a difference to the lives of those 
with anorexia? In what ways? With ‘good’ clients or ‘difficult5 clients? Can you give 
me an example of successful therapy? of unsuccessful therapy?
9) Why is it, do you think, that more women than men suffer from it?
10) There are anecdotal reports that the numbers of males diagnosed with anorexia 
are rising. Why do you think that might be?
11) How do you see your role in the treatment of anorexia? (Prompts: are you 
concerned with making a diagnosis or managing symptom control or maybe more 
concerned with understanding the underlying issues or even all of these things?)
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12) Do you feel that the different models of treatment can work together to help 
the AN sufferer? (Prompt: CBT treatments with psychodynamic treatments with 
family therapy treatments with interpersonal therapy treatments - depending on 
therapist’s approach.) How so? Can you give me an example?
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Appendix F
Transcription Symbols:
CAPTITAL LETTERS: emphasis 
Underlined words: louder speech 
[square brackets]: overlapping speech 
(.) a short pause 
(1.0) a timed pause
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How Rude Can You Get?
The Dialogic Unconscious in Therapy
The dialogic unconscious is a concept proposed by Billig (1997a, 1999) that links the 
seemingly oppositional domains of discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory. 
It employs the Freudian notion of repression to explain why certain utterances are 
privileged over others and it suggests that discursive acts have repressive as well as 
expressive functions. Billig (1997a, 1999) believes that the temptation to be rude is so 
often and so routinely repressed that an unconscious rhetorical skill occasioned by the 
social requirements of everyday conversation is developed to facilitate this repression. 
In order to examine the utility of the concept of the dialogic unconscious this study 
subjected transcripts of six psychodynamic therapy sessions from two clients to 
discourse analysis. The sessions were examined for instances of clients’ talk about 
politeness in mundane conversations and for evidence of discursive repressions. 
Conversations concerning repression were implicated in clients’ conceptualisations of 
their perceived psychological difficulties. A number of discursive practices used for 
the accomplishment of repression were noted. The functioning of a dialogic 
unconscious was observed in therapy and implications for discourse analysis and 
psychotherapy are discussed.
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How Rude Can You Get?
The Dialogic Unconscious in Therapy
A few years ago, the components of two apparently oppositional psychological 
schools were brought together by Billig (1997a) in the notion of the ‘dialogic 
unconscious’. The dialogic unconscious links the diverse and seemingly oppositional 
approaches of discursive psychology and psychoanalysis, following connections also 
made by Holloway (1989), Parker (1997) and Sayers (1990) among others. Billig 
(1997a) asserts that the Freudian notion of repression can be conceptualised as a 
dialogical achievement and, like all such linguistic acts, that it is both socially 
constituted and that it has social consequences. Freud (1924) considered his discovery 
of repression to be the single most important insight he made regarding psychological 
functioning. He suggested that repression occurs when thoughts, ideas or impulses are 
not allowed into conscious awareness because they would be a source of anxiety or 
distress. Described as the ‘cornerstone’ of his work (A. Freud, 1981), the concept of
I
repression continues to influence not only psychoanalytic practice but also the entire 
field of psychodynamic theory. Billig (1997a, 1999) has connected dynamic 
psychotherapies with discourse analysis by proposing that discursive acts have 
repressive as well as expressive functions. He suggests that conversational 
participants, actors or interlocutors are often unaware that certain topics of 
conversation or areas of discussion are being repressed.
Billig (1997a, 1999) adopts a discursive psychology approach which usually 
constrains discussion of constructs of the mind - like the unconscious - preferring to 
concentrate on explanations of behaviour that are based on speech acts, for example 
apportioning blame, offering excuses and warranting a particular speaking position. 
Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, relies on constructs of the mind to account for 
psychological functioning. Billig contends that the gap between the two theories can 
be bridged in such a way that the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious can be 
usefully employed to account for what discursive psychology has so far left 
unexplained: how actors suppress or eliminate certain utterances or topics from 
conversation without being aware that they are doing so. In other words, he explains 
how discursive repressions are able to accomplish social acts. The unconscious act of
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repression is believed to be created in rhetorical process as a means of socially 
avoiding particular subjects, accounts, speaking positions or acknowledgements.
On a macro level, discourse analysis (DA) can be used to examine how language 
mediates the broad relationship between people and their cultures (e.g. Parker, 1992; 
Willig, 1999) and this approach relies on a Foucauldian rationale. Discourse analysis, 
as practised by discursive psychologists, brings together ethnomethodology, semiotics 
and conversational analysis to underpin theoretically the practice of examining the 
occasioned nature and action orientation of speech in order to discover how social 
conventions are accomplished (e.g. Antaki, 1994; Bergmann, 1992; Billig, 1997b; 
Dickerson, 1996; Pomerantz, 1978, 1980). Garfinkel (1967) was particularly 
concerned with the practice of conversational morality, or what he termed ‘practical 
morality’ and he noted that politeness was essential to the maintenance of 
conversation even when there is disagreement amongst actors. Conversational flow is 
facilitated by the uttering of polite words or phrases such as ‘yes’ or ‘uh huh’ to 
denote agreement or that the listener is attending to the speaker’s speech (Grice, 
1975). This attention to politeness is also referred to as ‘everyday morality’. If 
repression can be said to be the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, then everyday morality 
might be described as the cornerstone of social discourse. Billig (1997a, 1999) 
suggests that where a moral utterance is occasioned, the immoral temptation to 
rudeness needs to be suppressed.
How is this accomplished? According to Billig (1997a, 1999) the desire to be rude is 
so often and so routinely repressed that it arises spontaneously and unnoticed, in other 
words unconsciously, alongside everyday conversational dialogue. The dialogic 
unconscious is therefore comprised of utterances ‘which could well have been spoken, 
but which remain unspoken’ (Billig, 1997a: 141). In essence they are temptations that 
have been unconsciously avoided. Coyle (2000) notes that it is the DA researcher’s 
primary task to provide a coherent account of the way in which speech acts perform 
specific social functions. The dialogic unconscious attempts to explain why certain 
utterances are privileged over others and it thereby addresses a gap in the theory and 
practice of this approach, according to Billig (1997a, 2000). He notes that discourse 
analysts are not normally concerned with utterances that remain unspoken.
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Clearly, the DA approach favours analysis of the externally observable process of 
interaction in talk over explanations that rely on the study of inner processes to 
account for social phenomena. Psychological states and emotions are viewed as being 
rhetorically constituted and accomplished in the action of talk. In this way, DA can be 
seen as oppositional to traditional psychoanalytic principles that suggest early 
childhood experiences - often pre-lingual ones posited to be incidental to the act of 
speaking - are fundamental to later adult perceptions of reality. Freud’s theory of the 
mind, of what is conscious and what remains unconscious, suggests that material 
which is too troubling to the conscious mind is repressed. Additionally, the very act 
of repression must itself remain unconscious and it is therefore also repressed. But in 
psychoanalytic theory there is a gap in the theoretical explanation of repression, as it 
fails to account for the way in which repressive mechanisms operate in order to 
become unconscious. Billig argues, ‘We have to create our unconscious. Unless we 
do something - unless we repress or push aside thoughts - we won’t have an 
unconscious’ (1999:17). He therefore believes that the unconscious is created when 
thoughts are not expressed either outwardly in our conversations with others or 
internally as part of our inner rhetoric.
Freudian theory postulates that the hidden or secret desires of the child begin with 
the Oedipal Complex and that undesirable wishes or impulses are repressed from 
conscious thought. Billig (1999) argues that the focus on Oedipal characteristics 
should shift from children to their parents because it is most often they who acquaint 
their children with normative social practices. He believes that, through dialogic 
exchange with ‘Oedipal Parents’, the child learns what is acceptable behaviour and 
what is considered to be rude or immoral. Adults therefore express their anxieties 
regarding immoral practices to their child in the form of admonishments and 
punishments for bad behaviour and particularly for unacceptable utterances. 
Effectively, the adult teaches the child everyday morality (Shorter, 2001a) and they do 
so often by abandoning the use of everyday morality in their conversations with the 
child (Aronsson, 1991).
From a Freudian perspective, the central task of psychodynamic therapy lies in 
uncovering what has been repressed and bringing this into the conscious awareness of
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the client (Freud, 1938). The client is believed to respond in therapy according to a 
pattern of behaviour established in relationship prototypes learned in early childhood. 
However, the client is said to be unaware that they have developed these relationship 
structures and, often because of childhood trauma, they are believed to repress the 
knowledge of their own defensive functioning. In a similar sense, Billig (1997a, 
1999) proposes a developmental mechanism in the dialogic unconscious. He suggests 
that repression is learned and then becomes an unconscious process. Although Billig 
is an academic and not an analytic practitioner, he does raise questions of whether and 
how dialogic understanding of repression might facilitate psychotherapeutic practice.
It is the aim of this research to examine the utility of the concept of the dialogic 
unconscious and its possible implications for discourse analysis and psychodynamic 
therapy. More specifically, the research aims to study therapeutic conversations 
concerned with dialogic repression and to examine how these repressions are managed 
in talk. Several questions will be addressed in the course of this analysis. Do issues 
of dialogic repression surface in therapy and are these repressions problematic for the 
clients? What rhetorical strategies are used to achieve dialogic repression? Can the 
functioning of the dialogic unconscious be observed in conversation and how might 
this contribute to the theories of discourse analysis and psychotherapy?
Method
Participants
Transcripts of six psychodynamic therapy sessions were obtained from a pre-existing 
library held by the Psychological Therapies Research Centre (PTRC) at the University 
of Leeds. The selection of sessions was randomly made and three sessions from each 
of two clients were analysed. The PTRC is an organisation that was developed 
specifically for the purpose of studying psychological therapies and all clients 
attending the Centre are aware that the therapy they receive may be used for research 
purposes. The clients provide written consent to the PTRC for this purpose and they 
are advised that they can withdraw their consent at any time.
Both of the clients whose material is used in this study attended 16 sessions of 
therapy. Client A was a married woman in her mid-30s and this was her first
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experience of therapy. Her therapist was male. Therapy sessions seven, ten and 
eleven were used in this research. Client B was a married male in his mid-50s who 
was a previous user of mental health services. His therapist was female. The data for 
this study are taken from his fourth, fifth and eleventh therapy sessions. Both clients 
had been diagnosed with a ‘depressive illness’ by their GPs. Therapists had been 
trained in the use of Hobson’s Conversational Model of Interpersonal Therapy 
(Margison & Shapiro, 1986).
Procedure
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Surrey’s Advisory Committee 
on Ethics (see Appendix A). All six therapy sessions were audio taped and 
transcribed by the PTRC using transcription conventions suggested by Jefferson 
(1978) and modified by Atkinson and Heritage (1984) (Appendix B). The transcripts 
were anonymised in order to protect the confidentiality of the clients. Initially, several 
readings of the data were made in order to select conversations that might broadly 
relate to utterances concerned with everyday morality. These early readings
i
monitored the text for instances of clients’ concerns about repressed dialogues which 
included talk about possible avenues of discourse either closed off to clients or closed 
off by them. Repression was defined as the individual or collaborative avoidance of 
utterances pertaining to certain themes, accounts or questions that were accomplished 
in routines of talk and of which the speaker appeared to be unaware. Conversations 
were divided into two broad areas: mundane conversations occurring in social 
relationships outside of the therapeutic setting and those that occurred between the 
client and the therapist. More detailed examinations were made of these passages in 
order to extrapolate any recurrent discursive patterns and themes were identified from 
these patterns. Working hypotheses were then formulated about the discursive 
practices of repression and the implications this may have for discourse analytic or 
psychotherapeutic practice. The final selection of extracts was made on the basis of 
their representation of the data set and of the discursive practices identified in these 
preliminary investigations.
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Analytic Approach
Billig’s (1997a, 1999) concept of the dialogic unconscious arose from the 
epistemological framework of discursive psychology and DA is the analytic method 
normally employed for associated research. It will therefore be utilised in this study. 
The discursive psychology approach developed and advocated by Edwards (1997), 
Edwards et al. (1992) and Potter and Wetherell (1987) is normally reserved for the 
explication of expressive speech acts which focus on concerns of conversational 
footing, speaking positions and entitlement. Departing from this restrictive 
interpretation of DA, Billig’s version permits inferences to be drawn about what might 
be repressed and the discursive means by which this is done. Billig (1996, 1997b) has 
developed a rhetorical approach to the analysis of discourse, which is concerned with 
argumentation and persuasion. This approach examines the taken-for-granted 
ideologies of religious practice and ‘banal’ nationalism (see Billig, 1999 and 1995, 
respectively), for instance. Billig’s (1997a) approach to DA suggests that a detailed 
examination of the conversational interchanges between interlocutors should be made 
and that attention should be paid to the particular occasion and context of specific 
utterances. It is Billig’s discursive psychology version of discourse analysis that 
which will be used in the present study.
Evaluation of the Research
Yardley (2000) suggests that four criteria are appropriate to the evaluation of 
qualitative research, including discourse analytic work. They are sensitivity to 
context; commitment and rigour; transparency and coherence; and impact and 
importance. It is her belief that rhetorical persuasiveness and the impact and utility of 
research are critical features of any psychological work and should be evaluated to 
determine the importance of a study to the body of knowledge. Because the current 
work challenges some of the conventional notions of two established schools of 
psychology - discourse analysis and psychoanalysis - it may be that the persuasiveness 
of the research and the evaluation of its utility will be particularly useful means of 
assessing the contribution to psychological studies. Modifications being made to the 
approaches of both discursive psychology and psychodynamic theory might unsettle 
the assumptions of the advocates and practitioners of these respective ideological
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schools and therefore arguments supporting the notion of the dialogic unconscious 
may need to be particularly persuasive in order to overcome theoretical objections.
Analysis
One passage from each of the two clients will be considered in turn, beginning with 
Client A. In the first extract, the following conversation occurs between Client A and 
her therapist during her tenth psychotherapy session. Prior to this discussion, Client A 
had explained to the therapist that her mother had had a miscarriage when she was 
aged nine. She continued to describe her own feelings about having children and the 
impact that her mother’s miscarriage may have had on her subsequent interest in 
children, and particularly, in young infants. In this extract the letter ‘Q’ refers to 
Client A’s husband.
Client A: Extract If Session 10
1 Therapist: (11) And that really comes about with Q
2 Client: [mm mm]
3 Therapist: when Q is...
4 Client: Because he's the one I've opened up to more. My Mum did ask me why I was
5 asking about this baby business. But it's just like my granddad was, and I had to talk
6 to my Dad. It was something I was really confused about. I knew it had happened but
7 I couldn't quite put two and two together and..I mean I've been like..I've wanted to
8 know for years, I was just.never asked. She said "Oh, why did you want to know?" I
9 said, "I can't remember" She said, "Well you were there", and my Mum couldn't
10 understand. She said, "I honestly thought," she said, "You never talked about it
11 because you were upset about it." And I said "Honestly I can't remember." And I
12 really cannot remember. (Inaudible). I want to remember now, but...
13 Therapist: You want to remember it?
14 Client: Mm. I feel as though it's important that I remember it, but I've racked my
15 brains and I...
Much of this segment is reported speech, a common feature of everyday talk. 
According to Wertsch (2001), when a past conversation is reported in subsequent 
speech, interlocutors are attempting to maintain the integrity and authenticity of the
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dialogue by separating the reported voices. Client A separates her voice from that of 
her mother’s in a distinct and consistent manner and this may be done to support the 
speaking position she has adopted in her conversation with the therapist, possibly as a 
means of warranting her assertion that she cannot remember details of the miscarriage: 
‘I knew it had happened but I couldn’t quite put two and two together’ (lines 6-7). 
Bakhtin (1981), who also wrote under the name Volosinov (1986), describes how the 
invocation of another’s voice acts a rhetorical strategy to support the claims of the 
reporter. Client A is fending off any challenge or suggestion from her therapist that 
she might be able to recall details of the event. Her mother has already challenged 
this, ‘Well you were there’ (line 9), and therefore Client A pre-empts any similar 
doubt that might be expressed by her therapist.
Client A also suggests that there has been familial confusion about what is said to 
whom and why. Both of her parents and her grandfather are mentioned by the client, 
‘My Mum did ask me why I was asking about this baby business. But it’s just like my 
granddad was, and I had to talk to my Dad’ (lines 4-6). Client A is therefore attending 
to the conveyance of this sense of confusion to the therapist and she reports the 
conversation in order to fend off possible challenges by her therapist to the presented 
scenario that she has forgotten the circumstances of her mother’s miscarriage. She 
warrants her loss of memory by not only telling her therapist about it but by reporting 
her conversation with her mother, ‘And I said “Honestly I can’t remember.” And I 
really cannot remember,’ (lines 11-12).
In her conversation with the therapist, the client warrants her account of memory 
loss in several ways and it is to this construction that many discourse analytic readings 
would be most likely to attend. The psychoanalytic literature, on the other hand, might 
be more concerned with other aspects of the therapeutic interchange. One of these 
might be disavowal. A psychoanalytic reading of the passage might speculate that the 
client’s mother’s assumption was correct and that she had never raised the subject of 
the miscarriage because it was distressing, (lines 10-11): ‘She said, “I honestly 
thought, she said, You never talked abut it because you were upset about it”. That the 
client acknowledges she ‘knew it had happened’ (lines 6) might be taken as evidence 
of this. In all likelihood, a psychoanalytic reading would assume that the reported
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conversation had actually occurred and further interaction between the therapist and 
client would therefore focus upon the events as they are reported to have unfolded.
Whilst being mindful that both of these analysis might provide an alternative 
reading of the dialogue, the dialogic unconscious is concerned with those speech acts 
which surface, unnoticed, in the conversation. Because it is not in the nature of the 
unconscious to be fully evident, it is likely that interlocutors will be attending to other 
speech acts when instances of the dialogic unconscious arise. Hence, Client A might 
be concerned with an explanation of her loss of memory while simultaneously 
providing clues as to how repressed dialogues are achieved. Billig (1999) argues that 
when repressed themes creep into reported narratives, ‘this should give more, rather 
than less, confidence in pointing to the possibility that dialogic repression may be 
unwittingly practised in conversation’ (pi25). For interlocutors, the objective of 
reporting other conversations is to accomplish a specific social aim - they are 
constructing an account of what has been said by someone else in order to warrant 
their own speaking position - and not to illustrate what is unconsciously avoided. 
Billig (1999) advocates the examination of the ‘little words’ in order to uncover what 
might be repressed in talk. Therefore, examining the fine detail of this conversation 
may point up instances of the practice of such repressions within the client’s dialogue.
This extract begins after a significant pause of 11 seconds, which often indicates that 
the conversation has reached a transitionally relevant place (Goodwin, 1984). 
Silences of one second or longer in mundane conversations pose problems for 
conversational interlocutors, according to Jefferson (1989). Longer silences in 
therapeutic settings are tolerated, says Sacks (1989), as a means of indicating that in 
therapy the client can have their say. It is possible that in the long silence of 11 
seconds, Client A was having some difficulty in formulating a statement because she 
was unsure of how she would be heard by the therapist. Shorter (2001a, 2001b) 
suggests that parents provide their children with a dialogic model of social discourse. 
Billig (1997a, 1999) too believes that parental rhetoric influences the way that 
dialogic acts will be practised by the child. ‘Oedipal parents’, as Billig refers to them, 
may make certain areas of discussion problematic even when there is no apparent 
reason for dialogic reluctance. If talk about the miscarriage was discouraged, or even
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prohibited, in mundane conversation at home, then it is possible that there was also 
some difficulty for the client in raising the subject elsewhere. It may be that the 11- 
second pause and the problematic moment that followed it occurred because the client 
experienced the subject matter as socially awkward. This possibility seems all the 
more likely as the analysis continues to focus on the fine detail of the client’s specific 
utterances.
Following the pause, the first spoken clue that suggests some difficulty in 
conversing about the miscarriage is provided very early on in the conversation. The 
miscarriage is euphemistically referred to as ‘this baby business’ (line 5). What is 
significant to the notion of the dialogic unconscious is not a fact-based interpretation 
of whether the client’s mother used the actual words being reported or even whether 
or not the conversation between the client and her mother actually happened. What 
are of interest are the words used by the client in the present to make her point to the 
therapist. Why, in her conversation with the therapist, does Client A refer to the 
miscarriage as ‘this baby business’ and not as ‘my mother’s miscarriage’ or even as 
‘the baby’s death’ as she might have done? It could be that to speak more directly 
about the death of an infant or a foetus might be construed by the client as rude or as 
contravening some social, moral code about this topic, even within the therapeutic 
setting. The loss of the unborn child may be such a delicate matter amongst her 
family that Client A can speak of it only in the very vaguest and most imprecise of 
terms when she is conversing with her family. It is also possible that this message has 
been socially reinforced outside of the home environment so that no direct or specific 
mention can be made about this event inside or outside of the family without raising 
some moral dilemma about how the information will be heard and thus whether or not 
it should be presented at all.
According to Silverman (2001) when potentially delicate items are discussed, 
particularly in a therapeutic context, expressive caution is exercised. The expressive 
caution used by the client in this segment additionally marks out the subject of her 
mother’s miscarriage as a delicate or awkward one for her, (lines 7-8): ‘ I mean I’ve 
been like...I’ve wanted to know for years, I was just...never asked’. Several 
conversational repairs are made during the course of the client’s explanation and the
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client begins the sentence with ‘I mean’, which is a conversational device that also 
marks out expressive caution. When such markings occur they carry strong 
implications for the moral characters of those both in and under discussion 
(Silverman, 2001). If, as Silverman (2001) suggests, moral characters are at stake 
when expressive caution is used, it is possible that Client A’s remarks were related to 
implications about either her own or her mother’s moral standings.
The client may be accounting to the therapist for what could seem to either or both 
of them as an inexplicable failure on the part of the client, to pursue a subject, the 
miscarriage, which she has suggested is of deep and enduring interest, T’ve wanted to
i
know for years, I was just...never asked’ (lines 7-8). At no time does the client say T 
couldn’t ask’ or ‘I wasn’t allowed to speak about it’. It may therefore be that everyday 
morality prohibits the acknowledgement that certain subjects are barred from 
conversation and therefore there is a need to repress the suggestion that these topics 
are being repressed. Not only should one not speak about particular subjects but 
possibly, conventions of everyday morality require that the very act of dialogic 
repression should itself be repressed. After all, if forbidden topics were openly 
acknowledged as forbidden then questions might be asked about the wisdom or 
benefit of this repression. The silenced material would then be brought into the realm 
of the socially acknowledged and hence, defeat the primary object of repressing the 
subject.
Client A’s claim that she ‘was just...never asked’ (line 8), is also a way of fending 
off a possible allegation by the therapist that her mother should have spoken to her 
daughter about what had happened much earlier in the client’s life. The conduct of 
significant others normally has implications about one’s own moral conduct, 
according to Silverman (2001). So, it may be that the client was attending to the 
moral implications of her statements as concerns her mother’s failure to explain the 
events under discussion and her own failure to broach the subject sooner. The client’s 
loss of memory satisfactorily explains both why she knew nothing about the 
circumstances of the loss of her mother’s baby and why there would now be a need for 
her mother to provide details of the occurrence. By invoking a memory loss, Client A 
is constructing a version of events that she cannot explain or elaborate and which
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therefore closes down further investigations of who was responsible for her lack of 
knowledge.
Edwards and Middleton (1986) and Edwards et al. (1992) have written extensively 
about the social accomplishments of remembering and forgetting, arguing that 
memories are constructed by conversational participants for social purposes. During 
the course of this passage, Client A problematises her inability to recall what 
happened at the time of her mother’s miscarriage and she constructs a reason - her loss 
of memory - for her interest. What seems pertinent to explorations of the dialogic 
unconscious is that an unwitting participant in dialogic repression, one who may be 
unaware that a particular topic is being resisted, might construct alternative accounts 
of conversations, which are in some way unconsciously constrained. Perhaps this is 
particularly appropriate to studies of claims of forgetting because memory loss does 
appear to provide a plausible explanation for the failure of a speaker to pursue specific 
areas of conversation.
Additionally, according to her report, the client needs to account to her mother for 
her need to know about the miscarriage. Again, whether or not the client’s mother 
actually asked her why she wanted to know about ‘this baby business’ is not the focus 
of this analysis. Of primary concern are the hidden assumptions contained within the 
client’s report of her conversation with her mother. By accounting to the therapist for 
her need to know about the loss of this baby, (line 14): ‘I feel as though it’s important 
that I remember it’, the client is assuming that she needs to provide an explanation for 
her interest in this area, or that such an explanation is morally requisite. Therefore, 
this may not be a matter the client feels able to discuss without offering a reason for 
her interest. The wish to talk about the miscarriage is subsequently said to have been 
dismissed by the client’s mother as being somehow unnecessary because the client 
was there when the miscarriage happened. But why should this be? The client 
follows with an explanation. She provides a report of her mother’s response to her 
curiosity, (lines 10-11): ‘She said, “I honestly thought”, she said, “You never talked 
about it because you were upset about it.” By reporting this comment, the client is 
assuming a tacit understanding between herself and the therapist that one should not 
broach a subject if it stirs up painful emotions. It seems likely then, that dialogic
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repressions are accomplished by putting an emotional spin on the topics of 
conversation that an interlocutor wishes to close down or make unavailable to others.
Client A’s mother is said to have believed that the client had not mentioned the 
miscarriage because she had been upset by it. This statement is additionally of 
interest as it provides several alternative insights into the ways in which dialogic 
repression can be interpreted. First, as already described, it speaks of a tacit 
understanding that if a matter is ‘upsetting’ then it should not be discussed. The 
implication is that Client A’s mother is attending to the conventions of everyday 
morality by avoiding the subject as a means of protecting her daughter from becoming 
distressed. Second, it preserves the Client’s mother’s moral integrity, and 
consequently the client’s integrity, as it accounts to the therapist for why she had not 
spoken sooner about the matter to her daughter. It implies that the client’s mother had 
an awareness that the subject was not being talked about and that she might even have 
expected that the subject would be raised had her daughter not been upset. This 
constitutes a denial of her mother’s interest in repressing the subject of the miscarriage 
and it therefore confirms what has been previously suggested about dialogic 
repression - that the conventions of everyday morality require a denial that a subject 
might be unmentionable or off-bounds.
Client A has illustrated that dialogic repression might slip into therapeutic 
conversations even when the client is unaware that certain topics of conversation have 
been closed off to them. A number of rhetorical manoeuvres are involved in the 
accomplishment of this repression. Euphemisms mark out the subject as being 
delicate and a more elaborate vocabulary may be drawn upon in order to avoid 
specific utterances. When interlocutors are unaware that dialogue is being repressed, 
they may privilege versions of dialogic accessibility - in this instance invoking 
memory loss to account for conversational reluctance. The doing of dialogic 
repression seems to carry moral implications for the actor and also for others being 
discussed and therefore explanations about why these barriers might be imposed 
appear to be required of speakers. This may produce a denial that a topic is being 
resisted or it may lead to claims that the interlocutor is attending to the emotional 
needs of others by not raising the subject. Dialogical barriers initiated in the home
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could be presumed to carry social prohibitions elsewhere and speakers may therefore 
exercise rhetorical restraint in other contexts.
Client B: Extract 2, Session 5
The following extract occurs in the first few minutes of Client B’s fifth session. He 
begins the session by talking about the holiday he has just returned from and the 
subsequent feeling of dread he had upon returning to work. Apart from an initial 
greeting and one ‘Mm hnT token (Czyzewski, 1995), the therapist has said nothing for 
several minutes while the client talks. This segment occurs about two-thirds of the 
way into Client B’s dialogue.
1 Client: And er if s..if s very worrying because I feel it's wrong that I should be paid for
2 doing a job when I'm..I can't get enthusiastic about it. I'm just.I'm just working every
3 day without, .well working without enthusiasm, as they say. Um, and this troubles me
4 a lot but I don't know what to do about it. Um (4) I feel I ought to try and..if I'm in
5 meetings or anything, I ought to try and impress myself on..on other people what I've
6 got to say, but it comes out so weakly these days as I... I just er..I had a bit of a..a set
7 to in a bit of a meeting today because of just an argument about a..the way we were
8 looking at something. And I was sure I was right and the other person was sure he
9 was right, and he was entirely wrong the way that I was looking at it, and it seemed so
10 tiring and exasperating to me because it's all quite pointless arguing about these
11 things, doesn't get anybody anywhere. And yet each person has to stick to
12 their..(laughs) their guns and er to try and justify what their..that they are right.
13 Everybody seems to do this. I do it myself. And yet so much time is wasted by this
14 futile argument that doesn't get anywhere. Um and yet I feel if I don't try and impress
15 myself on somebody else they just ignore me altogether, so I might as well not be
16 there, (sighs) And er the other thing is I seem to get..even now I've been away on
17 holiday I should be invigorated, but when I'm at work I'm anything but. And I..I find
18 that my voice, I feel as though there's a constriction in my throat and my voice gets
19 weaker and weaker and I'm talking like that. And that's..gives you a lack of
20 confidence when that happens, so I just tend to shut up and that's it.
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Throughout this passage, Client B talks about the way that he speaks to other people 
and the way that others speak to him. A key feature of this therapeutic talk is the 
client’s sense of dialogical self-repression and the constraint of possible speech acts 
during conversational interaction. A conventional discourse analytic reading of this 
text might draw upon positioning theory and focus upon the client’s subject position. 
According to Davies and Harre (2001) positions are learned through lived and 
narrated texts and people are often unaware of the position/s to which they have 
ascribed. This type of reading might speculate that Client B appears to be unable to 
negotiate alternative rhetorical positions in such a way that he regards his utterances 
as being heard, acknowledged and of sufficient interest to others to warrant their 
attention. Instead, he believes conversation to be a dialogic game and the assumption 
is, unless he plays along, he will disappear, and that he ‘might as well not be there’ 
(line 16).
That the client has adopted this rhetorical position is of less interest to studies of the 
dialogic unconscious than are the possibly ‘unconscious’ speech acts, which might 
serve to maintain and perpetuate such a position. The notion of the dialogic conscious 
attempts to examine the client’s narrative in order to point up not only what subject 
positions are taken up but how they are taken up. A close reading of this extract 
shows that the client’s sense is that he has no choice but to engage in this 
conversational game from which he will inevitably emerge as the loser with no one 
but himself to blame. He may repress particular utterances because he is unaware of 
how to perform specific rhetorical tasks: ‘it’s all quite pointless arguing about these 
things, doesn’t get anybody anywhere’ (lines 10-11).
The voice that is recognised and legitimated by others is a voice bom of an uneasy 
rhetorical combat and it is a voice that is forced, according to Client B’s account. He 
claims that the effect of this perceived discursive failure is that he is dialogically 
constrained: his sense is of being both determined by it and trapped by it. There is an 
inferential link made in his words suggesting that he could do and say more but that 
this would be socially unallowable and he would therefore be ignored: ‘they just 
ignore me altogether, so I might as well not be there’ (lines 15-16). Although we do 
not know what Client B might say were his other voices to be heard, it is clear from
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this passage that dialogic repression is presented as a central concern in his 
conceptualisation of his problems.
Further analysis of the client’s talk indicates that Client B’s self-repression is not a 
rhetorical strategy wittingly selected in order to accomplish desired social acts. 
Despite Client B’s claim that he has adopted a speaking position that is problematic, 
he seems unaware that alternative positions are available to him. However, he reports 
that they are open to others, ‘I feel as though there’s a constriction in my throat and 
my voice gets weaker and weaker and I’m talking like that. And that’s..gives you a 
lack of confidence when that happens’ (lines 18-20). The question here is not of 
whether Client B actually does become physically unable to speak. Rather, it is his 
apparent sense of being caught in a world that disallows him to respond in a way that 
he might consider to be more appropriate.
It seems likely that Client B’s response has been learned and is now replicated in a 
way that is automatic yet disturbing to him. The effects of self-repression seem to be 
unwanted by the client, whose responses to dialogic challenge arise spontaneously, 
according to his account. It might be speculated that this dialogic manner has been 
developed through habitual practice and has come to be performed unconsciously. 
The client’s claim that, T don’t know what to do about it’ (line 4) are echoed by a 
dialogic manner which appears to prohibit criticism of others, ‘Everybody seems to do 
this. I do it myself. And yet so much time is wasted by this futile argument that 
doesn’t get anywhere’ (lines 13-14). The client suggests that he would like to make 
his point with others and to impress himself on his colleagues whilst at the same time 
acknowledging that his efforts are futile, ‘they just ignore me altogether’ (line 15). 
Despite his sense of being ignored, Client B refrains from blaming others for his 
rhetorical inadequacies, as he perceives them to be.
At the beginning of the extract Client B offers a moral account and assessment of 
himself at work. Immediately prior to this, he said that he had lost interest in his job 
and therefore line 1 might be seen as a way of fending off the criticism that he is 
morally irresponsible or ignorant. He is asserting to his therapist that he is not the sort 
of person who takes money for doing a poor job and he therefore fends off criticisms
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concerning his status as an ethical employee. Although he has warded off these 
possible accusations, he also constrains self-criticism. This is so much the case that 
Client B is unable to say directly what he appears to be implying - that he might not be 
doing his job properly, ‘doing a job when I’m...I can’t get enthusiastic about it’ (line 
2). He makes a second attempt to be more specific about what he is doing, or not 
doing, at work but his utterances are replete with problematic formulations and there 
is another hesitation before he repeats that he is working ‘without enthusiasm’ (line 3). 
He completes the sentence with ‘as they say’, in order to downgrade his utterance. 
This seems to be a problematic topic for Client B and, in common with Client A, he 
appears to use words that are imprecise and vague as a means of avoiding dialogic 
specificity. In other words, he seems to be doing self-repression as he speaks of it.
Generally, speakers show strong preferences for descriptions of events that offer 
routine, and normalised versions of what might be unusual or significant events 
(Sacks, 1992). Client B provides such a normalised account of events at work. He 
has had an argument with a colleague, but he considerably minimises what occurred 
between them: ‘I just er...I had a bit of a...a set to in a bit of a meeting’ and this was 
‘just an argument’ (lines 6-7). There are three hesitations, indicating possible unease 
about how his utterances will be heard by the therapist. There are also four 
downgrades in his statement (see Silverman, 2001) as ‘just’ and ‘a bit’ are each said 
twice and thus the illocutionary force of the reported interchange is significantly 
diminished. This is presented as a routine occurrence with a routine outcome wherein 
the client is left in a no-man’s-land of rhetorical achievement.
Inferences can be drawn about the client’s sense that he usually loses his arguments: 
‘it comes out so weakly these days’ (line 6). Client B is talking about an 
uncomfortable dialogue at work and he is clearly uncomfortable in relating the story. 
Yet, the client has brought the topic into the open. Conventional discursive readings 
might suggest that he has adopted this subject position in order to warrant his previous 
claim that he is ‘well working without enthusiasm’ (line 3). However, perhaps the 
client has entered this difficult dialogic territory because self-repression is a recurrent 
pattern of rhetorical interaction that he would like to alter, but he feels that he lacks 
the skills to do so. It is possible that, in therapy, clients expose the difficulties they
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have in negotiating routine speaking positions because they wish to alter these 
habitual but restrictive and constraining conversational practices.
The client offers a binary presentation of social linguistic engagement (lines 8-9) 
when he presents himself and his colleague as being ‘sure he was right’ or else 
‘entirely wrong’ in establishing conversational credibility. For the client, these 
arguments are ‘tiring’, ‘exasperating’, ‘pointless’, ‘futile’, ‘time is wasted’ and he 
twice repeats that it ‘doesn’t get anybody anywhere’ (lines 10-14). Yet, this is 
apparently something that everyone does and he does it himself (line 13). This 
extreme case formulation, in which everyone, even he is included, functions as a 
means of accepting blame and responsibility for his assumed conversational 
weaknesses. He is also taking on the mantle of failure rather than blaming his 
colleagues for his inability to speak with greater illocutionary force. This indicates 
that conventions of everyday morality prohibit blaming others for one’s perceived 
rhetorical inadequacies. It also suggests that there are strong norms which prevent 
blame for conversational repression being shifted away from one’s self. It shows that 
repression is accomplished through the reproduction of socially accepted 
conversational norms and customs that prohibit the claim that speech acts are being 
closed off or disallowed. This was also shown in the case of Client A whose memory 
loss was invoked to account for the dialogic repression she encountered.
Some features were common to the analysis of both Clients A and B. In their 
therapeutic conversations, both spoke in some detail about dialogic repression. This 
repression was implicated in their perceptions of their respective psychological 
difficulties. Rather than speaking specifically about a topic she wished to raise, Client 
A used imprecise and vague terms when discussing it. Client B employed this 
practice when he too appeared to want to speak about certain topics. Also familiar to 
the analysis of extracts from these clients was that strong norms seemed to be in place 
that prohibited accusing others of dialogic repression. Client B appeared to habitually 
practice dialogic self-repression. He reported being accustomed to it as a routine form 
of conversational interaction and he repressed his speech when talking to his therapist. 
For Client B, his dissatisfaction with the ways that he rhetorically positioned himself 
in mundane conversations was a subject of therapeutic talk. Additionally, the client
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accepted responsibility for his assumed conversational inadequacies, as everyday 
morality prohibits the blaming of others for one’s perceived discursive failures.
Overview
This study presents an analysis of a limited selection of material from the pool of 
available data. One of the potential criticisms of the dialogic unconscious framework 
is that, as in all such analyses, multiple readings are possible. Inevitably, the readings 
made here will differ from those that might be suggested by other discourse analysts 
(Coyle, 2000). For instance, it may be that Client A reports the conversation between 
herself and her mother to her therapist as a means of warranting her claim that her 
mother did actually have a miscarriage. Additionally, it may be that Client A uses the 
phrase “this baby business” because she is maintaining the thread of a previous 
conversation about babies and not because she is more comfortable using a 
euphemistic term. This reading seemed less likely to me however, because the client 
had unlimited rhetorical scope to introduce both the topic of the miscarriage and the 
topic of babies without employing one phrase to suggest the other.
In the case of Client B, it could be argued that throughout his conversation with his 
therapist, he is not uncomfortable in relating his narrative of dialogic failure but that 
he is attempting to elicit a preferred response from him. It could be speculated that 
rules of politeness dictate that the therapist should contradict the client’s claims of 
conversational ineptitude and therefore that the client is inviting a more positive 
reflection about himself from the therapist. However, because the customs and rituals 
of therapeutic conversation do not always coincide with those of mundane 
conversations, I did not adopt this reading of the text. It seemed much more plausible 
that Client B’s claims were made in the context of the therapeutic setting specifically 
because they would invite a response that acknowledged and accepted his difficulties. 
However, these readings may present some challenges to discursive psychologists and 
also to psychotherapeutic practitioners, as the assumptions on which the research is 
based requires modifications to the theoretical perspectives of both traditions.
In addition, it could be argued that the analysis of therapeutic transcripts is 
hampered by the two-dimensional nature of the texts, which are devoid of any non-
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verbal information. However, in their conversation analytic work Goodwin and 
Goodwin (1986) and Schlegloff (1984) have found that non-verbal behaviour is 
guided by, and auxiliary to, what is being done verbally. In other words, non-verbal 
behaviour normally accords with what is being said. A number of conclusions can be 
drawn from this work, which might be incorporated into the bodies of knowledge 
informing the respective practices of discourse analysis and psychotherapy.
In answer to the research question: ‘Do issues of dialogic repression surface in 
therapy and are these repressions problematic for the clients?’ - one of the most 
predominant discourses of these therapy sessions concerned clients experiences of 
dialogic repression. Talk in which repression emerged as an issue for the clients took 
several forms and was reported to occur in a variety of contexts. Clients A and B 
reported experiencing discursive repression as an ongoing process and this repression 
in talk arose as an important factor in their perceived psychological difficulties. Yet, 
neither client offered any explanation as to how or why repression was socially 
occasioned and accomplished. On the contrary, dialogic repression was experienced 
as an everyday occurrence and, to that extent, was taken for granted as an accepted 
and unnoticed collaborative discursive practice. It was the clients’ own management 
of repressed dialogue that was problematised, especially by themselves, in therapy. 
This was particularly so in the case of Client B whose discursive functioning was 
reported to be inadequate in his own eyes.
In answer to the second research question, ‘What rhetorical strategies are used to 
achieve dialogic repression?’, several were identified. Vague and imprecise terms, 
including euphemisms, were used to avoid making specific utterances and opening up 
particular conversational avenues. Partial conversational shifts occurred and 
utterances peripheral to the subject were made. Because interlocutors were unaware 
that dialogue was being socially repressed, they privileged versions of dialogic 
accessibility, and memory loss was used to account for enquiries into a specific 
subject. The doing of dialogic repression appeared to carry moral implications for the 
actor and explanations were required for imposing dialogic barriers. This lead to the 
denial that a subject was being repressed and to claims being made that repressions 
were for the benefit of others. Clients took responsibility for their assumed discursive
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failures, indicating that everyday morality prohibits the blaming of others for 
perceived rhetorical shortcomings. Dialogical barriers initiated in the home could be 
presumed to carry social prohibitions elsewhere, with the result that speakers exercise 
rhetorical restraint in other contexts.
The final research question pertained to the observation of the dialogic unconscious 
in therapeutic conversation and the ways in which this study might contribute to the 
theories of discourse analysis and psychotherapy. This research illustrated that 
particular themes, accounts and questions were avoided in the routines of talk and that 
clients seemed unaware that this occurred as a collaborative process. It also showed 
that where there are partial conversational shifts, this indicates that there is resistance 
to particular utterances. The ways in which clients discussed conversational 
repressions supports the view that repression is practiced habitually and that it is 
therefore a consequence of the functioning of a dialogic unconscious. The dialogic 
unconscious is a concept that could be adopted and utilised by discourse analysts in 
their investigations into those areas of conversation that are closed off from 
discussion. To date, apart from Billig’s (1997a, 1999) work, research has been 
concerned mainly with the expressive functions of speech acts. Although there have 
been some studies concerning notable absences in conversation, these have been 
mainly confined to the avoidance of accepting certain subject positions -  for 
instances, by not answering a specific question (see Boyle, 2000; dayman, 1993). 
However, it is not enough for DA practitioners to acknowledge that certain areas are 
not taken up in conversation without investigating the social implications of such 
discursive practices. The findings of this study help to clarify the rhetorical markers 
of repression, and hence show the operation of the dialogic unconscious in action. 
Investigating these rhetorical strategies would enhance understanding of repression in 
talk.
Other areas of this analysis can enrich psychodynamic theory and practice. Talk 
about discursive repressions was a notable feature of psychotherapy and it is important 
that therapists should be made aware that clients find these repressions problematic 
and would like to change them. It should also be of interest to therapists that everyday 
morality prohibits the blaming of others for repressing certain topics of conversation
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and this also requires attention in therapy. Process notes and recording are commonly 
used tools for the analysis of clients’ sessions and examining process notes for 
evidence of the ways in which clients claim to be disadvantaged by discursive 
repressions could facilitate the therapeutic endeavour by opening up alternative 
dialogues. Studies that examine the detail of parent/child interactions would illustrate 
how parents teach their children the art of conversational repression and consequently, 
how the dialogic unconscious is acquired.
[Personal Overview
It has been more than a year since I wrote this piece of research and therefore the 
comments provided here are retrospective accounts of my involvement with the work. 
Also, I have written extensively in this Portfolio about how the dialogic unconscious 
has affected my clinical practice {The Dialogic Unconscious: The Missing Link or a 
Contradiction in Terms?, p.32). I first read about the notion of the dialogic 
unconscious in 1997 when it was published in the Journal o f Social Psychology. At 
the time I was a second year undergraduate with an interest in both discursive 
psychology and psychoanalytic practice. The former came about as a result of 
academic study on the degree course and the latter because of my own experience of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy, which I had found immensely helpful. At the time of 
undertaking the first degree I found the combination of the two disciplines stimulating 
and exciting but I can’t claim to have fully understood the implications of the dialogic 
unconscious until several years later when I was no longer a recipient but a provider 
of psychological services.
It cannot have escaped the attention of any reader of this Portfolio that I am critical 
of much of psychoanalytic theory and practice. So, why have I so fully embraced the 
notion of the dialogic unconscious, especially with it’s emphasis on Freudian ideas of 
repression and the unconscious? To put it simply, Freud was a progressive thinker 
who, like most of us, held the values and beliefs commensurate with many of the 
social assumptions of his time. Although he was constrained by those views and 
assumptions, his contribution to psychology was great and I believe that aspects of the 
therapeutic relationship he promoted have helped many people. However, he located 
psychopathology within the individual and not within the macro level social systems
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that regulate behaviours. Today, much has been said and written about those social 
systems and their effect upon the individual, yet we persist in applying a dated 
Freudian perspective in much of clinical practice. Because it takes a social 
constructionist perspective, the dialogic unconscious recognises Freud’s positive 
contribution to psychological theory, together with the effect that social structures can 
have upon individuals.
The task I undertook in this research - the elaboration of a dialogic unconscious 
approach to psychotherapeutic conversation - had not been attempted before. This 
entry into previously unchartered territory made for an oscillating mix of high anxiety 
and trepidation tempered with exhilaration and excitement. Hearing Billig speak 
about the dialogic unconscious, as I have done on two occasions, was very 
encouraging in addition to being a wonderfully pleasurable experience. Billig’s 
lectures were more a performance than a process of information dissemination and I 
found his book, Freudian Repression, Conversation Creating the Unconscious, to be 
equally stimulating and captivating. It combines psychological ideologies with 
historical reconstructions and at times it is reminiscent of a detective novel, unfolding 
ideas in layer upon layer of newly interpreted evidence until the case is indisputably 
established. I felt that Billig’s arguments were persuasive enough for me to endeavour 
to discover whether or not they could have any practical application and I await with 
anticipation any similar explorations that interested colleagues might attempt. As with 
any study - but perhaps particularly germane to the Portfolio’s final piece of research - 
this end point signifies new beginnings and raises afresh the question, ‘Where do I go 
from here?’.]
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Appendix B
(.) -  a short pause of less than half a second 
(1.0) -  a timed pause in seconds
[ ] -  overlapping speech 
italics -  a change in pitch of voice 
( ) inaudible
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